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Bertolt Brecht is famous for remarking that the worst sort of illiterate is the 
political illiterate, but he failed to acknowledge the collective effort that goes into 
cultivating one’s sense of political literacy. In reverence to that collective effort I am happy 
to acknowledge those who contributed directly and indirectly to my political literacy. First, 
I would like to acknowledge my debt to the Political Science and Women’s and Gender 
Studies Departments at Union College. During my four years at Union these departments, 
and more specifically the faculty within them have provided me with a superlative political 
education that transcends the confines of a syllabus. Professors Andrew Feffer, Cigdem 
Cidam, Andrea Foroughi, Jenelle Troxell, Michele Angrist, Clifford Brown, and Tom 
Lobe deserve special mention in this category. Special mention ought to be granted to Mort 
Schoolman at the University of Albany for his assistance with my understanding of 
Bergson in Chapter 2 and to Jennelle Troxell for her assistance with a critical film reading 
present in Chapter 4.  
 In addition, I am immensely grateful to my colleagues and friends, although the 
group is not mutually exclusive. For challenging my ideas, providing criticism, suggestion, 
and entertaining my countless anxieties, stress, and concerns, I am eternally grateful to my 
friends that constantly remind me that conversation is integral in maintaining a healthy 
politics. My family I think it is fair to say is one of the largest indirect contributors to this 
project. Their unconditional love, support, and understanding has provided the foundation 
and sustained my political literacy in ways they may not even always support. In 
acknowledgement of their ongoing contribution to my political theory, I would like to 
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thank Rachel Moskowitz, Sherri Moskowitz, Harmon Katz, Elaine Katz, Doug Weinstein, 
Max Weinstein, and Brad Weinstein.  
Finally, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the person that has 
contributed most directly to the political literacy exhibited in this project. Professor, Lori 
Marso who not only served as my advisor during this thesis, but also during my four years 
at Union became my mentor. Her influence on my development as a political theorist 
extends far beyond the pages of this thesis, editing and encouraging me to publish articles, 
facilitating my presentation of scholarly work at conferences, and allowing me to serve as 
her research assistant, Professor Marso has gone above and beyond the requirements of her 
job as a professor. She has always encouraged me to remain both cautious and optimistic, 
and both critical and appreciative. Revising many drafts, engaging in countless theoretical 
discussions, and continuously challenging me to become a more thoughtful and creative 
political theorist, I thank Lori Marso for her example, guidance, patience, and solidarity. 
Continuing next year in my doctoral program, I am confident that if I have learned 















MOSKOWITZ, MELISSA Simone de Beauvoir: Somatics, Aesthetics, Politics. Department 
of Political Science and Women’s and Gender Studies, March 2014. 
 
ADVISOR: Lori Marso 
 
"More than this: if man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it 
through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through beauty that man makes his way to 
Freedom" –  Friedrich Schiller, The Aesthetic Education of Man  
 
 
In this thesis, I seek to complicate traditional readings of embodiment in the work 
of Simone de Beauvoir by positing an alternative reading that stresses somaticism. 
Positioning myself within the tradition of historical political thought I track Beauvoir’s 
intellectual development to demonstrate that reading Beauvoirian bodies within the 
framework of phenomenological embodiment only discloses part of Beauvoir’s theoretical 
interests. Whereas the traditional conception of Beauvoirian bodies largely derives from a 
phenomenological vernacular, primarily concentrated on the notion of embodied 
consciousness, I advance a complimentary but alternative reading located within 
contemporary somatic discourses. By reading Beauvoir’s early interests as somatic I hope 
to disclose a Beauvoir concerned with the body experienced as de-systematized, sensorial, 
visceral, and corporeal. My first chapter examines some of the traditional readings of 
Beauvoir emanating from her own corpus and both applied and critical readings of her 
political theory. This analysis suggests that readings of the Beauvoirian body have been 
traditionally read as ‘embodied situation.’ Seeking to remove Beauvoir from this reading, I 
make a claim about an active and animate somatic body to be found in Beauvoir’s 
aesthetic, namely literary theory and criticism.   
 vi 
To situate these claims as consonant with already existing somatic discourses, I 
investigate the theoretical link between Beauvoir and nineteenth century vitalist Henri 
Bergson, a thinker whose reputation as a somatic thinker is already well established. 
Through a comparative reading of Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s respective essays on 
physiologist Claude Bernard, I contend that Beauvoir exhibits an allied interest with 
Bergson towards theorizing somatic bodies. This early theoretical affinity between 
Beauvoir and Bergson opens a discourse to theorize a somatic impulse in Beauvoir’s work, 
namely in the form of aesthetic political thinking. To this end, my second chapter entitled 
“Beauvoir’s Political Imagination” examines the capacity for imagination as a radical 
sensorial disclosure. Positioning Beauvoir within contemporary debates over sensorial and 
aesthetic politics, this chapter examines the political potential of Beauvoir’s 
characterization of the genre metaphysical literature. The contention is that Beauvoir’s 
treatment of the active reader imagination, animated by the genre of metaphysical 
literature, offers to political theory a rich conception of political engagement that is 
receptive to immanence. Invoking the imagination of readers, Beauvoir makes a political 
appeal to readers not only to acknowledge, but also to engage with, worldly immanence 
and turns us toward a sensorial political experience.  
The third chapter follows up on formal and aesthetic claims by placing Beauvoir 
into conversation with William Connolly on theories of filmic micropolitics, technique, 
and bodies. Drawing from William Connolly’s work on film and technique, I argue that 
Beauvoir’s time is a political technique by which to understand micro politics. I examine 
where Beauvoir’s time diverges from Connolly’s by way of a more specific focus on time 
as experienced by the somatic body. Examining the claim that film helps us to see 
 vii 
micropolitical phenomenon at work, I apply Beauvoir’s time, experienced by the body as a 
lens to read Chantal Ackerman’s (1975) Jeanne Dielman, 23, Quai Du Commerece, 1080 
Bruxelles. Staging the conversation between Ackerman and Beauvoir, I explore the  shared 
aestheticopolitical technique of corporeally experienced time. In the last section of this 
paper, I examine how Beauvoir’s theorizations may provide a filmic interpretation of time 
as a kind of ambiguity and micropolitics, one that is particularly useful in denoting how 
individuals establish and deny freedom through their dealings with time.  
My final chapter “Beauvoir Minds Neuropolitics” considers how through her 
Bergsonian assessment of somatic experience Beauvoir offers something to the renewed 
interest in the potential of scientific discourse in affect theory taking place in contemporary 
political theory. In this final chapter I read the somatic Beauvoir alongside the more 
traditional reading of situational Beauvoirian embodiment to argue that Beauvoir’s holistic 
reading of the body attends to the critiques of cognitive political theory as deterministic, 
ontological, and apolitical. I argue that reading the somatic as a modificiation on 
Beauvoir’s model of situated political freedom, as posited in traditional readings of 
Beauvoir, offers to political theory a model of engaged political freedom that is attentive to 
the concerns of cognitive theories while still remaining concretely political and enmeshed 
in questions of subjectivity and structure. Looking to Beauvoir, we may be able to answer 
a question posed by critics of affect theory, what does it mean to be embodied?
 1 
1| Theorizing the Beauvoirian Body: Aesthetics and Somatics  
 
Bodies in Beauvoir: Breaking Embodiment and Alternative Approaches to 
Beauvoir’s Corporeal Corpus 
 
The term embodiment has come to define Simone de Beauvoir’s corpus. 
Embodiment has become canonized in Beauvoir’s work through binate collaboration 
between Beauvoir herself and decades of scholarly interpretation. The profusion of 
scholarship that addresses embodiment is not disingenuous or illogical in light of 
Beauvoir’s theoretical schema. Throughout her opera omnia, Beauvoir attends to questions 
of world/body relations, by concentrating on what it means to be enmeshed in the world 
through an embodied lens
1
. Her 1949 tour de force The Second Sex queries about how 
women’s embodied situation constructs lived experience. Similarly, her 1970 text The 
Coming of Age addresses the embodied realities of aging and its consequent social, 
political, and economic impact. Beauvoir is also active in ensuring that embodiment is not 
cordoned off into the realm of purely metaphysical inquiry, in 1960 Beauvoir wrote “In 
Defense of Djalmia Boupacha” an essay in Le Monde that sought to illuminate the 
expressly political nexus between embodiment and colonial torture
2
. As a political thinker, 
Beauvoir’s emphasis on the politics of embodiment radically reframes questions of 
situation, experience, violence, judgment, and structural oppression
3
.  
Within political theory, Beauvoir’s theorization of phenomenological embodiment 
is sustained by appreciable scholarly interest in this dimension of her corporeal approach. 
Such expositions have sought to theorize how embodied models of politics contribute to a 
reconfiguration of essential themes, ideas, and categories of political thought. Beauvoir has 
received the most attention from feminist political theorists who seek to contemplate 
women’s political situation and advance a feminist politics.
4
 These approaches centralize 
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the role of the body as a locus of worldly interaction and stress that this orientation is 
underappreciated in political thought. By doing so, they call attention to the role of 
experience and situation as a means to undermine universalism, historicism, and idealism. 
Having said that, relatively few of these interpretations develop a theorization of the body 
beyond a material entrapment of self.
5
 Such discourses seldom engage with various 
elements to material facticity- sensation, perception, and other visceral corporeal 
phenomenon. Rather, they seek to establish the body as a point of physiological difference. 
Even when addressing the most explicit of bodily phenomenon, menstruation, sexual 
intercourse, puberty, the treatment Beauvoirian has received little inquiry beyond 
embodiment read as situational experience.  
This sort of approach to Beauvoirian embodiment is best emphasized by Iris 
Marion Young’s seminal On Female Body Experience. Deploying her own a 
phenomenological theorization of embodiment, Young’s book presents ‘embodied 
subjectivity’ as a political category that develops the allied Beauvoirian goal of exploring 
the embodied factices of female lived experience. She describes Beauvoir’s embodied 
contribution as debunking the essentialist and universalist claims through exposing the 
situational in lived experience.
6
 For Young, Beauvoir’s embodiment is the first and 
foremost component of establishing a situated philosophical approach—in short, Young 
treats Beauvoir’s embodiment as a spatial, temporal, and corporeal location. Placing 
Beauvoir’s work contra Leo Strauss’ articulation of a “mysterious “feminine essence,”” 
Young claims that Beauvoir’s Second Sex show that, “the situation of women within a 
given sociohistorical set of circumstances, despite the individual variation in each 
 3 




 Yet, Young does not continue to make use of Beauvoir’s embodied approach. 
Rather she critiques it for a lack of corporeal attention to immediate situation. According to 
Young, Beauvoirian embodiment, “fails to give a place to the status and orientation of 
woman’s body as relating to its surroundings in living action.”
8
 Young takes up the 
phenomenological embodiment of Beauvoir’s contemporary Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a 
formulation of embodiment more attentive to the conditions of immediate bodily 
movement. Merleau-Ponty, by Young’s account, does not see the body as an object and is 
able to therefore convey embodiment as relatively action oriented.
9
 Through, her reading 
of Merleau-Ponty Young aims to rescue Beauvoir from a sort of physiological passivity, 
but in doing so, reads Beauvoir’s primary contribution to embodiment as an 
acknowledgment of situation.  
Not all theorists of Beauvoirian embodiment are as dismissive as Young, regarding 
the limited characterization of embodiment. Sonia Kruks’ Simone de Beauvoir and the 
Politics of Ambiguity seeks establish a new reading of freedom through acknowledging 
embodied subjectivity’s limitations. Kruks’ reading of Beauvoirian embodiment states: 
“embodiment is the site of what Beauvoir calls the facticities of human existence: those 
contingent but inerasable facts about our lives that we do not choose and yet that 
profoundly shape our existence and actions.”
10
 Kruks makes use of this embodiment to 
evince Beauvoirian critique of abstract humanism and to orient our political attention 
towards “what mainly concerns Beauvoir…the kind of oppression that operates on and 
through such embodied, visible qualities” like sex, race, age, and class.
11
 For Kruks, 
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Beauvoir’s acknowledgement of limitations on experience makes it possible to focus on 
political freedom and build solidarity between individuals while accounting for the 
limitations imposed by difference in experience. Investigating the politics of Beauvoir’s 
own situational privilege in writing an article in Le Monde addressing the torture of an 
Algerian woman by the French colonial military, Kruks makes a case for limited 
situational solidarity as an alternative to neo-kantian abstract universalism.
12
  
Lori Marso’s “Thinking Politically with the Second Sex” establishes the 
methodological stakes of theorizing embodiment.
13
 Claiming that Beauvoir’s authority is 
garnered through a methodological emphasis not only on the facticity of embodiment as an 
abstract concept, but through her own embodied authorial voice, Marso exposes the active 
embodied author as a method of political prioritizing equality and enhancing freedom in 
situation. Marso writes that Beauvoir’s embrace of embodiment allows her to undermine 
the universal voice dominant in political theory and to subsequently expose “the pernicious 
political meanings assigned to certain bodies” and invalidates the “master/slave 
confrontation, as well as the reductive theories of human existence that give priority to 
either sovereign selves or the movement of history.”
14
 Marso’s attentiveness to the active 
dimensions of embodiment allays the objections raised by Young regarding the abstract 
physiological nature of Beauvoir’s embodiment and therefore facilitates a reading of 
embodiment as more than situation. Although Marso’s reading exposes the rarely explored 
active dimensions of embodiment her reading of embodiment is consistent readings that 
stress situation. Freedom is embodied, situated, and constrained, in Marso’s analysis of the 
Second Sex, and anatomical experiences are contextualized through situation, “the meaning 
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The use of embodiment (read as situational) as a definitive characteristic of 
Beauvoir’s corporeal approach is not solely codified by those who seek to establish a 
politics through engagement with her work, Beauvoir’s embodiment has also been 
ingrained as a site of criticism by both feminist theorists of sexual difference and those 
who critique certain bodily passivity in Beauvoir’s work. Most notably, Judith Butler 
critiques the Beauvoirian body’s approach to sexual politics by noting an ‘ambiguity’ in 
the work that reduces gender to a cultural construct. Butler theorizes that the body is not 
endowed with a sense of resistance against voluntarism, she writes, 
To become a woman is a purposive and appropriative set of acts, the 
acquisition of a skill a ‘project’, to use Sartian terms, to assume a certain 
corporeal style and significance. When ‘become’ is taken to mean 
‘purposefully assume of embody’, it seems that Simone de Beauvoir is 
appealing to a voluntaristic account of gender. If genders are in some sense 
chosen, then what do we make of gender as a received cultural 
construction?... Does this system unilaterally inscribe gender upon the body, 





Elizabeth Grosz detects a similar definitional absence in Beauvoir’s embodiment but 
locates it on the level of materiality. Grosz claims in Volatile Bodies that Beauvoir’s 
conception of the embodiment constitutes an entrapment wherein conceptions of equality 
can only be accomplished through an antagonistic relationship to one’s body, an ethos of 
overcoming that enforces dualism.
17
 In her essay “Feminism Materiality and Freedom” 
Grosz expands upon the political implications of Beauvoir’s materialization via 
embodiment, “concepts of autonomy, agency, and freedom—the central terms by which 
subjectivity has been understood in the twentieth century and beyond—have been central 
to feminist politics since its theoretical reeruption in the writings of Simone de Beauvoir. 
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While these concepts are continually evoked in feminist theory, however, they have been 
rarely defined, explained, or analyzed. Instead they have functions as a kind of mantra of 
liberation.”
18
 Both of these critiques of Beauvoir set forth a tantamount case that there is 
something that seems unexcavated in Beauvoir’s theorization of embodiment, despite the 
terms endeavor to highlight the body as a fundamental certitude of our being-in-the-world, 
for these theorists Beauvorian body politics often fails to think beyond ways that move 
past situation.  
Although all of these works make radically different use of Beauvoir’s theory of 
embodiment, they are fundamentally united by an emphasis on situation as the definitive 
body characteristic. Through embodiment, the role of facticity comes to define Beauvoir’s 
contributions to theorizing the body. Work conducted in contemporary political theory has 
produced a reading of Beauvoir that stresses embodied positionality as an integral 
component of understanding political concepts such as subjectivity, structural oppression, 
judgment, and freedom. However, it has inadvertently produced archetype of Beauvoir’s 
corporeal approach. I worry that by continually producing readings of ‘situation’ as what 
Beauvoir intends by embodiment, we have concurrently demarcated a structure that 
occludes alternative explorations of the body politics embraced by Beauvoir. More 
fundamentally, giving priority to embodiment impedes our ability to ask what sorts of 
other active bodies does Beauvoir have in mind? It should be said that my intent is not to 
admonish the work conducted by previous political theorists. In more ways than one, I am 
indebted to these theorists whose attention to Beauvoir and close readings of her texts have 
made possible my b-side exploration of Beauvoir’s corporeal intentions. In many ways, 
this reading cuts against Beauvoir’s own philosophical presumptions. This thesis 
 7 
challenges the predominant reading of Beauvoir to inquire about what sorts of 
supplementary conjectures about bodies surface when embodiment is not adopted as the 
primary lens by which to understand anatomical modes of being-in-the-world.  
Despite Beauvoir’s recognition as theorist of embodied lived experience her 
theorization of the body is scarcely considered beyond those aforementioned terms.
19
 
Through my reading of Beauvoir, I expose some alternative potential avenues of bodily 
political thinking active and animate in Beauvoir’s corpus (pun intended!). By doing so, I 
hope to expose a Beauvoir concerned with corporeal immediacy, namely sensation. This 
responds to Young’s estimation of a lack of concern with bodies that live, move, act, and 
occupy space in active animate ways. My contention is that a second reading of Beauvoir 
exposes different more corporeal investments and that Beauvoir offers alternative 
ontological and political understandings of the body that exist somewhat independently of 
her phenomenological ontologies. Much, although not all, of Beauvoir scholarship locates 
the foundational thinking on embodiment by means of “becoming” woman as it is 
articulated in the Introductory Chapter of the Second Sex. Beauvoir’s strong statement, 
which propounds an essential corporeal fact of situation and a subsequent conditioning 
based on that fact, establishes a paradigm of theorizing the body via embodiment in 
Beauvoir. I query whether this is the only bodily question animate in Beauvoir’s work? Or 
whether this forcible bodily claim in Beauvoir ought to overshadow more subtle questions 
about active and perceptible bodily phenomenon. 
The aim of this introduction is to outline what methods, means, and approaches 
motivate this shift in thinking about Beauvoir. In rejecting these conceptions of embodied 
politics, I advance a counter reading of somatic bodies in Beauvoir’s political thought. 
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Section two introduces the concept of somaticism as an approach to political theory. 
Building upon that, section three addresses Beauvoirian somatic and its manifestation in 
aesthetic methodological inquiries. Section four details the assets afforded to contemporary 
political theory by paying attention to the somatic in Beauvoirian bodies. Lastly, section 
five maps out the course of the thesis and the respective theoretical arguments contribute to 
understanding Beauvoir’s somatic impulse.   
Somaticism in Political Thought 
 
 Somatic approaches to political theory fall into the category of models, techniques, 
and approaches that portend to formulate notions of political bodies. For the sake of 
understanding Beauvoir as a contributor to this tradition, we ought to understand somatic 
theory’s ontological intents and questions as kin to those posited by phenomenologists. 
The two discourses share several concomitant claims, intents, and principles regarding the 
body as a locus of political action and a commitment to theorizing experience. It is no 
surprise that many contemporary theories of the somaticism draw from phenomenological 
thinkers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
20
  Importantly, both renounce Cartesian 
dualism and other ideological accounts of mental primacy as distinct from physical 
entrapment. By contrast with phenomenological inquiry, somatic discourses are less 
invested in the notion of lived bodies as consciousness, subjectively embodied entities, or 
images of a subjective-self posited in oppositional relationship to objects. Somatic 
discourse extends into several less-phenomenological discourses particularly regarding 
questions of materiality as active, immediate sensory phenomenon as structurally imbued, 
and the relationship between cultural and linguistic practices on the material, vital, and pre-
conscious registers of the body. While it may be unlikely to hear a phenomenological 
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argument about the precariousness of the subject in relation to materiality it is not far off 
from the somatic litany. We could anticipate the somatic as raising comparable claims to 
Judith Butler’s central inquiry in Bodies that Matter, wherein Butler asks, “is there a way 
to link the question of the materiality of the body to the performativity of gender?”
21
 
Somaticism as a theoretical method proceeds from the somatic, derived from the 
Greek work soma (sōmatikos or σωματικός) meaning of, or related to, or affecting the 
body.
22
 It is distinguished from psyche and soul as a corporeal, fleshy, and immediate 
definition of the body. Somatic discourse is also a response to hostility or somatophobia in 
the tradition of western political theory. Elizabeth Grosz writes, “since the inception of 
philosophy as a separate and self-contained discipline in ancient Greece, philosophy has 
established itself on the foundations of profound somatophobia… the body has been 
regarded as a source of interference in, and a danger to, the operations of reason.”
23
 That 
being said, somatic impulses can be approximated throughout the history of western 
political thought- discrepant thinkers such as Alfred Whitehead North, Lucretius, Henri 
Bergson, William James, J.L. Austin, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. However, as a separate 
division of theoretical inquiry, the concept of political somaticism is a fairly recent 
development. Contemporary somatic theory has been catalyzed by neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio’s somatic marker theory, which contends that emotions read as changes both 
body and brain to stimuli can alter and bias decision making, particularly our conception of 
reason. By studying who were considered “rational in the way they ran their lives up to the 
time when, as a result of neurological damaging in specific sites of their brains, they lost a 
certain class of emotions and, in a momentous parallel development, lost their ability to 
make rational decisions.”
24
 Damasio’s research claims, “that the delicate mechanism of 
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reasoning is no longer affected, nonconsciously and on occasion even consciously, by 
signals hailing from the neural machinery that underlies emotion.”
25
 Damasio’s discovery 
of emotive affect in the process of reasonable decision making attracted attention to the 
idea of revisiting the body’s visceral role in ontological being. Embracing the body as a 
vital, complex, and contingent factors in philosophical research and political life, somatic 
theorizing prioritizes the bodies movements as telling for social, cultural, economic, 
aesthetic, and political ontologies. Appropriating Damasio’s orientation to the body for 
social and political theory contemporary somatic theorists such as William Connolly, 
Edward Slingerland, John Protevi, Elizabeth Grosz, and Douglas Robinson apply the 
corporeal orientation to their respective projects.  
Consistent with their initial attraction to Damasio’s scientific findings, somatic 
discourses draw their inspiration and intellectual fodder from multiple cross-disciplinary 
sources, contemporary theorizations of the humanities, performance studies art criticism, 
neurological and cognitive science, and social, economic, political, cultural, and economic 
inquiries
26
. While somatic theorization lacks a uniform definition certain overarching 
themes and principles can be more broadly applied. First off, somatic theorization rejects 
the Cartesian split between mind and body. Consequently agency cannot be located with a 
conscious subject, “consciousness now becomes a more modest power than it is in the 
Cartesian and (though less so) Kantian and neo-Kantian traditions.”
27
 Second, somatic 
theorists privilege the immediacy of action as an ontological category instead of theorizing 
reason as an idealistic or realistic epistemological form of knowledge.
28
  Third, theorizing 
bodies with ontological immediacy allows somatic theory to consider the role of sensation 
and affect on bodies as active materially oriented components of experience. Because 
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somatic theorizations of the body are action oriented, they are unconstrained by both 
ideological and epistolary methods of inquiry. Visceral and kinesthetic experiences are not 
mollified by their intuitive and anatomical influence but are the grounds for metaphysical 
and ontological inquiry. Fourth and finally, bodies in somatic theories dismiss the 
bifurcation of bodies as subject and object. Claiming that this binary approach to thinking 
about bodies affects an orientation towards reading physiology as objective, innate, and 
ergo passive, somatic theorization advances a notion of the body’s material and conscious 
dimensions active and action-oriented. This approach to bodies emphasizes a fundamental 
mechanistic materiality of the body as an assemblage of flesh, bones, chemicals, tissues, 
and cells and acknowledges, serves as the foundation for complicated corporeal 
phenomenon. Segregating the brain from consciousness enforces arbitrary distinctions that 
obscure our notion of self and are potentially deleterious.
29
  
 A somatic shift in political thinking orients us toward an active conception of 
bodies not only as subjective selves, but also as animate, sensory, and immediate. Contrary 
to thinkers that claim a somatic orientation to political bodies establishes deterministic 
limits and accounts for a rejection of human responsibility by locating things on a 
biological, ontological, or ethical level, a somatic account of politics does not disavow 
ideological pretensions of self, but helps us to understand their limits, operations, and 
affective properties. By seeing the affective, sensorial, and animate qualities of bodies we 
understand not only their limits, but what sorts of positive action oriented possibilities 
attainable, public, and employable. Such an account does not seek to reconcile the paradox 
multifarious components of self as subject, object, flesh, soul, and neurological 
mechanisms, but mines them to create an entangled and contingent depiction of the zoetic 
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body. Somatic politics discloses the political potential of affect, not as a means to explain 
away subjective phenomenon, but to better theorize the body’s diverse operations, not just 
those available on conscious and subjective levels. Foremost, somatic orientations to 
politics furnish an account of bodies in an active and immediate relationship to the world’s 
structures. For example, Brian Massumi’s attempt to relate the body with virtual mediums 
provides a new account of sensation and becoming beyond traditional semiotic and 
rhetorical models.
30
 Similarly, John Protevi’s presentation of bodies as political organisms 
helps to identify embodiment an embedded “cognitivist subject.”
31
 “The adherents of the 
embodied-embedded school define cognition as the direction of the situate action of the 
organism in its world” opening new conceptual framework Protevi applies to robotics, 
oncology, bacterial infection, and ecology.
32
 Somaticism plumbs the account of 
embodiment rendered as situation to provide further nuance about the affective, sensory, 
and preconscious factices of being-in-the-world.  
I see somatic theorization of the body as closely related to the contemporary work 
of theorists such as Lars Tonder and Davide Panagia, who seek to understand the role of 
sensation in structuring political experience. Theorizing the affective dimensions of 
sensation orient us towards new and somatically allied political bodies. Panagia’s The 
Political Life of Sensation treats aesthetic claims about the sensible as political to illustrate 
that sensation is actively embroiled in not only our ontological constitution but also our 
politics. Interruptions that subvert our sense of continuity “exceed the limits that structure 
our daily living,” and become ethical moments that compel us to reconsider  “how we can 
give value to an object when we lack confidence in our bannisters of judgment.”
33
 
Invoking Jacques Rancière “partitions of the sensible,” Panagia locates the politics of 
 13 
sensation on a somatic level in relation to touch. Our sense of skin as a boundary is 
interrupted by the sensation of touch, Panagia writes,  
to touch as Erin Manning has recently suggested, “is to conceive of a 
simultaneity that requires the courage to face the in-between.” There is no 
impermeable boundary that our skin might guarantee, and yet we insist on 
perceiving skin as a containment vessel. Gender, race, sex, desire, beauty, 
weight, and height are signifiers that correspond to the experience of skin as 
a determinate organ of perception. So it is that with skin we have a partition 
of the sensible that guarantees a series of other equivalences like 
recognition, impermeability, unity, and cohesiveness that are transcribed 
onto our political conceptions of individuality, identity, and subjectivity and 




Lars Tønder’s Tolerance A Sensorial Orientation to Politics establishes the stakes 
of a sensorial shift on bodies more explicitly than Panagia. Arguing that our understanding 
of political tolerance has been limited in democratic theory to either a depiction of restraint 
or benevolence, Tønder relocates tolerance as a visceral and sensorial political action. A 
sensorial orientation to politics is a descendent to “various efforts in twentieth-century 
Continental philosophy, especially those inspired by Husserl’s phenomenological 
investigations and further developed in discussions of embodiment, sexuality, desire, 
psychology, new media, and techniques of the self.”
35
 A sensorial orientation to politics 
rejects mind-body dualism to “generate a more nuanced conception of how sentient beings 
participate in the production of regimes of discourse and sensation.”
36
 Tønder’s account of 
sensorial bodies acknowledges the limits of particular bodies to understand the “relations 
of power and difference,” which these bodies are always posited in constant contingent 
relationship with.
37








Aesthetic Method and Beauvoir’s Somatic Bodies   
 
Although Beauvoir is primarily known for her philosophical and literary texts, I 
turn to the opuscule collection of literary theory and aesthetic criticism to advance my 
reading of somatic bodies in Beauvoir.  Rather than treat this turn to Beauvoir’s lesser-
known work as evidence that Beauvoir’s somatic theorizations are scant and thus require 
far out esoteric evidence, I claim that Beauvoir’s shift from the production of philosophy to 
aesthetics is consistent with her methodological claims about the relationship between 
systematization and experience. In doing so, I argue that tracing this methodological 
concern with experience to her aesthetic criticism makes not only a claim about the forms 
by which political theory is undertaken, but also why at the convergence of Beauvoir’s 
methodological propensities and thematic concerns a new and innovative reading of bodies 
as somatic is rendered. It beseems me to comment on why Beauvoir’s literary theory and 
criticism is a more advantageous source of somatic theory than Beauvoir’s own novels, 
memoirs, and plays. While Beauvoir’s literature often posits the subject in tenuous 
relationship to embodied experience, her criticism most clearly introduces the stakes, 
goals, benefits, and operations of aesthetic method. These essays, often delivered in the 
context of lectures/speeches or published as brief articles in the phenomenologist 
supported literary journal Les Temps Modernes, are Beauvoir’s most coherent expression 
of the formal possibilities put into effect through aesthetic method. In turning to literary 
form, Beauvoir exculpates the positive and political accounts of bodies in a radically 
different way than what is invoked in her philosophical contributions. While Beauvoir is 
not traditionally seen as an aesthetic political thinker, her tendency to put forth aesthetic 
claims as sensorial models of bodies firmly casts her within this tradition of investigating 
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political experience as sensory and perceptive. This reading of Beauvoir allies itself with 
Panagia’s claim that “the first political act is also an aesthetic one, a partitioning of 
sensation that divide the body and its organs of sense perception and assigns them 
corresponding capacities for making of sense.”
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Aesthetic theory and criticism are central to Beauvoir’s account of somatic bodies. 
In the following pages I bring to bear some locations of somatic concern in Beauvoir, these 
moments, I argue are located clandestinely in her literary theory and criticism. Following 
upon Beauvoir’s own stated preference to write literature over the production of 
philosophy, I suggest that Beauvoir’s interest in real and lived experience orients her 
toward aesthetic methods where bodies, ideas, world, contingencies, and interruptions can 
be felt with in concord with the tense and contested agon of worldly experience. The 
feeling of experience is imperative to understanding Beauvoir’s somatic theorizations of 
the body. By contrast with her philosophical discourses that portend to produce accounts of 
lived experience, Beauvoir’s aesthetic turn proffers a feeling of experience, a more fluid, 
complex, and ambiguous presentation of experience, concepts, ideas, and actions. The 
opacity of Beauvoir’s aesthetic feeling establishes groundwork to consider somatic bodily 
experiences of sensation, immediacy, and interruptions of consciousness. Through 
Beauvoir’s literary theory, I expose a Beauvoir concerned with the role of affect, sensation, 
movement, space, and time on bodies and not specifically on conscious selves.  
The formalist shift in Beauvoir’s work from philosophical essay to literature 
resonates with Beauvoir’s thematic concerns regarding systematization and the primacy of 
experience. Throughout Beauvoir’s ouvere, questions regarding the relationship between 
systematization and experience dominate. The ability of systems such as ideologies, 
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economies, political structures, filial association, and cultural and social practices to shape 
the experience of individuals resurfaces constantly in Beauvoir’s work. A system’s 
capacity to obscure experience is linked by Beauvoir with a constraint or denial of 
freedom. Her rejection of philosophical method ultimately reflects her disapproval of 
systems. Claiming that philosophy imposes ready-made values, limits, and ideas that 
detract from a metaphysics that prioritizes experience, Beauvoir switches to aesthetics to 
convey more accurately the immanence, precarity, and fragility of experience. By 
expressing a preference for what is felt over what is known, Beauvoir’s literary criticism 
emphasizes action-oriented perception over knowledge-based approaches. Appealing to 
sensation allows immanence and contingency to disrupt, interrupt, modify, and recalibrate 
her account of experience. Such altercations bespeak Beauvoir’s concerns about the 
precarity and fragility of experience and the mendacity of systems that universalize, 
idealize, and deny freedom.  
Throughout this thesis, I advance that this methodological concern with experience 
as immediately lived, fragile, action-oriented, and contingent as having not benefited from 
being read in total consanguinity with phenomenological concern. Using Beauvoir’s 
aesthetic theory as a guide I claim that this methodological rejection of systems as 
ontologically distorting echoes an earlier Bergsonian impulse in Beauvoir’s work. 
Bergson’s interest in perception as an action-oriented phenomenon and not as a form of 
epistemological knowledge resounds in Beauvoir’s aesthetic accounts of sensation, 
reading, and imagination in metaphysical literature. Both Bergson and Beauvoir’s 
apprehension regarding the relationship between systems and experience motivates a 
methodological orientation towards the immediate, contingent, and sensible. I will also 
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contend that this aesthetic interest in experience read as such leads her to produce a 
somatic account of political bodies that renders a contrary depiction of the relationship 
between embodied experience, subjectivity, and political structure. 
Beauvoir’s Somatic Bodies Re-Thinking Becoming  
 
 Aside from providing a rejoinder to theorists who critique Beauvoir for a lack of 
attention to the physiology of the body as more than situation, examining Beauvoir as a 
somatic political thinker provides a unique perspective on her theoretical contribution. 
Stressing the somatic in Beauvoir’s orientation to bodies divulges a new Beauvoir 
accompanied with distinct, in some cases antithetic, bodily priorities. In some cases, her 
queries, skepticism, and ethical commitments are analogous to those stressed in traditional 
readings of Beauvorian bodies. In other cases, a somatic approach better attends to axioms 
and methodological imperatives of Beauvoir’s thoughts.  
 My reading of somaticism in Beauvoir emphasizes four interrelated somatic 
concerns. 1) There is no distinction between mind and body. Dualism does not account for 
the nebulous and corporeal experience of the body. 2) A somatic approach to political 
bodies embraces the immediacy and corporeal dimensions of action. It does not seek to 
depict action as a mediated and contemplative operation emanating solely from ones 
mental faculties or sense of self. In doing so action is read through the all-important 
Beauvoiran lens of experience. 3) Beauvoir’s somatic approach places a premium on 
perception as an action oriented experience that acclimatizes and adjusts our senses of the 
world. This breaks with theorists who endeavor to know the world through perceiving it. 4) 
Somaticism seeks to engage in the world as a nebulous and desystematized assemblage. It 
challenges the conception that any uniform dictum on experience can be applied to 
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understanding the world. This includes but is not limited to deterministic, historicized, 
essentialized, and idealistic accounts of being. 
All of these somatic precepts are tied together through a concern with contingent, 
interrupted, and fluid conceptions of politics. They iterate Beauvoir’s enduring concern 
with experience and systematization, in all of its forms, ability to dictate experience, 
provide false senses of continuity, and deny the ambiguous components of lived 
experience. A somatic Beauvoir is attentive to sensorial and perceptory moments that 
interrupt images of experience as continuous and uninterrupted. In this way the somatic 
body poses a challenge to ideologized, historicized, deterministic, and universalized 
models of politics. Embodiment as it is traditionally read in Beauvoir, is not always 
consistent with the dystematized, immediate, and sensosory presentation of bodies in 
Beauvoir’s work. Phenomenological approaches to Beauvoir that have been rendered as 
situation, although highly critical of Cartesian dualism and a separation of self from body, 
nonetheless ascribe certain privileges on a consciousness that formulates a hierarchical 
relationship between the self and the body and the self and the world. For this reason, 
many critics of Beauvoir have noticed the tension between her total rejection of systems 
and her application of the phenomenological system of self/other, subject/object, one/other, 
immanence/transcendence onto all dimensions of experience.  
 Foremost, what is at stake in reading bodies somatically is a sense of what it means 
to be embodied beyond being located in a particular corpus. Somatic reading of Beauvoir 
turn to her most fundamental question on ‘becoming’ and reanimate this experiential 
discourse with notions of movement, immediacy, flesh, perception, and sensation. By 
doing so, they venture to establish immediate sensory phenomenon as tactile, kinesthetic, 
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and most importantly, integral to the composition of the world. In some instances, I show 
that the somatic better attends to an account of Beauvoir’s ambiguity and that at the least, 
attending to a somatic Beauvoir enhances our understanding of the multifarious parts that 
constitute Beauvoir’s politics of ambiguity, challenging the conception that bodies in 
Beauvoir’s ambiguity are not merely subjects embodied by situation. 
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Toward a Theory of Somatic Bodies in Beauvoir’s Aesthetics  
  
 In keeping with Beauvoir’s own interdisciplinary theoretical approach, this thesis 
employs an assortment of cross-disciplinary literature and engages in theoretical 
conversation with a variety of forms, mediums, and genres. Pulling from the cognitive 
sciences, aesthetic criticism, film theory, and political theory I mobilize a theory of active 
somatic bodies in the Beauvoir, and consider how this conception provides a new outlook 
of bodies for contemporary political theory. The ambition of the next four chapters is to 
illustrate the intimate link between Beauvoir’s overarching methodological concerns, her 
aesthetic criticism, and her account of somatic bodies.  
 In chapter 2, I place Beauvoir in conversation with her early philosophical 
interlocutor Henri Bergson.  This chapter entitled “Beauvoir and Bergson: knowledge, 
bodies, and somatic approaches to politics” contends that Beauvoir’s interconnected 
exploration of experience, science, and philosophy contains a deeper Bergsonian claim 
about somatic political experience. A comparative reading of Henri Bergson and Simone 
de Beauvoir’s respective analyses of mid-nineteenth century French physiologist Claude 
Bernard discloses methodological similarities between the two thinkers by way of a shared 
critique of idealized and realistic knowledge as systematizing approaches. I argue that in 
both their assessments of Bernard’s philosophy a rejection of systematization and a 
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preference for philosophy of experience excavates a somatic and sensorial model of 
political action. Linking this postulation with some of Bergson’s claims in Matter and 
Memory reveals an active somaticism Beauvoir’s thought, often obscured by what is 
wrongly assumed as a dogmatic emphasis on the idea of consciousness. Examining 
Bergson’s theories of the body as a center for action and perception as a bodily action, 
offers a new theoretical paradigm to consider the somatic in Beauvoir’s bodies. This 
mutual theorization of the limits of knowledge and systems, I argue, provides the 
groundwork for a theoretical transition toward the aestheticopolitical in Beauvoir’s literary 
criticism. This chapter also reevaluates the portrayal of Bergson’s philosophical influence 
on Beauvoir. Rather than read Bergson as a figure who modifies Beauvoir’s later-formed 
phenomenological outlook on the self, I want to explore the ways in which Beauvoir 
submits an analogous reading of the body, one that hinges on the precariousness of the 
subject and body. 
Picking up on the limits of knowledge and perception as a bodily phenomenon, I 
consider Beauvoir’s literary criticism a wellspring for somaticism. Positioning Beauvoir 
within contemporary debates over sensorial and aesthetic politics, chapter 3, “Beauvoir’s 
Political Imagination” examines the political potential of Beauvoir’s characterization of the 
genre metaphysical literature. The contention is that Beauvoir’s treatment of the active 
reader imagination, animated by the genre of metaphysical literature, offers to political 
theory a rich conception of political engagement that is receptive to immanence. 
Metaphysical literature potentially provides a model for political life as it draws the reader 
into an imaginary world wherein she experiences the multiple temporalities, ambiguities, 
disruptions and contingencies that characterize life, and does so through the engagement of 
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her own imaginary capacity. Invoking the imagination of readers, Beauvoir makes a 
political appeal to readers not only to acknowledge, but also to engage with, worldly 
immanence and turns us toward a sensorial political experience. Imagination draws our 
attention to the perceptory action involved in making sense and serves to highlight the 
impermanence and vicissitudes of our experience as readerly subjects. When employing 
our imaginations, we open ourselves to affects and interruptions that threaten the certitude 
of ourselves. To make the claim that Beauvoir’s imagination articulates a sensory and 
somatic model of politics, I contrast it with Sartre’s reading of detotalized totality and the 
imagination. I also consult contemporary theorists of the imagination such as Linda Zerilli, 
Jason Frank, and Martha Nussbaum, to situate Beauvoir’s imaginary contributions within 
the larger debate on the imagination as a political apparatus and action.  
Two major features distinguish part one (chapters 2, 3) from part two (chapters 4, 
5). First, a methodological turn occurs between historical analyses to contemporary 
utilization. Having located and articulated the domain of somaticism and somatic concerns 
in Beauvoir’s earlier work, Chapters 4 and 5 switch from the conduct of historical political 
inquiry to the application of Beauvoir’s somatic outlook in some pressing debates in 
contemporary political theory. Second, chapters 4 and 5, however ambitiously, attempt an 
integration of Beauvoir’s somatic concerns alongside her more ethically oriented embodied 
situation. Noting that in Beauvoir’s actual work, the distinction between these two 
approaches is often unclear and that more often than not she strives to integrate them, 
chapters 3 and 4 aim to read both approaches together while at the same time. The 
contention is that reading both versions together results in a reading more accurate to 
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Beauvoir’s multidimensional style, one more useful for political and theoretical 
commitments.   
 Chapter 4, entitled “Using The Second Sex for Film Analysis: Corporeal Time, 
Technique, and Ambiguity,” continues with Beauvoir’s reading of somaticism in aesthetic 
mediums by considering time experienced somatically as a filmic technique. This chapter 
stages two conversations. The first dialogue occurs between Beauvoir and contemporary 
political theorists working on film. Attending to the lack of specific attention given to 
animate bodies in political film theory, the chapter places Beauvoir’s technical reading of 
bodies that experience time into conversation with the recent endeavors in film and 
political theory that interpret the relationship between the technical components of 
filmmaking and micropolitics. I argue that Beauvoir’s somatic account of time experienced 
and sensed by the body challenges conventional readings of time. Additionally, Beauvoir 
makes a contribution to this affective model of theorizing filimic micropolitics through her 
analysis corporeal experience as micropolitical phenomenon. At the same time, Beauvoir 
points to the immanent components of time refusing a definition of time that is 
understandable or rational. Drawing from William Connolly’s work on film and technique, 
I argue that Beauvoir’s time is a political technique by which to understand micropolitics. 
In the last section of this paper, I will examine how Beauvoir’s theorizations may provide a 
filmic interpretation of time as a kind of ambiguity and micropolitics, one that is 
particularly useful in denoting how individuals establish and deny freedom through their 
dealings with time. To do so, I will consider how Beauvoir’s political time operates as a 
technique in Chantal Ackerman’s Jeanne Dielman, 23, quai de Commerce 1080 Bruxelles. 
The second conversation takes place between the somatic reading of Beauvoir expounded 
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in previous chapters and the Beauvoir’s phenomenological magnum opus, The Second Sex. 
In this chapter, I revisit the Second Sex’s traditional interpretation of the exposition on 
embodiment and undertake a reading of the Second Sex that is more sympathetic to a 
somatic Beauvoir.  
 Returning to the scientific inquiries that inaugurated an examination of Beauvoir as 
a somatic political thinker, “Beauvoir Minds Neuroscience” examines what contributions 
both critical and positive Beauvoir has to make by way of not only her immediate, 
sensorial, action-oriented somaticism but also her traditional theorization of embodiment 
as situated freedom. Contemporizing Beauvoir, I place her into the current debate over 
affect theory’s, particularly the strain that employs cognitive and neurological science, 
utility in creating new theories of politics and political bodies. Engaging with the 
neuropolitical theorists and their critics, I conclude not by advancing the somatic Beauvoir 
over the Beauvoir that makes use of situated view of bodies, but by combining both 
readings. Amalgamating these two conceptions of the body, we gain a more holistic sense 
of Beauvoir’s corporeal politics. Furthermore, reading these Beauvoirs in cooperation 
offers a rejoinder to critics of affect theory who deride its determinism, desituatedness, or 
apolitical turn to ontology while still producing a positive account of somaticism in the 
concept of situated political freedom.  
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2 | Beauvoir and Bergson: knowledge, bodies, and somatic 
approaches to politics 
 
“In no age has science considered itself as partial and lacunary; without believing itself to 
be definitive, it has however, always wanted to be a total expression of the world, and it is 
in its totality that in each age it again raises the question of its own validity”- Simone de 
Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity 
 
Introduction 
In her Memoirs, Beauvoir famously rejects the philosophical methodology of 
Bergson in favor of literature as terrain for metaphysical inquiry and politics. She writes: “I 
toyed with the idea of writing; I preferred literature to philosophy, and I wouldn’t have 
been pleased at all if someone had prophesized that I would become a kind of female 
Bergson; I didn’t want to speak with that abstract voice which, whenever I heard it, failed 
to move me
40
”. Although Beauvoir’s claim seems like a total repudiation of philosophy, 
Beauvoir never ceased to partake in philosophical discourse. In this claim, Beauvoir 
exposes her affinities for a philosophical method that restrains from the use of abstraction 
but not from the practice of philosophy at large. In the sentence that follows Beauvoir 
claims that she “wanted to communicate my experience” (MDD, Beauvoir, 208). In this 
chapter I will draw out Beauvoir’s skepticism on philosophical abstraction and claim that 
Beauvoir’s agnosticism toward philosophy and Bergson ironically discloses 
methodological similarities between the two thinkers. By examining the influence 
Bergson’s empirical methodological disquisition had on Beauvoir, I wish to suggest that 
Beauvoir’s rejection of idealistic and realistic models of knowledge, read here as abstract, 
contribute to her emphasis on the body as a singularly perceptive agent and not solely a 
traditional exemplification of phenomenological consciousness.   
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 To establish the methodological similarities between Bergson and Beauvoir, I turn 
to their respective writings on French physiologist Claude Bernard.
41
 Bernard’s 
interventions into debates on vitalism and scientific method garnered attention from both 
Beauvoir and Bergson for their receptiveness to an experiential metaphysical outlook, their 
rejection of mind/body dualism, and a methodological affinity for lived reality. While the 
intellectual association between Bernard and Bergson is well established, Beauvoir’s 
theoretical relationship to the sensorial scientific approach has been under evaluated. As 
thinkers invested in the relationship between bodies and experience, both Beauvoir and 
Bergson offer insight into the active dimensions of bodily politics. I want to suggest that 
the primacy of experience and the acknowledgement of experienced limits lead Beauvoir 
and Bergson to not only make comparable claims about the methods by which philosophy 
is conducted, but to practice philosophy themselves with methodological similarities. 
These two parts of Bernard’s philosophical outlook are shepherding principles that move 
Bergson and Beauvoir from the abstract towards a bodily politics.  
This chapter is driven by two interrelated theoretical ambitions. The first is a 
historical claim that establishes the relationship between Bergson and Beauvoir beyond 
that of an early philosophical influence. Through examining the mutual points made by 
Beauvoir and Bergson related to Bernard, I claim that Beauvoir’s methodological turn to 
immediate experience echoes Bergson’s notion of experiential perception. Demonstrating 
these relationships I posit a somatic-political claim about the use of bodies as a shared 
methodological approach born out of the rejection of abstract disembodied notions of 
knowledge and being. This holds political significance, I’ll argue, because it diversifies 
Beauvoir’s use of the body to portend to phenomenological experience and gestures us 
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towards a somatic reading of Beauvoirian politics. As I demonstrated in the introductory 
chapter, Beauvoir’s potential to theorize the body as an active, perceptive, and fluid 
component of political life has been under utilized.  
In what follows, I place Beauvoir and Bergson into conversation on the notion of a 
somatic political experience. The first section theorizes the importance of immediacy and 
experience as a critique of abstract knowledge through an examination of Bernard. Section 
two examines Beauvoir’s philosophical method in light of Bergson’s critique of realist and 
idealist models of perception in his seminal Matter and Memory. Drawing from Bergson’s 
claim that these paradigms are united by a reduction of perception and knowledge and not 
action based, I venture that this similarity not only alters how Beauvoir’s Bergsonian 
influence has been traditionally understood, but also opens the possibility of a critique of 
Beauvoir’s notion of phenomenological consciousness. Consequently, this allows for a 
consideration of the active body in Beauvoirian politics. In the final portion of this paper, I 
will consider how Beauvoir through her Bergsonian assessment of somatic experience in 
Bernard offers something to the renewed interest in an action-oriented model of political 
bodies. Looking to Beauvoir, we may be able to answer a question posed by critics of 
affect theory and the neuro-bio-logical, what does it mean to be embodied?
42
  
The Somatic: Between Knowledge and Bodies  
  
Beauvoir has become a prominent thinker on bodies for feminist theorists looking 
to centralize the body as a component of gender and sexual politics. Beauvoir has been 
both denigrated and celebrated for her analysis of the female body. Particularly feminists 
who desire to read the body outside of its biological objectivism have adopted her 
phenomenological approach. Iris Marion Young, for example, looks to Beauvoir to 
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exculpate the body as a subjective corporeal consciousness that is in constant relation to 
the conditioning of situation, primarily, class, race, and gender. At the same time Beauvoir 
has been criticized for what is assumed to be an antithetical position toward sexual 
difference ensconced in female body. In spite of abundant attention given to Beauvoir as a 
theorist of embodiment, an ironic lack of examination has been done to define precisely 
what is meant by Beauvoir’s theorization of the body. This chapter is an attempt to rectify 
the dearth of serious investigation of Beauvoirian body-politics. These contrasting 
interpretations are united in their neglect of the creative and vital elements of the 
Beauvoir’s description of the body.  
Thus, this chapter posits a question as to whether Beauvoir’s articulation of the 
body as a component of a subjective embodied consciousness is undermined, if only 
momentarily, by a alternative theorizations of bodily action, movement, and perception. If 
it is challenged in particular instances by a more vital and material articulation, which I 
will argue it in fact is, what sorts of political configurations of the body are now accessible 
to us through Beauvoir’s analysis? Part of this chapter’s intention is to challenge the 
underlying presumption that Beauvoir is not invested in somatic philosophical discourses. 
By suggesting that her concentration on the body supersedes the orthodox 
phenomenological definition of bodies, I want to render a new idea of perception as a 





The complexity of Beauvoir’s corporeal politics is evidenced by a strong somatic 
impulse in her work. I use the term somatic to express a model of bodily politics that 
fundamentally rejects mind/body dualism. In doing so it considers embodiment to be an 
immediate phenomenon, it refuses an understanding of the body as an a prori to 
consciousness. Drawing from affect theory, it portends that kinesthetic experience affects 
both the body and mind in a visceral and simultaneous manner. Somatic markers, studied 
by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and political theorist William Connolly, suggest that a 
loss of affective and sensorial indicators, such as olfactory, visual, and audible, 
dramatically alters our sense of being, in spite of fully functional analytical reasoning.
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This follows on Edward Slingerland’s implementation of somatic theory into cognitive 
linguistics, which portends-- “the primary purpose of achieving human scale is not to help 
us apprehend a situation, but rather to help us to know how to feel about it.”
44
 Connolly 
defines the somatic marker’s political definition as “a culturally mobilized, corporeal 
disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary orientations to perception and 
judgment scale down the material factored into cost-benefit analyses, principled 
judgments, and reflective experiments.”
45
 By turning away from rationalism and 
knowledge, perception is complicated in Beauvoir by attention to proto-conscious bodily 
phenomenon.
46
 This ought not be read as an apolitical claim about determinacy or an 
excuse of responsibility, but as Connolly suggests as a reminder of inter-subjective 
limitation and a factor that begets inclusion into our thinking about political phenomenon.  
Once somatic markers are added to your ledger, both rational-choice theory 
and the reduction of culture to an underplayed set of intersubjective 
concepts and beliefs are thrown into jeopardy. Culturally preorganized 
charges shape perception and judgment in ways that exceed the picture of 
the world supported by the models of calculative reason, intersubjective 
culture, and deliberative democracy. They show us how linguistically 
 29 
complex brain regions respond not only to events in the world but also, 
proprioceptively, to cultural habits, skills, memory traces, and affects mixed 




Much work has already been conducted to establish the link between Bergsonianism and 
affective somatic discourses.
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 This chapter’s intent is not to further prove Bergson’s 
preemptive relation to somaticism, but to consider how Beauvoir’s somatic moments are 
motivated by Bergsonian methodological affinity for thinking about immediacy and 
experience as philosophical and political. For Beauvoir, the question of somaticism is 
intimately related to knowledge as experiential, a contention that heavily resembles 
Bergson.  
 Returning to Beauvoir’s statement illustrating a preference for literature and 
aesthetic politics, the question arises, why turn to an early writing of Beauvoir’s on 
Bernard’s physiology. By comparing Beauvoir’s appraisal of Bernard with that of 
Bergson’s, the contention is that Beauvoir’s receptiveness to experience, sensation, and 
affect is an instance where Bergson’s initial philosophical footprint is visible in Beauvoir’s 
later aesthetic work. The question of seeing and feeling experience, intangible and 
unavailable to a philosophical discourse, translates into her aesthetic works and 
consequently remains a central component of her politics. Following Margaret Simons’ 
claim that “the essay on Claude Bernard provides unique evidence of one of Beauvoir’s 
early philosophical awakenings, while also shedding light, as we shall argue, on the 
development of her philosophical methodology, subjects that receive a cursory and 
sometimes misleading treatment in he Memoirs.”
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 In what follows, I suggest Bergson’s 
and Beauvoir’s criticism of abstract intelligence and shared methodological approach 




Methodological Inquiry as Experience 
 
 Bergson writes, “What philosophy owes above all to Claude Bernard is the theory 
of experimental method.
51
” One important point that unites Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s 
attempts to extract philosophical value from Bernard’s writings is a shared concentration 
on the role and content of methodology. Bergson’s and Beauvior’s interest in Bernard’s 
methodology is twofold. Both thinkers are concerned with the significance of Bernard’s 
methodological approach to studying the body through experiment. In addition, they are 
intrigued by Bernard’s choice to treat experimentation as a question of methodology. 
Throughout Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s respective essays both appraise and situate the 
philosophical contributions of Bernard through his advocacy of a new scientific 
methodology of experimentation. The anti-teleological and non-abstracted orientation to 
philosophy, which becomes shared cite of endorsement for Beauvoir and Bergson, is 
derived from a methodological shift toward experience in Bernard’s experimental method. 
My claim is that Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s focus on Bernard’s methodology as an 
expository theoretical tool is intentional and is indicative of their agnate claims about 
philosophical experience.  
 Bernard’s introduction to An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine 
lays out the reasoning behind his decision to concentrate on experimentation as a method. 
According to Bernard, concentration on method exculpates both the philosophical and 
empirical dimensions of scientific experiment. It rejects a realist claim that 
experimentation is founded in tangible component of reason, but also exhibits hostility 
towards treating methodology as an entirely philosophical question. The central claim of 
Bernard’s decision to examine experimentation as a methodology is the acknowledgment 
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of situation, contingency, and experience as critical variables. Because Bernard places the 
study of experimental method as an alternative to procedural realistic scientific experiment 
and to philosophical experimentation, it exists in a space of experiential phenomenon. 
Bernard writes,  
scientific medicine, like the other science can be established only by 
experimental means, i.e., by direct and rigorous application of reasoning to 
the facts furnished by observation and experiment. Consider in itself, the 
experimental method is nothing but reasoning by those whose help we 
methodically submit our ideas to experience,-- the experience of 
facts…experimentation is undeniably harder in medicine than in any other 
science; but for that reason it was never so necessary, and indeed so 
indispensible…but before going into general considerations and special 
descriptions of the operative procedure proper to each of this division, I 
deem it useful to give a few explanations in this introduction in relation to 
the theoretic and philosophic side of the method which this book, after all, 




Bernard’s investigation into methodology ought not be read as a rejection of philosophical 
inquiry nor as an endorsement for a quantitative and realist based approach to science. 
Bernard claims that his “single aim is, and has always been, to make the well-known 
principles of the experimental method pervade medical science” (Bernard SEM 3). In fact, 
Bernard’s claims of experimentation intend to situate experimental method in-between 
realism and idealism as equally abstract methods.  
 What Beauvoir and Bergson both seize upon is a notion of methodology that is 
rooted in experience rather than idealistic or realistic abstraction. In Bergson’s closing 
remarks regarding Bernard’s method he celebrates the renunciation of systematization by 






One of the greatest obstacles encountered in this general and free 
progression of human knowledges is the tendency which leads the various 
forms of knowledge to become individualized into systems…systems tend 
to enslave the human mind…we must try to break free from the fetters of 
philosophical and scientific systems…philosophy and science should not be 
systematic (HB quoting CB in SEM)  
 
Bringing methodology into question, Bernard is able to expose the epistolary and 
metaphysical claims that underwrite scientific endeavor, while remaining considerate to 
the “precautions to be taken in their [experimental methods] application, because of the 
very special complexity of the phenomena of life” (Bernard SEM 3). Consider Beauvoir 
and Bergson’s confirmation of Bernard’s foundational consideration on methodology. 
Bergson writes that the principle contribution of Bernard’s was to “show us how the fact 
and idea collaborate in experimental research” (Bergson PCB 171, my emphasis). Bergson 
mirrors this claim by insisting that when he “speaks of the philosophy of Claude Bernard, I 
am not alluding to that metaphysics of life people thought they found in his writings and 
which was perhaps quite far from his thought,” rather Bergson locates Bernard’s 
philosophical claim with a “conception of truth” revealed through the methodology of his 
“creative and organizing idea” of scientific experimental method (HB PCB 172-173). 
Bernard “seeks less to define life than to define the science of life” (HB PCB 127). 
Following upon Bernard’s insistence that methodological experimentation exists in an 
experiential realm, Bergson calls Bernard’s analysis a “happy combination of spontaneity 
and reflection, of science and philosophy” (Bergson PCB 171). Beauvoir echoes Bergson, 
by using Bernard’s quote “in relation to the theorectic and philosophic sides of the 





 Why for Beauvoir and Bergson is scientific methodology important for 
metaphysical inquiry? In this piece I suggest that this blurring of genre and form in method 
represents a larger commitment on both Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s part to situate all 
metaphysical inquiry on the level of experience and to thusly reject systematized 
approaches to study which dislocate it into abstract situations. Here Beauvoir and Bergson 
recall the skepticism of Bernard’s regarding the limits of knowledge located outside of 
experience as an embodied, contingent, and lived practice. All three thinkers aim at 
divorcing a conception of philosophy as abstraction and of philosophy as systematizing.  
 It is not incidental that Beauvoir and Bergson pick up on Bernard as a 
methodologist specifically. In their respective oeuvre both Beauvoir and Bergson 
deconstruct, modify, and relocate their work to actualize a methodological practice that 
places priority on theorizing experience. In the next section, I will argue that Bernard’s 
methodological approach appeals to Beauvoir and Bergson for two reasons. First, 
Bernard’s theorization of experimental knowledge as experience-based becomes the site 
for a shared critique by Beauvoir and Bergson about the limits of abstract philosophy and 
systematization. Employing a methodological critique both thinkers bring into view how 
particular methodologies that defy the primacy of experience, misrepresent phenomenon in 
potentially deleterious ways. Second, because Bernard’s method is positioned on the level 
of lived experience, it creates a positive account for immediacy, limitation, and the 
sensorial useful for somatic political thinking. This claim challenges the traditional 
theorization of Beauvoir and Bergson as thinkers who fail to produce positive accounts of 
political life.   
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Beauvoir and Bergson on Bernard’s An Introduction to the Study of Experimental 
Medicine   
 
 Beauvoir and Bergson both share a commitment to a philosophy conducted on the 
grounds of experience. Although they differ on what experience is constituted by or how 
precisely it is lived, their mutual affinity for lived reality as the grounds for philosophical 
methods augurs a shift towards somaticism. However, such a claim only scratches the 
surface of common philosophical prerogatives held by Bergson and Beauvoir. Operating 
on the level of methodological analysis, I aim to show how a similar methodological 
approach towards knowledge, bodies, and perception, discloses the positive resources for a 
somatic politics.  
 Beauvoir’s attraction to Bernard as a theoretician lies in his attempts to analyze the 
lived practices of experimental method. In her introduction to the study, Beauvoir claims 
that Bernard’s major contribution to “considering the difficulties of experimental 
reasoning” is an “attempt to “study the role played by observation and experimentation, 
and then the importance of preconceived ideas and doubt” (SCB 23). What Beauvoir 
chooses to stress in Bernard is telling for her own philosophical development. Rather than 
attend to questions of ideology, material, or structure directly, she concerns herself with 
how particular situational factors complicate experimentation and phenomenon—while 
these complications are located on ideological, material, and structural levels, they are in 





Beauvoir’s and Bernard’s refusal to establish an intractable boundary between 
observation and experimentation evidences a critique of abstract knowledge. In assessing 
the respective roles played by observation and experimentation in experimental method 
Beauvoir acknowledges, like Bernard, that the two terms operate as separate and distinct 
phenomenon. Beauvoir writes, “Observation and experimentation are the only means that 
man possesses for gaining knowledge of phenomena. The first reveals their existence, and 
the second uncovers their signification” (SB SCB 24).  This follows upon Bernard claim 
that “observation shows, and experiment teaches” (SEM CB 5). However, both thinkers 
reject the dualistic relationship between experimentation and observation and posit such a 
relationship as an “arbitrary distinction” that encumbers the study of phenomenon (SB 
SCB 24).  Beauvoir maintains that,  “Bernard shows by examples that this separation, 
which is so clear in theory, is difficult or impossible in practice” (SB SCB 24). When the 
terminology of experimentation is lived the categories are porous; what is assumed to be 
passive may take on active dimensions.   
Beauvoir stresses that randomness and contingency as lived factors bollix activity 
and passivity in the definition of observation and experiment. Challenging the work of 
pyhsiologists Zimmerman and Cuvier who define “the observer…to be passive in the 
production of phenomena while the experimenter is said to take an active part in it,” 
Beauvoir reifies that systematized definitions cannot abrogate the multiple variables 
intrinsic to lived experience (SB SCB 24). “There are active as well as passive 
observations,” Beauvoir writes, “since some are made randomly and others are made in 
order to verify the accuracy of what has been hypothesized. Likewise, certain experiments 
are passive; the activity of the experimenter does not always intervene”  (SB SCB 24). 
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When experienced in reality, “observation and experiment cannot be distinguished” within 
scientific investigation as both are “merely facts brought to light by investigation” (SB 
SCB 24). If scientific method is to attempt to explain phenomena as it occurs, it cannot 
operate by establishing an ends of abstract experimental knowledge.   
Beauvoir’s assessment of Bernardian critique of observation and experiment 
suggests a rejection of abstract and systematized approaches to knowledge. Ultimately, 
both Beauvoir and Bernard reject these categories entirely. Beauvoir’s claim that these 
“definitions are false because of the meaning of the two words “observation” and 
“experiment” are too restricted” mirrors Bernard’s objection to the terms as narrow words 
that serve as “two opposite extremes of experimental reasoning”  (SB SCB 24 and CB 
SEM 10). The extremities of the terms do not reflect the ambiguity and permeability of the 
terms as lived. Beauvoir’s dismissal of observation and experiment as dyadic categories 
resonates with her preference for experiential epistemological and ontological methods. 
Like Bernard, Beauvoir maintains that epistemological action cannot occur in the abstract. 
Knowledge cannot be de-ontological, as it is always subject to the contingencies of 
situation and experience, as well as the spontaneity of chance. The narrowness of the 
terms, according to Beauvoir, leaves no opportunity for change. Beyond that, it 
perniciously removes experimentation from reality. Beyond falsifying experience, 
Beauvoir’s later work attends to the ways abstract epistemological methods can obscure 
and misrepresent lived experience to edify institutions, structures, concepts, and ideas. 
“Experience” Beauvoir remarks is the “instruction given by life” (SB SCB 24). Margaret 
Simons argues that Beauvoir’s essay picks up on a “rejection of “scholasticism,” 
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“immutable trurths,” and “philosophical system building”” evident in her later work 
(Simons 18).  
Challenging the methodology of his predecessors, the experimental method 
developed by Bernard stresses the difference between gaining experience and a relying on 
observation from the making of one’s own experiments and observations.
54
 The critical 
difference between the former, which are Bernard’s criterion for experimentation, and the 
latter, advocated by Bernard’s contemporaries, is that gaining experience and relying on 
observation demand an emphasis on the contingency of experience. What is observable in 
the momement of experimentation supersedes the authority of theories. Experimentation is 
in essence observable experience, not the practice of observing a hypothesis.
55
 Bernard 
defines experience as “knowledge gained in the practice of life” (CB 11 SEM). Scientific 
methodology occurs in situated moments and thus must be treated as a measure of 
experience. Bernard writes,  
In experimental medicine, we shall use the word experience in the same 
general sense in which it is still everywhere used. Men of science learn 
every day from experience; by experience they constantly correct their 
scientific ideas, their theories; rectify them, bring them into harmony…by 
the experimental method, we simply make a judgment on the facts around 
us, by help of a criterion which is itself just another fact so arranged as to 
control the judgment and to afford experience. Taken in this general sense, 
experience is the one source of human knowledge (SEM CB 12).  
 
Making observations and experiments, by contrast, necessitates abandoning experience as 
the foreground of experimentation and ergo, eradicating doubt from the experimental 
method. By situating knowledge on the level of abstract truths one is able to make 
observations and experiments.  
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Beauvoir’s analysis of Bernard emphasizes the prominence of doubt and 
epistemological limitation in the experimental method. Because the experimental method 
is rooted in experience, it acknowledges and is constrained by certain situated and 
empirical limitations. Most prominently, Beauvoir establishes the role of doubt in the work 
of experimentation. “The experimental method adds nothing to this idea; it only can direct 
and develop the idea, which is the basis of science… a fact or discovery has value only 
insofar as it suggests an idea…in order to attain this result, the scientist must conserve a 
great freedom of mind founded in philosophic doubt” (SB SCB 26). Certainty in any form 
of knowledge or reason produces a closed result—“when the stating point of a reasoning is 
absolute, one must accept its conclusions, but here the starting point is always doubtful” 
(SB SCB 26). Beauvoir makes an ironic argument by implying that the acknowledgement 
of doubt as an epistolary feature of experience allows for more interpretive freedom. This 
is because Beauvoir does not equate doubt with skepticism. By contrast with skepticism, 
which caulks what is available to us by way of philosophical analysis, doubt accepts our 
limitations, as a means to theorize without the possibility of constructing systems that 
reciprocally limit the extent of our inquiry.  
Introducing Bergson’s writing on Bernard complicates our reading of Beauvoir’s 
understand of philosophical method. Despite her definitive rejection of Bergsonian 
vitalism and philosophy, as a totalizing ontological system, the resemblance Bergson’s and 
Beauvoir’s analysis of Bernard suggests a shared outlook on the conduct of philosophical 
experimentation. Bergson’s exploration of Bernard’s philosophical import broaches 
analogous subjects to that of Beauvoir. His attention to the situation of knowledge and the 
primacy of experience posited in Bernard’s work complicates our understanding of the 
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depths of Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s methodological disagreements. Furthermore, 
Beauvoir’s and Bergson’s shared methodological evaluation discloses the same conclusion 
regarding why an experiential method is best for philosophy. Bergson’s partiality towards 
experiential forms of knowledge that do not endorse or organize systematic epistolary, 
ontological, and political regimes anticipates Beauvoir’s identical conclusion. This is the 
very conclusion that leads her to reject philosophy as a disembodied positivistic 
systematizing method and form. Ergo, we may anticipate Beauvoir’s turn from philosophy 
as a Bergsonian movement.  
Rejecting the relocating of experimental and observational knowledge to abstract 
levels, Bergson extols Bernard’s ability to locate the purpose of scientific work on level of 
experience. Bergson first attempts to locate Bernard’s contributions within the “creative 
and organizing” disciplines of physiology, philosophy, chemistry, and physics (HB PCB 
174). Discussing Bernard’s rejection of vitalism, his assertion that physiology is a rigorous 
science, and his defense for a different methodoligcal criterion for physiology from the 
other physical sciences, Bergson locates Bernard’s contribution as more philosophically 
consequential than the empirical compilation of “determining the conditions of 
experimental physiology” (HB PCB 174). Bergson writes, “if Claude Bernard did not give 
us and did not wish to give us a metaphysics of life, there is, present in the whole of his 
work, a certain general philosophy whose influence will probably be more lasting and 




What Bergson speaks of is a restructuring of the ambitions of philosophical 
discourse. Bergson describes the traditional ambitions of philosophical inquiry and method 
as the ‘reconstruction of thought’ by “resources of reasoning alone” (HB PCB 174). 
Knowledge is an objective of idea to be possessed in the service of constructed systems, 
ideals, and ways of being. Under this understanding, “nature would thus be a collection of 
laws inserted one into the other according to the principles of human logic; and these laws 
would be there, ready-made, internal to things” (HB PCB 175). This renunciation of an 
abstract knowledge echoes Beauvoir’s concerns about the abstract knowledge’s inability to 
speak to lived experience.
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 Bergson anticipates Beauvoir by suggesting that theoretical 
models of knowledge, ideal or realistic, construe experience to correspond with an ideal.  
By bringing experimental inquiry to the level of experiential observation Bernard 
has offered a methodology that “is a protest against [the] conception of facts and laws” 
(HB PCB 175). Bernard reorients us away from abstract knowledge and toward experience 
by suggesting an employment of “observation and experiment to our assistance” (HB PCB 
175). When we transcend our emphasis on abstract reason as the aim of philosophy we are 
inclined to theorize experience with limitation and doubt. Bernard writes,  
What is absurd in our eyes is not necessarily so in the eyes of nature: let us 
try the experiment and if the hypothesis I verified it will of necessity 
become clearer and more intelligible the more the facts constrain us to 
become familiar with it. But let us also remember that an idea, no matter 
how flexible we may have made it, will never have the same flexibility as a 
thing (HB PCB 175).  
 
Like Beauvoir, Bergson’s primary valuation of what Bernard brings to bear on 
philosophical method is an acknowledgement of the fragility and doubt philosophical 
method must account for-- the impermanence of theories, the inflexibility of ideas, and an 
eye towards not only rejecting systematization but also the importance of the aim of de-
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systematizing. Bergson concludes his assessment of a Bernardian influenced philosophical 
method as one that can only benefit from active desystematization: “as a philosophy is 
developed, capable of following concrete reality in all its sinuosities. We shall no longer 
witness a succession of doctrines each one of which, to be chosen of discarded at will, 
claims to embrace the totality of things in simple formulas” (HB PCB 176). Bergson’s 
choice to describe philosophy as ‘following’ the sinuosity of reality is telling. Rather than 
claim knowledge as a mental possession altering the world, he implies a more reciprocal 
relationship between knowledge and external experience.  
Because both thinkers seek to escape theoretical dualism by locating their 
respective methods on the level of experience, Beauvoir and Bergson respectively 
anticipate the turn to active and affective bodies stressed by somatic political discourse. 
More generally, these two seemingly different theorists are focused on scientific 
experimentation conducted through a focus on the body as somatic. Scientific method, by 
avoiding prior assumption, does not discount the observation’s embodied bias, which 
provides a limited knowledge; it embraces a turn that is crucial for somatic political action. 
Thus, knowledge can never be pure, objective, abstract, de-ontological, etc. The somatic 
impulse in experimentation does not, however, discredit its contribution as a creative 
world-affirming endeavor. 
Bergsonian Leanings in Beauvoir: Matter and Memory  
  
Building upon the claim that Beauvoir’s treatment of Bernard echoes a Bergsonian 
evaluation of philosophical method, here I suggest that Bergson’s skepticism about 
knowledge as an epistemology resonates in Beauvoir’s reading of bodies. Bergson’s 
seminal Matter and Memory that undertakes the function of memory in associational life is 
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also rich with ontological fodder about the relationship between knowledge and the body. 
To establish the claims Bergson will make later in the text, he first attends to the reception 
of knowledge by our bodies. Bergson offers a critique of both idealized and realistic 
models of knowledge that echoes the prior concerns expressed in this chapter about 
systematized knowledge. By reading Bergson’s account of bodily participation in 
knowledge as an anti-stystematic ontology, we may get a sense of what sort of role the 
body plays in an experiential politics.   
Bergson claims that the dualistic relationship between mind and body is an 
artificial consequence of realistic and idealistic epistemologies. Between idealistic and 
realistic epistemological paradigms, the relationship between mind and matter is 
constituted by a dyadic relationship between brain and body. Idealistic models that claim 
the mind is superior and that the world exists in our head, it cannot supersede our internal 
representations. This is the position best epitomized by the idealism of Kant. By contrast, 
realistic models stress that our knowledge is a function, “perception occurs as fuction of 
our brains and the body’s neuro-chemical circuitry, which responds to elements of the 
empirical world” (Guerlac 107). Bergson depicts the realistic model of perception as 
starting “from the universe, that is to say from an aggregate of images governed, as to their 
mutual relations, by fixed laws, in which effects are in strict proportion to their causes, and 
of which the character is an absence of center” (HB MM 14). Our insistence to prioritize 
body or mind is a function of an epistemological imperative in both models.  Both models, 
as Bergson sees them “share the assumption: that perception occurs in the service of truth 
or knowledge about the empirical world” (Guerlac 107).  “If we look closely at the two 
doctrines,” Bergson writes, “we shall discover in them a common postulate which we may 
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formulate thus: perception has a wholly speculative interest; it is pure knowledge” (HB 
MM17). Bergson maintains that epistemological models goad us toward both mind/body 
dualism and the evaluation of being as contained by a particular system. Bergson scholar 
Suzanne Guerlac claims, Bergson, “is not committed to the mind/body dualism per se; that 
is he is not interested in choosing one term to dominate the other. He is interested in 
exploring the relation between the two terms, as the subtitle of the book indicates: “Essay 
on the Relation of the Body to Mind” (Guerlac 107).   
Examining Matter and Memory alongside Bergson’s theorization of Bernard 
proposes one potential avenue for the application of Bergson and Beauvoir’s theorization 
about a philosophical methodology attentive to doubt, de-sytematization, and experience. 
Considering action as the primary intention of perception reorients our opinions on the 
body to constitute a new image of somatic politics, one that includes both mind and body 
cooperating simultaneously characterized by a non-hierarchical relationship. By turning 
toward action, knowledge as a systematized regime no longer determines experience. 
Additionally, sensation, affect, and sensorial data are introduced to the register of 
experience, and are recognized as definitive subjects open for philosophical inquiry.  
Somatic Impulses in Beauvoir and Bergson  
 
 Margaret Simons’ work on Beauvoir’s early philosophical writings concentrates on 
locating the phenomenological themes, questions, and approaches that structure and define 
her later work. Simons’ articles seek to connect the philosophical work of Bergson and 
Beauvoir by stressing mutual affinities for consciousness and the immediacy of 
experience. In doing so they depict Beauvoir’s phenomenological approach as indebted to 
certain Bergsonian traditions. Similarly, Simons’ introduction to Beauvoir’s analysis of 
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Bernard suggests that doubt, anti-systematization, and the “value of discovering the 
external world” are themes in Beauvoir’s early thought that remain prominent throughout 
Beauvoir’s phenomenological oeuvre
57
. Simons articulates that Beauvoir’s analysis of 
Bernard identifies constitutive elements of Beauvoir’s later phenomenological approach to 
philosophy writing, “Beauvoir’s attempt to integrate science and phenomenology, an 
attempt assisted by her earlier familiarity with Bernard’s account of the subjective 
elements in scientific discovery, is more evident in her post-World War II writings on 
racism and feminism
58
.” In one example, Simons’ claims that “Bernard’s account of 
scientific discovery, where he argues that discovers are not engendered by 
reason…anticipates [Beauvoir’s] phenomenological focus on embodiment and the 
subjective element in the disclosure of the world
59
.” 
Here I wish to offer a contrary, but complimentary, reading wherein I suggest that 
Beauvoir’s theorization of Bernard is not an indication of her earlier phenomenological 
approach, but in fact an exposition of the limits of phenomenological method which 
prioritizes consciousness within structural orderings. Simons’ rightly identifies the themes 
that course through Beauvoir’s body of work, however, identifying them within the 
phenomenological tradition may in fact undermine the extent to which Beauvoir was able 
to deconstruct particular systems. Similarly, locating Beauvoir’s theorizations of the body 
within the domain of phenomenological tradition invites a specific understanding of 
embodiment that Beauvoir herself is constantly challenging, deconstructing, and 
attempting to locate and understand in light of particular systems. This speaks to a tension 
raised by many Beauvoir scholars about Beauvoir’s cultivation of particular systems dyads 
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within the phenomenological tradition (self/other, immanence/transcendence, different 
categories of men in the EoA) and her methodological intent to deconstruct systems.  
My intent is not to claim that Beauvoir is not a phenomenologist or that she has 
mis-categorized the tenure of her work. Alternatively, I wish to suspend our focus on 
categorization within tradition and in place of this consider Beauvoir’s contributions to a 
somatic discourse through her reading of Bernard. Beauvoir’s reading of Bernard exposes 
a different concern one influenced by Bergsonian philosophies interest in experiential and 
somatic political experience. By doing so, I claim that Beauvoir’s early interest in de-
systematization is not best served through her phenomenological reading of the body, but 
rather by the somatic reading evinced in her Bergsonian evaluation of Bernard. 
Furthermore, the reduction of Beauvoirian body to solely the conscious mind, may endorse 
a dualistic vision of mind/body relations that Beauvoir was skeptical of at points. 
Beauvoir’s analysis of Bernard offers to us an opportunity to theorize Beauvoir with some 
critical distance from the phenomenological category and conversely to locate somatic 
concerns in her early work that may resurface throughout her theoretical endeavors. Her 
focus on methodological theorization of bodies, perception, and action reveals a Beauvoir 
uninvolved with consciousness or phenomenological theorizations of self whilst still 
theorizing the detriment of systematizing thought and the centrality of bodies and 
experience.  
Consider Beauvoir’s depiction of doubt in Bernard, which attends to the 
importance of a subject’s perception sans immersion in phenomenological nomenclature or 
onomastic categories. A closer look at Beauvoir’s writings reveals an absence of 
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phenomenological framework consistent with her skepticism of philosophical systems, 
Beauvoir writes,  
one must believe in science, which is the absolute and necessary relation of 
things, yet be convinced that we have only an imperfect knowledge of this 
relation. When the starting point of reason is absolute, one must accept its 
conclusions but here the starting point is always doubtful, and consequently 
reasoning guides us but does not impose its consequences on us. If we 
discover a new fact, we must never reject it under the pretext that it 
contradicts it (SB SCB 26) 
 
The absence of categories of self, consciousnesses, and other in her analysis of 
experimental doubt emphasize experience and desystematization. Moreover, Beauvoir’s 
early work exposes a foundation by which to theorize Beauvoir’s phenomenological 
embodiment as only a partial reading of the body’s classification in Beauvoir.  
This passage illustrates the somatic potential for Beauvoir’s politics because of its 
appreciation of the limits of perception as type of knowledge. Beauvoir’s somatic account 
of doubt coincides with the somatic accounts of the body in Bergson’s assessment of 
Bernard and Matter and Memory. Beauvoirian doubt, by insisting we must approach 
experimentation from the vantage of “imperfect knowledge,” concedes to the action 
oriented aims of experimentation and perception that transcend the mind/body pretensions 
of idealism and realism. To that end, Beauvoir establishes the same conclusions as Bergson 
regarding the location of action-oriented doubt in philosophical method. Bergson’s 
extrapolated lesson from Bernard also concerns the necessarily application of somatic 
doubt in philosophical endeavors,  
We shall no longer say, “nature is one, and we are going to seek to among 
the ideas we already possess the one into which we can put it.” We shall 
say, “Nature is what it is, and as our intelligence, which is a part of it, is less 
vast than nature, it is doubtful whether any one of our present ideas is large 
enough to embrace it. Let us work to expand our thought: let us strain our 
understanding: break, if need be, all our frameworks; but let us not claim to 
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shrink reality to the measure of our ideas, when it is for our ideas, as they 
grow larger; to mold themselves upon reality” (HB PCB 176).  
 
 Unearthing the somatic sympathies in Beauvoir not only offers new understanding 
of the intricacies of perception and knowledge, but also a unique interpretation of the body 
politic. Through a somatic reading of Beauvoirian bodies we come to understand corporeal 
entrapment not only as a material residence for consciousness, but also as an active, 
affective, sensorial actor indivisible from mental agency. Conversely, we come to 
understand consciousness not as a solopsitic mental phenomenon, but one ontological 
component of our entire bodily politics. That is to say, focusing on the somatic experience 
in Beauvoir’s writing may detract from our attention to the experience of embodiment, 
which enforces a mind-body problem and instead, shifts our ontological attention toward 
an immediate body as a holistic and center of action.  This follow upon Bergson’s claim 
that the body is “centere of action,” which occupies a exclusive role in our experience 
although not a hierarchical role.  
Role of Bodies in Bergson and Beauvoir Re-Thought  
 If Beauvoir is a somatic thinker because of her methodological turn to Bergsonian 
experience, then the categories of self, one, subject, and transcendence that have come to 
define Beauvoiran theorization of lived experience are recast in relationship to Beauvoir’s 
political claims about the body. Our tendency to posit Beauvoir’s jargon (self, one, subject) 
as singular notions contra the world at large is problematized by an unfixed view of the 
body as the center of action.  Ergo, the role of the body in experience is transformed. It no 
longer serves as just a home for the aforementioned concepts. While it continues to be a 
location for notions of subjectivity, it is also buoyant with its own dynamic agency. This 
Gordian reconfiguration of about bodies as an animate component of the self is the grounds 
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for considering a Beauvoirian embodiment that locates not the self, but the body as the 
center of action. Bergson articulates such a view of the body adducing that, 
Situated between the matter which influences it and that on which it 
had influence, my body is a centre of action, the place where the 
impressions received choose intelligently the path they follow to 
transform themselves into movements accomplished. Thus it indeed 
represents the actual state of my becoming, that part of my duration 
which is in process of growth. More generally, in that continuity of 
becoming which is reality itself, the present moment is constituted by 
the quasi-instantaneous section effected by our perception in the 
following mass; and this section is precisely that which we call the 
material world. Our body occupies its center; it is, in the material world 
(HB MM 178).  
 
If we adopt that this reading of the body is given an allotment in Beauvoir’s embodied 
politics, then the relationship between the physiological body and sense of self transcends 
the paradigm of consciousness ascribed with Beauvoir’s ontological perspective.  
 What role does perception play in sussing out Beauvoirian lived experience if 
perception is not conducted by a singular self in relation to the world? A reduced emphasis 
on orthodox readings of consciousness is replaced with an understanding of the body as the 
center of action. All of a sudden, the modes of being that are presented as attempts to 
understand or confirm a theory of lived experience are recomposed as questions regarding 
how particular modes of being have an affect on us. The question of experience is no 
longer a knowledge-based claim seeking to confer a theory of consciousness, but a query 
on the affect of certain actions.
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 Then our bodies are no longer just the sites of oppression, 
but the active action-oriented beings embroiled in systems. When bodies no longer 
accommodate ideas, ethics, systems, and types of knowledge, but are the active stuff and 
substance of a Beauvoirian politics, we are able to further desytemize the methodology we 
apply to considering lived experiences.  
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When perception and observation are reconstructed as actions, the political stakes 
of our being and our freedom heightened. Reading the body as dynamically active, not 
only heightens our awareness to relationships between the body and systems, but the 
micropolitical episodes of being.  Sensations and perceptions are revalued not only as the 
foundation of political being, but the active stuff of politics. Sensory bodily experience is 
treated as actions that inform and constitute politics. Furthermore, the body is recognized 
for its unique position as an arbiter between world and self, without the ascribed 
importance of systemized doctrines that would appraise these relations with hierarchical 
privilege. This is what Bergson denotes as the body as a “center of action”  (HB MM 14). 
We come to see the body’s political role as interfacial action and not only knowledge, 
Bergson writes,  
I see clearly how the external images influence the image I call my body. They 
transmit movement to it. And I see how this body influences the other images: 
it returns this image that acts like all the other images, with this small 
difference, perhaps, that my body is able to chose, to a certain extent, the way 
in which it returns the energy or notion it has received (HB MM 14 [19])  
 
Through such an evaluation, need attention is demanded to the politics of movement, 
perception, and time, not as idea but as empirical forces that affect the senses not only as 
action. Guerlac notes that the body’s sensory features treated actively resist the definition 
of determinism and are posited in active relationship to the world,  
 
Since my body moves, acts, and changes its environment, perception cannot 
correspond exactly to the universe of images that make up the exterior world 
independently of us…the brain is not a center of knowledge that gives us a true 
picture of the world when it functions well... The brain does not give us a 
picture at all, because it does not produce representations. It merely transmits 
movements and causes delay. And then the body interacts with the world 
(Guerlac 114).  
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The question of defining experience is rewritten, not as mental knowledge in sole 
relationship to the world, but is redrafted to incorporate an active sensorial body as the 
grounds for methodological inquiry into experience. 
Such a consideration of the body in Beauvoir demands a re-shifted focus on the 
micropolitical as a constitutive factor of Beauvoirian politics and ethics. Renewed attention 
to the sensations and perceptions that docent politics on a localized level urges a 
reconsideration of how and where politics are positioned in Beauvoir. A refocused 
attention to micropolitics would draw attention to the “organized combinations of sound, 
gesture, word, movement and posture through which affectively imbued dispositions, 
desires and judgments become synthesized.” 
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 Moreover, Beauvoir’s meticulous attention 
to the body in situation may not be read as edifying a larger political argument but as 
examples of politics themselves. Under such a reading, the body becomes the center of 
micropolitica action and inquiry.   
By attending to the micropolitical and somatic body in Beauvoir, we can better 
understand the complex tensions of immanence and transcendence that play out in the 
ethics of ambiguity not just on knowledge based ideological, systemic, and other such 
macro analyses but also on the body itself. Through such a reading of Beauvoir, we are not 
only exposed to the self posited as transcendence against the world and others as 
immanence. The self is remunerated as a complex aggregation of material, idea, flesh, 
perception and concept. It is materially limited but also limited by the conditions of 
situation and the application of ideologies, procedures, and norms that act on the somatic 
body. The fusion of these immanent and transcendent components reminds us that the 
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Traditionally, Beauvoirian ambiguity is understood as understanding situation as 
immanent and transcendent in a world with others posited in the same relational ambiguity. 
Turning to a somatic reading of the body, a politics of ambiguity is enhanced through a 
reading that stresses doubt, immanence, and contingency as perceptible action oriented 
bodily micropolitics. Kruks explains the role of the body in Beauvoirian ambiguity as a 
point of interaction- the language of point suggests ambiguity be understood as a question 
of situation. Beauvoir, Kruks writes, “examines the body as our point of inherence in the 
world, thus at once material and cultural, at once the site of both freedom and constraint.”
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A Beauvoir inspired by a somatic Bergsonianism, adds that this point is contingent and 
contiguous with all worldly interactions. It is not simply and exclusively the point of 
interaction, but the center of all actions. Furthermore, it heightens our awareness to the 
body’s functions that do not manifest high cognitive functions such as judgment, reason, 
and reflexivity.  This does not serve to admonish higher cognitive functions in the name of 
realism, but to further complicate the notion that our embodied experience is felt without 
interruption. Such a reading of the body opens us up to the material immanences that at 
once enhance and problematize readings that claim the Beauvoirian conscious self as the 
arbitrator of self and world.  
Conclusion  
 
Reading Beauvoir and Bergson in conversation over Bernard’s method of examining the 
body demonstrates a methodological affinity between the two thinkers. Both Bergson and 
Beauvoir suggest that the philosophical value of experimentation must be extracted by 
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looking at experience as dystematized. By doing so, both thinkers include space in their 
analyses for the randomness, precarity, and discontinuity of lived experience. Through 
their shared methodological critique of knowledge as an ends for experimentation, and 
perception more broadly, I have suggested that Beauvoir may find herself in agreement 
with the claims surrounding realist and idealist models of perception in Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory. In the final portion of the chapter, I have shown that placing Beauvoir and 
Bergson into conversation on the role of experience and bodies may help to enhance our 
account of Beauvoirian ambiguity to account for the immanence, contingencies, and inter-
corporeal phenomenon that Beauvoir admires in Bernard. In the chapters that follow, I will 
examine how this grounds for an affective and visceral body as the center of action rallies 












3| Beauvoir’s Political Imagination 
“So is it with any activity; failure and success are two aspects of reality which at the start 
are not perceptible. That is what makes criticism so easy and art so difficult: the critic is 
always in a good position to show the limits that every artist gives himself in choosing 
himself; painting is not given completely either in Giotto or Titian or Cezanne; it is sought 
through the centuries and is never finished; a painting in which all pictorial problems are 
resolved is really inconceivable; painting itself is this movement toward its own reality; it 
is not the vain displacement of a millstone turning in the void; it concretizes itself on each 
canvas as an absolute existence.”- Simone de Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity 
 
Introduction  
 Some recent work in political theory has concentrated on how to engage and act in 
a world replete with immanence. At the same time, a concurrent strand of political theory 
has sought to investigate how aesthetic mediums and forms intimate new methodologies 
by which to understand political action. In Simone de Beauvoir’s work, the two 
explorations are intimately related as she evinces the importance of lived experience as the 
grounds for philosophical (namely metaphysical) and political inquiry. Nothing better 
exemplifies this perspective than Beauvoir’s notion of the reader’s imagination, which 
transgresses the boundaries between subject and object, transcendence and immanence, 
real and irreal to offer a model of sensory political engagement receptive to the world’s 
immanence. To explore the nature of engagement, aesthetics, sensation, and immanence, 
Beauvoir makes an unlikely turn to form for answers. Consistent with the 
phenomenological approach, Beauvoir is interested in our lived experiences as a 
metaphysical and ontological reality.  Beauvoir’s inquiries on the role of form to 
understand metaphysics have implications on two levels. Foremost, there is a comparative 
theoretical claim about what sorts of forms best disclose lived experience. Second, and 
more importantly, are what Davide Panagia calls “asthetico-political implications” 
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(Panagia 2009, p. 23). Lived experience, explored through the senses as Beauvoir 
demonstrates, exposes the contingencies, immanence, fragilities, and vicissitudes of the 
political. 
Although multiple readings suggest that Beauvoir’s literary criticism on form is 
constrained by ideological existential thinking, I want to advance a different reading that 
stresses Beauvoir’s formal aesthetic claims. Principally, theorizing Beauvoir’s aesthetic 
comments on form entices us into a sensible world in ways not allotted by her 
philosophical texts. In a 1965 interview for the Paris Review, Simone de Beauvoir was 
asked to remark on her preference for either memoir or fiction. She responded by saying 
that memoirs jeopardize that ability to convey “certain depths, certain kinds of myth and 
meaning that one disregards” (Paris Review). By contrast, “in the novel…one can express 
these horizons, these overtones of daily life, but there’s an element of fabrication that is 
nevertheless disturbing. One should aim at inventing without fabricating” (Paris Review).  
Beauvoir’s comments in the Paris Review are far from the first time she undertook 
to explain the issue of literary forms and their affective features. Throughout Beauvoir’s 
oeuvre the questions of form, particularly in fiction, play a prominent albeit unexcavated 
role. Despite Beauvoir’s renown as an author of novels, memoirs, and philosophical 
disquisitions, a surprising lack of attention has been given to Beauvoir’s scholarship on 
aesthetic forms and affect. Though a small community of political theorists have paid 
attention to Beauvoir’s writings as telling for questions of freedom, judgment, 
embodiment, and otherness few have considered what Beauvoir’s writings on form and 




In what follows, I explore Beauvoir’s engagement with literary criticism, namely 
her essays “Literature and Metaphysics” and “What Can Literature Do?,” as instruments of 
sensorial disclosure.
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 Sharon Mussett writes that Beauvoir’s relatively unexcavated work 
on literature is an attempt “to defend Existentialism on artistic grounds” as a way to both 
propose an alternative understanding ‘between philosophy and literature’ and “comprehend 
philosophy as literature” (Musset 2013, p. 17). While such readings remain true to 
Beauvoir’s own wariness about the extent form bleeds into politics, I want to explore the 
capacity of Beauvoir’s investigation of imagination, fiction, and affect already ingrained in 
her aesthetic scholarship. In doing so, I will suggest that the question of political 
significance in Beauvoir’s work is already discernable within the form.  
 I begin by discussing Beauvoir’s critique of the limits of the philosophical essay as 
a literary form incapable of stimulating the reader’s imaginary capacity, and therefore 
incapable of presenting the immanent components of lived experience. Following 
Beauvoir’s phenomenological claim that metaphysics cannot be rendered solely in 
philosophical argument, because philosophy fails to engage the reader in an sensory 
disclosure of lived experience, I contrast Beauvoir’s account of the limits of the 
philosophical essay with her writings that depict metaphysical literature as a genre that 
discloses the radical immanence of lived experience.   
 What do novels do that philosophy cannot? According to Beauvoir, metaphysical 
literature depicts a singular temporal experience replete with disruption, unfamiliarity, and 
encounters that reveal our non-sovereignty, inter-subjectivity and radical exposure to 
others, all features prominent in our daily lives, as well as our political lives, but that fail to 
register on our consciousness as immanence.  Instead of recognizing these features as the 
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immanent components of lived existence, they are narrated via life stories and political 
ideologies as knowledge, autonomy, and fantasies of sovereignty.  What novels can do, 
according to Beauvoir, is expose the limits of these narratives and reveal features of 
immanence that are otherwise obscured.  This is to some extent an ironic claim given that 
Beauvoir is herself invested in narrative in novels and defends metaphysical literature 
against the “new” novel.
66
  It is the activation of the imagination that via particular forms 
of narrative, however, that reveal these features of/as immanence, revealing the very 
conditions of lived (and political) experience.  
Beauvoir complicates our understanding of engagement by challenging the 
assumption of the transcendent reader-subject. She does so by initiating a turn toward 
somatic and sensorial imagination.
67
 In doing so, Beauvoir challenges the ways 
imagination is traditionally understood—as a subjective apparatus, controlled by a reader. 
The imagination, for Beauvoir, presents not a new opportunity to narrativize, but as close a 
replica as possible for imitating the moments of our lived experiences when we engage 
with immanence—the moments in which we sense but are fundamentally indescribable. 
Beauvoir does not reproduce the imaginative reader as a transcendental subject.  Instead 
she offers sensorial model of imagination where the reader subject is active, embodied, and 
engaged in experiencing immanence.  
Limits of the Philosophical Essay 
Beauvoir’s skepticism about the philosophical essay as a conveyor of metaphysics 
emanates from her belief that the essay as a genre obscures, abstracts, and selectively 
misrepresents lived experience. Our grasping of metaphysical reality is not done onto the 
world, but exists embroiled in our ontological factices, our modes of being in the world, 
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our pasts, presents, and futures—“to be” metaphysical” is how we do metaphysics.
68
 As 
“every human event” exists within these dimensions, it is understood to have 
“metaphysical significance” beyond the “social and psychological” elements afforded to 
them in our subjective analyses (LM 273). A form that totalizes or systematizes experience 
rejects the immanence implicit in our worldly disposition. The philosophical treatise does 
this by discounting the immanent components of lived experience, namely by removing 
our attachment to the immanence of spatial-temporal realities; “the theoretican draws out 
and systematizes these significations on an abstract plane” (LM 273). Beauvoir’s critique is 
located on this level: the philosophical essay fails to depict the multifarious dimensions of 
immanence in our lived metaphysical realities—the indefinite properties of others and 
objects, the presence of multiple temporalities, the inevitable singularity of embodied 
perception, the vicissitudes of chance, and the fragility and ambiguity of experience—as a 
result our ability to experience immanence and engage with the world presented in the 
philosophical text are limited to a disembodied intellectual absorption.  
There are two deficiencies in form (philosophical essay) that make the metaphysics 
it presents inimical to accurately representing lived experience. First, the essay fails to 
depict the multiple immanences that constitute the world and our experiences of 
immanence as a constitutive part of ontological reality. The philosophical essay seeks to 
establish the world as a system and in doing do paves over the contingencies, fragilities, 
and multiple temporalities that when experienced as immanence complicate and rupture 
the singularity of experience. In laying out a carefully articulated set of arguments, the 
essay introduces ideas, objectivism, and rationality to redefine the immanent components 
of experience. This is, in part, a result of the philosophical essay’s attempt to present 
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argument in the absence of spatial-temporal reality.
69
  Consequently, the philosophical 
essay directs us away from perceptible and sensorial political life. Beauvoir’s second point 
is acutely related to her first. If the immanence of lived experience is reduced or 
systematized, the participation of the reader is limited.
70
 The theoretical engagement 
proffered to the reader is restricted to consumption. Beauvoir contends that the espousal of 
arguments allows for the reader’s engagement only so far as they intake the information 
offered by the text.  Beyond this, Beauvoir notes that this intake occurs on an intellectual 
level that eschews the sensorial dimensions of engagement in lived experience.  
According to Beauvoir, the systematization of the world exhibited in the work of 
Leibniz, Aristotle, and Spinoza, for example, is aimed at reducing the nonviable 
immanence that constitutes experience. As everything receives a definition and a specific 
function within the system, the properties, agency, and vitality of being are limited to 
definition. Beauvoir writes, “The theoretician wants to compel us to adhere to the ideas 
that the thing and event suggest to him”  (LM 270). Such an ascription is not only hostile to 
immanence: it employs definition to actively transgress it.
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 The opacity and fragility of 
things is reduced to the world of the theoretician, in a way that undermines the lived 
experience of objects: “in the real world, the meaning of the object is not a concept 
graspable by pure understanding” (LM 270). The notion of reality and objectivity is only 
partially representative. Borrowing from her earlier philosophical influence Henri Bergson, 
Beauvoir holds that, “the question” of metaphysical truth “is posed very poorly; put this 
way does not allow for a response because reality is not a fixed being it is a becoming. It 
is, I repeat, a swirling of experiences that envelop each other while remaining separate. So 
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it is impossible for a writer to reduce reality to a fixed completed spectacle that he might 
show in its totality.”
72
 
 The abstraction of philosophical thought induces a systemization of the world and 
reduces immanence to descriptions, functions, and roles within the system. The 
“philosopher and essayist give the reader an intellectual reconstruction of their 
experience,” but such a definition is limited (270LM). Beauvoir acknowledges the value of 
elucidating metaphysics’ “universal meaning in abstract language,” devising metaphysical 
theories as “described, and more or less systematized in their essential character” renders 
them “as timeless and objective” (LM 273). However such a definition of the subjective 
system omits the immanent, subjective, horizontal, multi-temporal, and discontinuous and 
also “excludes any other manifestation of truth” (LM 274). An essayist who imposes 
rationalizations, formula, and a priori definitions, rebukes the notion that many 
components of experience are indescribable utilizing the aforementioned methods. 
Empirical, sensory, and somatic realities, such as time and space, are admonished in order 
to cultivate systems. Shannon Mussett considers Beauvoir’s critique of the philosophical 
system a binary: “first, she takes issue with the position of the philosopher as 
depersonalized, universalized, and unbiased mouthpiece of truth, and second, she 
disparages the promotion of unified systems of reality accessible to intellectual abstraction 
alone” (Mussett 2013, p.19). What these two criticisms of systemic argument are united by 
is a disregard for the immanent components of lived experience.  
 Systemic analysis not only reduces the ability to depict immanence, it also obscures 
our true relationship to the world, by depicting it as objective information, hindering our 
opportunities for engagement. Here Beauvoir anticipates the work of John Protevi, who 
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suggests that models of politics that fail to incorporate bodily experience disadvantage us 
by obscuring our sense of self and world. Protevi’s describes that “the individual as 
rational cognitive subject”… 
gathers sensory information in order to learn about the features of the 
world…[and] calculates the best course of action in the world given the 
relation of those represented features of the world and the desires it has 
(whether the subject is thought to be able to change those desires given the 
features of the world it has represented to itself (Protevi 2009,  p. 3) 
 
When a system of ideas is presented in a theoretical essay, our engagement with it is 
limited to the representations as told in the timeless and objective system. Beauvoir claims 
that when objects, events, and ideas are presented as pure definition “many minds find 
such intellectual docility repugnant” (LM 270). If philosophy is limited to a closed set of 
arguments, rationales, and ideologies, it fails to confirm the freedom of the reader as an 
ambiguous subject with a creative and imaginative agency. Readers, Beauvoir writes, 
“want to retain their freedom of thoughts…they instead like a story that imitates life’s 
opacity, ambiguity, and impartiality” (LM 270). 
 Beauvoir’s claim that minimizing or eliminating immanence leaves readers bored 
suggests another failure on the part of the philosophical essay, namely, its inability to 
produce engagement contiguous with how it is experienced within our spatial-temporal 
dimensions on earth. For Beauvoir, this means that the philosophical form abandons a 
model of engagement that is embodied, active, subjective, and most importantly, sensorial. 
Beauvoir notes that metaphysical realities are best conveyed through a communication 
where the reader reconciles with a world offered up its totality—including but not limited 
to its immanences, ideologies, emotions, affects, ruptures, systems, objects, and swirls. 
Beauvoir suggests that when the essayist proffers a “timeless heaven,” or system, the 
reader has no capacity to engage with the world as a subject. The engagement always 
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exists on an intellectual level that is removed from body and situation. When one reads an 
essay, Beauvoir maintains, they accept the world being put forth from a disengaged stance. 
Notice the passivity in Beauvoir’s language when she describes the experience of reading 
the philosophical text, “a philosophical treatise would carry me beyond the terrestrial 
appearances into the serenity of a timeless heaven” (LM 269). 
Argument and Limits of Sensation  
For Beauvoir, then, the question of form is perhaps indirectly a question about 
location, and which locations are best able to enact a “metaphysical attitude” and to imitate 
the conditions by which we recognize our selves in the world. Beauvoir begins her piece 
with a question that links location (both spatial and multi-temporal) and experience, 
questioning if truth, understood as lived experience, is to be found “on earth or in eternity” 
(LM 269). Assuming the position of the reader, Beauvoir mentions that when reading an 
essay by Spinoza or Kant she experienced a sort of removal from earthly realities and 
spatial-temporal limits, into “timeless heaven” (LM 269). To an extent, this heavenly 
universe offers an escape from the dimensions of lived experience that encumbers us, and 
presents those dimensions, which are essential to the novel as “frivolous” (LM 269). 
Conversely, Beauvoir writes that having read the work of Julien Sorel or Tess d’Uberville 
she sensed it was “useless [vain] to waste one’s time fabricating systems” that bring little 
to bear on the lived realities that we experience on a perceptible, sensual, and somatic 
level. Beauvoir concludes that in spite of this tension, our metaphysical discourses exist in 
“only one reality…in the midst of the world that we think the world through” (LM 270). 
Beauvoir’s understanding of the importance of the earthly world as a location for the 
conduct of metaphysics is linked to its ability to represent our lived experience more 
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genuinely. It is fair to say that Beauvoir opts for the tangible earthly world of experiences 
and rejects the lack of subjectivity, immanence, and temporality in the philosophical 
heaven. I want to suggest that what ties her two theoretical critiques on immanence and 
engagement together is a commitment to a sensorial politics.  
A sensorial politics is vital for Beauvoir. What we sense is critical to disclosing our 
metaphysical realities, and sensation is consequently a fundamental ontological feature of 
lived experience. A failure to invoke sensorial moments, rejects a notion of being in the 
world central to Beauvoir’s phenomenological tradition. When we reject the immanence of 
the world and disallow engagement, we are denying our ability to enact a sensorial politics. 
Margaret Simons argues, “Beauvoir describes the goal of philosophy as a “disclosure of 
metaphysical reality” but “because the metaphysical meaning of human events and objects 
cannot be grasped by pure understanding, but can only be disclosed within an overall 
relation of action and emotion, philosophers must reject the system building and turn to the 
novel.”
73
 Consider Beauvoir’s treatment of Plato, when she writes,  
thus, as long as Plato asserts the supreme reality of the Forms, which this 
world only mirrors in a deceptive, debased way, he has no use for poets; he 
banishes them from his republic. But, when he described the dialectical 
movement that carries man toward the Forms, when he integrates man and 
the sensible world into reality, then Plato feels the need to make himself a 
poet (LM 274, my italics). 
 
In the failure to depict immanence, and the consequential inability to appeal to our 
imaginations, Beauvoir cites a detrimental shift away from a sensorial politics. Issuing of 
ideas and arguments and interaction with them on an intellectual level has two fold 
implications in undermining the sensory dimensions of politics—it fails to present the 
immanence of our world and consequently, leaves the reader unable to sense and cultivate 
a relationship to immanence. Because a form’s philosophical potential is related to its 
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ability to best convey lived experience, the shift to arguments, which discerns a 
disembodied reader, removes our opportunities to sense and engage with immanence. To 
remedy the absence of sensation in our political and metaphysical experiences, Beauvoir 
turns to the genre of metaphysical literature.  
 Following Beauvoir’s notion of sensorial and somatic experience as integral to 
understanding lived experience, Beauvoir would agree with what Lars Tønder calls ‘a 
sensorial orientation in politics.’ According to Tønder in “a sensorial orientation, human 
bodies “act and react” because their senses presuppose an opening to the world” (Tønder 
2013, p.16). A sensorial orientation to politics by Tønder’s description is thus to not 
intellectualize experience by cultivating a “mind-body dualism,” but to “rethink political 
practices from within the world in which they appear, and therefore to problematize any 
pregiven separation of both mind and body and culture and nature” (Tønder 2013, p.16). 
Tønder’s claim that a “sensorial orientation to politics…shows how reorientation implies 
major epistemological upheavals, not only for the intellectualism of contemporary 
democratic theory” echoes Beauvoir’s notion of a sensory imagination animated by 
metaphysical literature that is capable of exposing immanence, multi-temporal life, and 
becoming through an appeal to the sensory dimensions of experience.  
Metaphysical Literature  
Beauvoir seeks a form for metaphysical expression and representation that mimics 
“the real world” (LM 270). A world constituted by innumerable representations and 
perceptions, where “the meaning of an object is not a concept graspable by pure 
understanding” (LM 270). To recreate a more realistic experience, Beauvoir turns to the 
form of the novel, and more specifically the invented genre of metaphysical literature, to 
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disclose the immanence of objects and stimulate engagement between reader and world. 
Beauvoir’s understanding of how metaphysics is conducted precipitates a change in form. 
Emphasizing the importance of politics as lived, Beauvoir writes, “Why construct a 
fictional apparatus around ideas that one could express more economically and clearly in 
direct language? The novel is justified only if it is a mode of communication irreducible to 
any other” (LM 270).  
Metaphysical literature is Beauvoir’s point of compromise between the 
philosophical treatise and the novel. It is a genre propitious for cultivating a more 
realistically empirical terrain for metaphysical inquiry, precisely because it is able to 
imitate the conditions of lived political experience. By introducing the reader to the 
instantaneous sensations of ‘one singular, concrete, temporal world,’ it opens the reader up 
to the pre-judgmental, the visceral, perceptible, and somatic. It prompts thinking about the 
world as comprised of multiple temporalities, because it rejects an image of the world that 
is a unitary “fully constituted-self sufficient system” (LM 272). Beauvoir writes,  
a metaphysical novel…provides a disclosure of existence in a way 
unequaled by any other mode of expression. Far from being, as has 
sometimes been claimed, a dangerous deviation from the novelistic genre, it 
seems to me, on the contrary, to be an accomplishment of the highest level, 
since, insofar as it is successful, it strives to grasp man an human events in 
relation to the totality of the world, and since it alone can succeed where 
pure literature and pure philosophy fail, i.e., in evoking in its living unity 
and its fundamental living ambiguity, this destiny that is ours and that is 
inscribed in both time and in eternity (LM 271). 
 
It is no wonder then that, Beauvoir maintains, that metaphysics are attempted in the 
existential tradition from both a theoretic and literary approach: like metaphysical 
literature, the existentialist project is one that seeks to “reconcile the objective and 
subjective, the absolute and relative, the timeless and historical” (LM 274). Through the 
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disclosure of a fictional world in metaphysical literature, the novel redresses the major 
problem of systematized disclosure put forth in the philosophical essay.  
Beauvoir does not offer a very specific description of what styles, issues, plots, 
narratives, or perspectives compose metaphysical literature; in contrast, she lays out the 
simple end of creating tangible although irreal opportunities for communication, action, 
and experience. It strives to create a sense of “being-in-the-world” for the reader that is 
denied in the disengaged systems advanced by theoreticians (LM 273). A metaphysical 
novel succeeds if it can produce engagement between the reader and fictional world that 
facilities the discovery of one’s “presence in the world, his abandonment [delaisement], 
his freedom, the opacity of things, and the resistance of the foreign consciousnesses” (LM 
273). Stressing the relevance of sensation in our experience of reality’s composition, 
Beauvoir notes the affective practices of literature produces a more profound experience of 
our metaphysical realities “Through his joys, sorrows, resignations, revolts, fears, and 
hopes, each man realizes a certain metaphysical situation” (LM 273 LM). As Toril Moi 
notes, “For Beauvoir, a philosophical essay doesn’t draw the reader in the same way, 
doesn’t produce the sense of experience that literature offers.”
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 Because metaphysical literature is one singular temporal world, it can probe the 
more evasive components of lived experience, namely for Beauvoir immanence.  The 
novel is able to present the immanence of objects, temporalities, and other 
consciousnesses, because it discloses the world as an “imaginary plane this experience 
itself as it appears prior to any elucidation” (LM 270). On an imaginary plane, the meaning 
of the object is presented with an authentic complexity and ambiguity as the real world. 
When reading a novel, we expect to be immersed in the “flesh and blood presence” of the 
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world “whose complexity and singular infinite richness exceed any subjective 
interpretation” (LM 270). Beauvoir gives us an example of metaphysical immanence 
depicted in Kafka… 
thus the novel is the sole form of communication possible for Kafka, since 
he wishes to portray the drama of a man confined in immanence. To speak 
of the transcendent, if only to say that it is inaccessible, would already be to 
claim having some access to it. An imaginary account, on the other hand, 
allows us to respect this silence that is alone appropriate to our ignorance 
(LM 274) 
 
Similarly, Beauvoir shows that when the novelist rejects systemization, they are able to 
convey the complexity of immanent ideas more thoroughly. Thus, Beauvoir concludes that 
as “Ribot’s disciple Proust bores us; he teaches us nothing…but as an authentic novelist, 
Proust discovers truths for which no theoretician of his time proposed an abstract 
equivalent”  (LM 273). 
The novel favors the immanent components of life because its form rejects 
systemization and objectivity. According to Laura Hengehold, Beauvoir believes 
“literature is better equipped to present the qualitative complexity, ambiguity, and 
multisidedness of being than many forms of philosophical argumentation, especially the 
categorical, systemic, and idealistic” (Hengehold 2011, p. 191). Literature is endowed with 
the facility to challenge the totalizing of ideological regimes because it depicts the 
discontinuous, singular, and isolated spatial-temporal realities of a fictional world. 
Metaphysical literature succeeds “where pure literature and pure philosophy fail” in 
displaying the “fundamental living ambiguity” of experience (LM 276). It is able to show 
the moments of disruption that challenge the challenge the totalizing of abstract 
philosophies, “technocracies, bureaucracy, and their temptation to deny ambiguity” 
through the administration of ready-made transcendent values (Hengehold 2011, p.15). 
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To attempt to recreate metaphysical experience, Beauvoir says, the reader must be 
brought into this world of immanence via engagement. Rejecting the “intellectual docility” 
that is offered to the reader by the theoretician reconstruction of experience on the level of 
ideas, Beauvoir proposes that the affective components of the novel that solicit our 
perceptual and visceral reactions are what provide a novel with a more successful 
(genuine) metaphysical experience. A novel succeeds in Beauvoir’s opinion if it can offer 
us a model of communication, with the world, others, and objects. Literature becomes a 
mode of communication, by advancing opportunities of engagement between the world 
disclosed by the author and the judgments, perceptions, affects, and sensations of the 
reader. Between ourselves and others, as well as ourselves and the world, but this can only 
be accomplished when we are “taken in…and carried off” into the fictive world offered by 
metaphysical literature (LM 271). “Literature finds its justification and meaning” through 
communicating between worlds, “each situation is open onto all others and it is open onto 
the world, which is nothing other than swirling [tournoiement] of all these situations that 
envelope each other” (LD 199).  
In literary theorist Toril Moi’s reading of Beauvoir sharing the experience of others 
constitutes adventure. “A good novel for Beauvoir,” Moi writes, “is an invitation to the 
reader to share the author’s sense of exploration [rechereche] and discovery, to join her on 
an “authentic adventure of the mind” (Moi 2011, p. 134). Moi joins Beauvoir’s point about 
the sensory and communication with the experience of an other, “reading a novel enables 
Beauvoir to feel that she, for a moment, genuinely becomes other without ceasing to be 
herself” (Moi 2011, p. 134). Moi’s point about sense and engagement is well taken, but her 
insistence that Beauvoir prizes the knowledge or experience of the other is only a narrow 
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fragment of the opportunity proffered by engagement. Beyond that, the vertiginous state 
induced by the world of fiction itself opens the possibility of engagement through our 
senses, and privileges the immanence of not knowing ‘the other’ as a means to point out 
the subjective hubris that endures in our lived realities, and is bolstered by narrative and 
systematization. To accept entirely the world of an other, as suggested by Moi, rejects 
Beauvoir’s desire to posit us in a relationship to engagement with the sensation of 
immanence.  
Martha Nussbaum seizes on a comparable point to Moi’s. Establishing a link 
between the subversiveness of the literary form and the capacity of the imagination, 
Nussbaum argues that the ‘value’ of the literary form is indebted to its ability to stimulate a 
subversive imaginary faculty in its readers (Nussbaum 1991, p. 880). In Nussbuam’s 
reading of Charles Dickens’ Hard Times, the most distinguishing characteristic of 
novelistic communication and the imaginary, which address’ Moi’s concern, is “the 
capacity to see one thing as an other” (Nussbaum 1991. p. 895). Through the imaginary, 
we are able the ‘know’ what morally and politically evades us in lived political life 
(Nussbaum 1991, p. 898). Principally, for Nussbaum, we are able to know the experiences 
of an other through imaging them, the novel  
forges a complex relationship to its reader in which, on the one hand, the 
reader is urged to care about concrete features of circumstance and 
history…but… on the other hand, urged always to recognize that  human 
beings in different spheres do have common passions, hopes, and fears 
(Nussbaum 1991, p. 903).  
 
Nussbaum concludes her point about shared desires, solidarities, and passions brought to 
light by readerly imagination to suggest their moralistic value for developmental political 
economy. Simon Stow considers Nussbaum’s imagination as “an expansion of our moral 
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imaginations which enables us to empathize with all sorts of different people whilst 
rationally evaluating their position” (Stow 2006, p. 410). Through our moralistically 
diverse experience, proffered by imagination, we can begin to understand political 
economy from what she terms the “novelistic paradigm,” which would posit that we 
“consider our fellow citizens, our fellow human beings with the wonder and generosity 
that this imagination promotes” (Nussbaum 1991, p. 97). Communication that seeks to 
translate imagination into value undermines what Beauvoir notes as the fundamental and 
terminal exercise of imagining immanence.  
Therefore, Beauvoir may partially agree with the readings advanced by Moi and 
Nussbuam, but the imaginary, and our imaginary capacity, is the site of a more intrinsic 
sensorial communication than either thinker accentuates. What “gives a good novel its 
value,” Beauvoir maintains, is the ability for a subject (reader) to accept, believe, and 
occupy a world before one is able to judge, rationalize, or experience it  (LM 270). If a 
novel activates our imaginary capaciousness, it has done precisely that. “It allows one to 
undergo imaginary experience that are as complete and disturbing as lived experience” 
(LM 270). Moi’s concern with communication as ‘adventure’ and Nussbaum’s moralistic 
investment in ‘value’ surpass, and consequently disregard, a more intrinsic a sensorial 
claim about experience. 
 
The imagination annexes the otherworld, but “implicitly enveloping world does not 
mean that one knows it but that one reflects,” it only offers a taste of something that is self 
aware that it is a “partial truth” (LD 200-201). Beauvoir writes, because “reality is not a 
fixed being; it is a becoming” when we imagine, we enter this “a fixed and completed 
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spectacle that he [the writer] might show in its totality” but it is foremost an imaginary 
world (LD 200). Providing the example of Balzac’s Le Pere Goriot, Beauvoir says, “I 
know very well that I am not walking through Paris such as it was in Balzac’s time; I am 
walking through a novel by Balzac in the universe of Balzac” (LD 201). For a moment 
literature engages and enchants us into entering the heart of another world, “Kafka and 
Balzack…invite me and convince me to settle down, at least for a moment, in the heart of 
another world” (LD 201). Far from only communicating ideas through text, the text 
becomes a world assembled—a total world disclosed—the reader’s imagination compels 
us into a world.  
Engagement for Beauvoir is a form of experiencing our freedom. She writes that 
many minds “want to retain their freedom of thought,” the freedom to engage, which exists 
only if the novel can accomplish the two aforementioned principles of metaphysical 
literature (LM 270). It must first disclose a world full of ambiguity, immanence, and 
opacity, and then it must provide and invoke the reader into engagement with these 
immanent forces. It is within moments of engagement when a world is sensed by the 
subject that freedom is not possessed, but experienced. The result, by Beauvoir’s account, 
is that can we engage with a non-soveriegn ambiguous form of freedom, a freedom that 
acknowledges the conditions of immanence and transcendence- a lived freedom grounded 
in the perceptual framework of the individual situated embodied subject. In what follows, I 
will consider how Beauvoir’s theorization of the imaginary offers to political theory a 
model of engagement with immanence that bolsters the conditions of non-
soveriegn/ambiguous freedom articulated by Beauvoir. 
Beauvoir and Political Imagination 
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As we have seen, Beauvoir creates the genre of metaphysical literature to enhance 
our sense of sense in form. In this next section I wish to examine how her use of the 
imaginary as a model of engagement, offers to political theory a better model of 
engagement with immanence, because it shifts our notion of reality towards a senosorial 
politics and by doing so modifies our political relationship to immanence. I will argue that 
Beauvoir’s version of the imaginary modifies our perceptual experience and distinguishes 
her amongst phenomenologists because her outlook includes immanence as a constitutive 
factor of our own situated perspectives. The nascent work in imaginative models of 
political thought, such as those advocated by Jason Frank, Linda Zerilli, and Martha 
Nussbaum, have concentrated on the role of imagination animating and affecting certain 
mental activities and dispositions.
75
  Drawing from David Hume’s Treatises, Frank’s 
analysis of the political imagination in Federalist documents attends to various ways 
imagination can be syphoned, mobilized, and constructed for political propositions, both 
within and without the deliberative and realist frameworks. Equivalently, Zerilli’s reading 
of Hannah Arendt’s imagination contributes an aesthetic judgment as a means to 
representative thinking. While all the aforementioned authors articulate an imagination 
with the capacity to divest the uncontested authority of realist and rationalist models of 
political thought, the sparse literature on the political imagination has not yet considered 
the explicitly somatic dimensions of the imaginary.
76
 Beauvoir’s corporeal emphasis adds 
to the literature by fleshing out a distinct relationship between sensation and immanence. 
In addition, Beauvoir furnishes our notion of the imagination with an explicit 
understanding of the body’s involvement, by stressing the somatic qualities of imagining.   
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 It may seem that Beauvoir’s imaginary is confirming the standard existential belief 
of a dyadic experience of freedom between transcendence/immanence, and that her 
principle criticism of the ideological novel and philosophical essay is that it defers all 
subjectivity to the author and rebukes the reader’s subjectivity. She does after all critique 
the role of the author as having the capacity to undermine the imaginary by not “hiding his 
presence” to allow for magical component of the imagination (LM 270). Similarly, 
Beauvoir does suggest, borrowing from the Sartrean framework of detotalized totality that 
metaphysics are conducted when one “is to realize in oneself the metaphysical attitude, 
which consists in positing oneself in one’s totality before the totality of the world” (LM 
273). However, I suggest that a closer reading of the imaginary suggests that Beauvoir is 
actually critical of this model of subjectivity as pure sovereign freedom. Through our 
imaginary, she adds to the Sartrean understanding of detotalized totality a dose of 
immanence. The Beauvoirian imaginary challenges the claims of freedom made by 
sovereign models of freedom by appealing to our immanence in situations and in our own 
perceptive judgments.  
In her various speeches on the nature of literature, Beauvoir echoes the Sartrean 
notion of detotalized totality where the configuration of the reader as subject is posited as a 
totality before the detotalized illustration of the world.
77
 Describing detotalized totality at a 
gathering of authors, literary theorists, and literary critics, Beauvoir theorizes that 
detotalized totality “means that, on the one hand, there is a world that is indeed the same 
for us all, but on the other hand we are all in situation in relation to it. This situation 
involves our past, our class, our condition, our projects, basically the entire ensemble of 
what makes up our individuality” (LD 198). It also means that our singular temporal 
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consciousness is completely totalized from the experiences of others, “each situation 
envelops the entire world in one way or another…for example, I am unaware of what is 
happening…in a certain city in India today, and that is part of my condition as a French 
woman living in Paris in the condition in which I live” (LD 199). We may understand this 
admission of ignorance as an acknowledgement of immanence, that the world is composed 
of more temporalities, or a type of pluralism, than we can possibly comprehend in a 
singular moment. Although Beauvoir proclaims to adhere this traditional existential 
understanding of detotatlized totality, I wish to suggest the Beauvoirian imagination and its 
appeals to a sensorial politics usher in a much more nuanced understanding of immanence 
in a still embodied and political context. 
Sartre’s reading of the imagination derives from his theorization of detotalized 
totality. Opposing the readings of imagination offered by Hume, Leibniz, Descartes, and 
Bergson, Sartre aligns his own imagination with the template offered by Husserl. To begin, 
Sartre ignores the sensory by claiming that imagination is not a perception-oriented action. 
Sartre interprets the production of the image as a conscious thought that transcends the 
metaphysical experience of image conjuring and relocates it to a conscious psychological 
register. Sartre writes: “in spire of metaphysics there is between image and perception a 
difference in nature.”
78
 As we know now, Beauvoir refuses to separate these states 
taxonomically and prefers to see them as integrated sensorial phenomenon.  
It is clear how Sartre’s imagination diverges from the somatic and sensorial version 
offer by Beauvoir when examining where Sartre finds fault with Bergson’s analysis. Much 
of what Sartre finds problematic about Bergson echoes the claims of immanence, 
contingency, and sensation in Beauvoir.
79
 By contrast with Beauvoir who revels in the 
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materiality of the text, Sartre criticizes Bergson for leaving “nature its materiality and the 
image its character as image.”
80
 Bergson’s account of imagination is unsuccessful by 
Sartrean standards, because it fails to give an account of active consciousness, or in 
Sartre’s language provide for the opportunity to experience oneself as totality. The 
Bergsonian experience of imagination is imbued with too much uncertainty, visceral 
effectiveness, and interruption. Sartre writes, “if consciousness is defined by Bergson in a 
vitalist manner as an actuality resulting from corporeal attitude, it also represents for him 
the margin that separates the action from the acting being, the power to escape from the 
present and from the body, memory.”
81
 Yet, it is this sort of visceral and to again 
approximate the Sartrean dialect detotalization of sense, perception, and self that Beauvoir 
cites as the location for imaginary politics. 
The imaginary is juxtaposed to the intake of information, because the orderings and 
operations of the imaginary are immanent in and of themselves. Beauvoir’s stresses that 
our imaginations are uncertain, disorganized, nebulous, and indefinable. “In the novel… 
there are no perceptible givens other than the form of words printed in black and 
white…nothing supports the imagination of the reader.
82
” This affect reflects similar 
propulsion of faculties noted by Jason Frank in the work of David Hume, who stresses one 
dimension of the imagination as “transformative malleability” (Frank 2009, p. 78). 
Beauvoir offers this model to stress that our actions, perceptions, and judgments are never 
“reduced to formulas” nor can they be retold or recreated. They always exist in singular 
situated temporal moments. This is critical in reproducing the immediate authenticity of 
our lived experience.  
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Beauvoir offers this model of imaginary perception to stress the immanence of our 
modes of being in the world. The use of the imagination highlights the immediacy of lived 
experience and thus, the individual’s imaginary engagements are foremost, sensorial, 
perceptive, and somatic. The imagination is capable of enchanting the reader through the 
experiences as overwhelming, fragmented, and disorienting. Hengehold elaborates that for 
Beauvoir, the “original grasp” of reality by every human consciousness is temporal and has 
qualitative, subjective tone betrayed and belied by the universal and systemic pretensions 
of philosophical writing” (Hengehold 2011, p.192). By contrast, the imaginary in Beauvoir 
is essentially qualitative, the absurdity of the imagination enchants the reader by turning 
what is in reality an assemblage of words into a temporal world of objects, and compilation 
of swirling temporalities. “Bewitched by the tale he is told” the reader “reacts as if faced 
with lived events” (LM 270). 
 Imaginary experience clues us into bodily sensation and affect. This follows upon 
John Protevi’s notion that “the concept of bodies politic is meant to capture the 
emergent—that is, the embodiment and the embedded—character of subjectivity: the 
production, bypassing, and surpassing of subjectivity in the imbrications of the somatic 
and social systems” (Protevi 2009, xvi). The imaginary proffers to us the embodied 
experience of bypassing, a taste of the world sensed before it is oriented, placed, perceived, 
and judged. For example, her insistence that “there is a unique taste to each life,” which 
literature provides a glimpse into, strengthens her claim that we somatically experience the 
world, our bodies serving as an active and integral element (LD 201). Beauvoir’s notion of 
the epistolary separation included in detotalized totality is modified by her insistence that 
we navigate and experience imagination in a way that rejects mind-body dualism. 
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Emphasizing her Bergsonian notion of worldly immanence, Beauvoir’s imagination, again 
challenges the notion of detotalized totality, by accentuating the confines of external, or 
sensory, oriented perception for navigating experience as sensed.
83
 In the reader’s 
imagination, everything is established to represent the feeling of subjectivity noted by 
Protevi, a limited and sensory experience felt by the body and packed with immanence. 
Beauvoir notes that because this experience of enchantment, vertigo, and bypass is 
experienced as imaginary bodily sensation, it becomes a mode of “expressing the world,” 
but not is not “made explicit to reveal a truth to us” (LD 203).  
The imagination is critical in relocating the conception of perspective away from 
the notion of transcendence and toward immanence, by emphasizing its sensorial and 
visceral composition. Our imagination plays to affective and immanent components of 
reality before subjective action can be experienced. When faced with an imaginary world, 
the reader is “moved, he approves, he becomes indignant, responding with a movement of 
his entire body before formulating judgments that he draws from himself that are not 
presumptuously dictated to him” (LM 270). Beauvoir’s literary intent, as Margaret Simons 
writes, is to help us recognize immanence “since the metaphysical meaning of human 
events and objects in the real world cannot be grasped by the pure understanding, but can 
only be disclosed within an overall relation of action and emotion” (Simons 2004, p. 265). 
Through our perspective, we can only understand so much about the object’s existence, the 
meaning of the object is only brought to bear through our engagement with it. Beauvoir 
writes, “although made of words, it [the object] exists as objects in the world do, which 
exceed anything that can be said about them in words” (LM 270).  
Conclusion 
 77 
Beauvoir’s theorization of the literary imagination offers us a bodily entrance in to 
discourses on sensation, aesthetics, and affect. Disassembling the boundary between 
aesthetic and political theoretical dialogues, Beauvoir illustrates the ample political 
substance of the genre metaphysical literature. Conversely, her assessments of the limits of 
the philosophical essay modify what is considered principle in metaphysical exploration to 
include readership, disclosure, immanence, and engagement. Through a redirected 
emphasis on the roles, actions, bodies, and responsibilities of the reader the sensorial 
dimensions of politics are brought to our attention and open a new juncture by which to 
theorize engagement.  In this manner, Beauvoir’s rejection of the systematization of 
thought reframes metaphysical questions in the realm of sensed spatial-temporal realities. 
Beauvoir’s insistence on lived experience as grounds for metaphysical analysis establishes 
the sensual and somatic stakes of political engagement. The sensorial imagination offers to 
political theory a notion of immanent sensation as active engagement. Encouraging us to 
divest ourselves of the notion of real as rational, ideological, or objective, the irreal 
imagination implores us to sense the world's ambiguous composition. To imagine for 
Beauvoir is to see and feel a world of immanence evoked with its ‘flesh and blood 
















 Pointing out the limits of narrative and story for political theory, contemporary 
political theorists such as William Connolly and Davide Panagia have utilized film as a 
medium that disinters new political questions, models, and dialogues by situating there 
research beyond plots, narratives, characters, and parables that constitute traditional 
paradigms of political film theory. Looking to the film’s materials and composition, these 
theorists have exposed the utility of thinking about “stochastic serialization” and 
“technique” to establish a relationship between film and the political.
84
 Following this 
tradition, I wish to examine how Simone de Beauvoir’s political thought on the body’s 
experience of time produces a creative new lens to understand film as expository political 
phenomenon. Beauvoir’s reading uniquely accounts for the situated, embodied, and 
contingent character of lived reality, thereby prompting an integral shift in our ontological 
and political thinking. In doing so, Beauvoir expands technical accounts of film by 
merging discourses on somatic bodies and filmic technique thereby expanding our ability 
to locate techniques operation in both film and micropolitics.  
Borrowing from Connolly’s language of technique, I aim to show that Beauvoir’s 
somatic outlook on time thinks technique in the way Connolly advocates. In so far as 
Beauvoir’s time provides a lens as to how time operates affectively and exposes new 
readings of interruption, immanence, fragility, and becoming.
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 Approximating Connolly, 
she does not reduce time to a narrative component of a situation. This paper seeks to join 
Beauvoir’s reading of time with her thinking on bodies, embodiment, and ambiguity in 
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order to affirm time as a technique in Beauvoir’s political thinking. Positioning Beauvoir 
within the discourse of affect, technique, and micropolitics not only makes an analytical 
point about the tenure of Beauvoir’s treatment as a scholar of bodies. This chapter also 
contends that Beauvoir makes a positivist contribution to theorizing technical time by way 
of relating its experience to the human body.  
Beauvoir appends the traditional dialogue on technique by attending to its relative 
lack of attention on how technique operates on the body. Beauvoir reads the body’s 
experience of time binately. She proffers both an affective and somatic reading of bodies 
that experience time, as well as an account of time as embodied within individual actants. 
By reading time’s affect in conglomerate ways she assembles a more nuanced account of 
technical time that does not diminish the role of individual agents, who may experience 
time as narrative, in affirming or denying freedom.
86
 Beauvoir exposes us not just to the 
experiences of time affectively onto bodies, but time’s embodied relationship to discourses 
of political structure. Because Beauvoir’s technical time still includes, and focuses on the 
individual actor’s experience (read as both traditional subjective and as action-oriented and 
sensory), it offers a uniquely political reading of time as related to freedom. Beauvoir’s 
time provides an understanding of micropolitics in both film and political events precisely 
because it emphasizes the agent’s relationship to time, while at the same time offering a 
critique of rational ontologies as restrictive for analyzing micropolitics.   
The first portion of this paper turns to Connolly’s critique of narrative and Lacanian 
film theory (first published in an exchange on film with Slavoj Žižek in Theory and Event, 
2002) to explore the advantages offered to film and political theory through technique. 
Adopting Connolly’s language of technique, I will argue that Beauvoir’s reading of time 
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can be understood as technique because of its affective/sensory and embodied/situated 
character, which bolsters our understanding of micropolitics and identifies the limits of 
rationalism for theorizing politics.  
Turning to the Second Sex as an analytical film tool, the next portion of this 
analysis considers how Beauvoir’s two readings of timely bodies offer us something 
unique. Building off of the somatic reading of bodies formulated in previous chapters, I 
read the Second Sex, a text predominantly associated with an orthodox reading of 
Beauvoiran bodies as a discussion attentive to the sensational, affective, and sensory 
experiences of time. Identifying somatic affect in the text complicates Beauvoir’s 
theorization of temporality, dislocating it from its existential proclivities. I catalogue this 
time as, somatic time. Then I return to a reading in agreement with her larger existential 
project wherein Beauvoir argues that time is an ambiguity that is neither natural 
(completely immanent) nor constructed (rational). Most importantly, by depicting 
ambiguous time as experiential and embodied, Beauvoir equips us with an understanding 
of how individuals affirm or deny the structures of time. By way of contrast, I note this 
experience of time as situated time. Although the distinction between these two readings of 
bodies and time is much more collaborative and integrated, I draw the distinction to locate 
where Beauvoir fits within the larger project of technical film discourse and where her 
account deviates to educe a new reading. Here I wish to suggest that Beauvoir’s 
understanding of time as a component of ambiguity has some similarities to Connolly’s 
theorization of time as becoming, although it is uniquely equipped to decipher how 
individuals interact with time. 
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Utilizing Beauvoir’s reading of timely bodies, I will examine Chantal Ackerman’s 
(1975), Jeanne Dielman, 23, quai de Commerce 1080 Bruxelles as an example of cinema 
allied with Beauvoirian bodies and time. The affinities between Beauvoir’s account of 
timed bodies in the Second Sex with Ackerman’s technical exploration of the same 
concepts evinces help us to see bodily time disclosed as micropolitics through technique. 
Considering bodily time’s application in Beauvoir’s housework section of the Second Sex 
alongside Ackerman’s Jeanne Dielman heightens our awareness to technical operations of 
time, micropolitics, and freedom as intimately related to both the affective somatic and 
situated structural bodies.  
Technique and Micropolitics in Connolly 
 In “Film Technique and Micropolitics” William Connolly argues that narrative, 
storytelling, and rationalism have become overemphasized in our methodologies used to 
theorize film
87
.  Connolly challenges the near hegemonic position that Lacanian and other 
Freudian-based methodologies have enjoyed in contemporary political film theory. 
Pointing to the dogged emphasis that rationalism receives in these dominant theoretical 
paradigms Connolly stresses that insufficient attention has been given to the micropolitical 
experiences of film. For Connolly, Lacanian analysis prioritizes the role of “symbolic 
interpretation” and removes its relationship to technique.
88
 The privilege rationalism and 
narrative receive in film theory obscures our ability to recognize the many benefits offered 
by an analysis that is attentive to technique. By trivializing the role of technique in film, he 
says, we are ill equipped to theorize micropolitics.  
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By a film’s technique Connolly refers to the very stuff that converges to constitute 
it. We may think of technique as a discontinuous assemblage of a film’s many 
components: the sounds, rhythms, images, words, lighting, angles, and shots that merge to 
compose a film. In contrast with thinkers such as film theorist Stanley Cavell, who 
maintains that technique is a formal apparatus of film no different than “a number 
motivated in an opera or musical comedy,” technique for Connolly comprise all of the 
compositional elements of film.
89
 Filmic technique’s sites of operation are different than 
those of symbolic interpretation. Animating our sensual and perceptive faculties, filmic 
techniques are the functional components that “work on the visceral register of human 
sensibility.”
90
 Technique appeals the materials in film, and operates through the 
momentary perception identified by nineteenth century empiricist Henri Bergson.
91
  
 Connolly aims to accentuate the role of micropolitics through an awareness of 
filmic technique. Only through observing the synthesis of the psychoanalytic and narrative 
based forms of analysis with technique are we able to see “how immersed we are in the sea 
of micropolitics.”
92
 Technique parallels micropolitics because both are an amalgamation of 
“sound, gesture, word, movement, and posture through which affectively imbued 
disposition, desires, and judgments become synthesized.”
93
 Arguing that narrative-based 
analysis of film lends itself to become a rational analysis, Connolly contends that our 
preoccupation with narrative prevents us from thinking about how micropolitical 
experience forms the foundation for the larger macropolitical questions we ascertain 
through a more capacious technical analysis. Solely concentrating on narrative renders us 
unable to sense, experience, and perceive the events of a story on the visceral level evoked 
by the film’s storytelling technique.
94
 They invoke the initial somatic and chaotic actions 
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that orient us in the world. Technique is what conveys and emphasizes perceptual moments 
of intake. 
 Connolly’s emphasis on the fragmented techniques of film converging, rather than 
being absolute, ontologically re-situates time’s operation in film. Micropolitics as an 
experience of discontinuous techniques allows us to discern a non-linear reading of time. 
In contrast with narrative and more rational forms of theorizing film, technique draws our 
attention to time as becoming. One may think of the converging aspects of film’s 
techniques as establishing time as evolutionary. Connolly expands upon the theme of 
becoming introduced in his exchange with Žižek in A World of Becoming (2011). His 
subsequent theorizations establish becoming as a sort of discontinuous time marked by a 
“disjunction of moments,” namely, “the reverberations back and forth between past and 
present, with each folding into the other and both surging toward the future.”
95
 Drawing 
from Bergson, Lucretius, and Nietzsche, Connolly shows how filmic analysis of time as 
becoming is more suited to theorizing the summation of technique’s components into 
micro- and macropolitical phenomena. Connolly writes:  
Let's turn to another issue and another film. Thinkers such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze suggest that modern 
conceptions of linear and teleological time support unwarranted hubris in 
explanation and interpretation while often supporting punitive conceptions 
of political morality. But, according to these very thinkers, everyday 
perception itself does not secrete the nonlinear image. The question 
becomes: How to expose oneself viscerally to a nonlinear image of time? 
Gilles Deleuze, in Cinema II, The Time Image, reviews a series of films that 
vividly convey time as “out of joint” (2002)  
 
Connolly’s time anticipates the synthesis of micro- and macropolitical events. By forcing 
us to read time as composed by multiple heterogeneous force fields that transcend the two 
registers of temporal experience (action-oriented perception and durational becoming), the 




 Reading Connolly’s time as incidental reveals some of the more 
existential components of time.
97
 As Connolly reminds us: “to amplify the experience of 
becoming is one affirmative way to belong to time today.”
98
 We are compelled to think 
about what evades us in our understanding of time, and in doing so we submit to time’s 
irrational if not somewhat immanent nature.
99
  Such a reading of time is better for 
understanding micropolitics as a combination of transcendent and immanent forces, as 
both stories and techniques.   
Connolly appeals to technique in order to bolster notions of immanence in our 
readings of time, and in doing so renovates how we parse the relationship between time 
and freedom. In part, filmic time is linear and guided by our transcendent interpretations, 
but much like micropolitics it is also a compilation or assemblage of incidental partially 
immanent impulses. Time portrayed as fragments or as becoming invites a different 
reading of freedom.  As Connolly writes, “you may begin to connect freedom more closely 
to becoming, as that strange activity by which the new surges into being from a threshold 
below the reach of perceptions, theories and stories already available to us.”
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   To act in 
accordance with Connolly’s theory of becoming is to “move from salient experiences of 
time as duration, the very experience that must be pushed to the background when the 
dictates of action are strong, to reflections in several zones of life, and then push back 
again, moving back and forth until we reach a reflective equilibrium that carries a certain 
degree of plausibility.”
101
 It is, in other words, to cede to momentary indulgences in a 
Proustian and Bergsonian duration, where our “life’s indispensible richness” and 
complexity are beyond rationalization.
102
 In exchange for checking our protean hubris at 
the door, we are better able to assess our freedom and agency (and its boundaries), and 
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 Moreover, Connolly’s time prompts us to use synthesis of technique and narrative 
to address questions more existentially.
104
 Attention to time as a technique is one way to 
highlight micropolitics, but when this method is combined with narrative forms of analysis 
Connolly asserts that we have more ability to discern the existential questions important 
for politics and film.
105
  “By recalling how contestable such experiences of time and ethics 
will be in a culture saturated with secular concepts of linear causality and Christian ideas 
of eschatology,” we may begin, he says, 
To cultivate agonistic respect for different orientations to time and morality. For the 
question of time persists as an existential question, while a definitive resolution of it 
acceptable to all seems unlikely. It is like Lacanian and Nietzschean philosophies in those 
respects” (Connolly 2002)   
 
Thinking about time in film, Connolly suggests that the ruptures and irrational cuts in film 
ontologically reorient our thinking about time and its relationship to our ontological 
experiences.  
To be infected by the image of a rift in time is not only to suggest 
modifications in one's experience of meaning and freedom. You also see 
more clearly why an ethic that plays up the importance of cultivation, 
sensibility, ethos and critical responsiveness to the new may possess some 
advantages over a morality grounded in transcendental commands or fixed 
contracts. For each time a fork or turn occurs it becomes timely to reassess 
established interpretations of the universal that grow up like underbrush in 
and around us. Eventually, rather than treating the rift as a crisis in the 
fabric of causality, meaning, morality and freedom, you may modify each 
idea in relation to the others. Such modifications, if they take, sink into your 
subliminal sensibility as well as rising into the higher intellect. For being is 
layered. These modifications involve experimental intersections between 




To think about time in film is to think about the existential ethic of becoming. Technique 
and time becomes embodied as it “repetitively and experimentally” allows “a mixture of 
images, gestures, postures, rhythms, memories, arguments, and ethical concerns to be 
folded into your sensibility. You [the viewer] stimulate the techniques by which film 
already acts upon us.”
106
 It calls on us to ignore any imposed narrative of time, meaning, or 
ideology that could be presented as linear, forthright, or providential. It recodes experience 
and analysis from what is first experienced as “intellectual themes” to a “series of 
experimental techniques to recode sensibility.”
107
  
In Neuropolitics, Connolly shows how the experience of time can be interrupted to 
cultivate new affective experiences for the viewer. Drawing from Bergson’s claim that “in 
every day perception the image is set in linear time; the virtual memories it folds into 
perception are assembled to fast to surface as explicit recognitions.”
108
 Connolly shows 
how when the right combination of techniques is applied “in conjunction with the story 




 Here Connolly’s emphasis on the senses provides us with a more affect-imbued 
version of embodied time that is experienced by the individual in situation. Technique and 
micropolitics challenge rationalism as the uncontested motive and knowledge-claim that 
informs film. Actions, judgments, bonds, schemes, and motives are presented not as the 
rational choices of individuals but as the summation of fragmented techniques, which 
converge in a series of filmic moments. Connolly extends his analysis to configure a 
critique on how we assess politics as the motives and actions of individuals. Connolly 
critiques the psychoanalytic tradition’s overdependence on rationalism as a means to 
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interpret action. The perils of such a method place “the theorist in the role of master,” an 
imposing figure, “always ready to fit our lives into an authoritative narrative in which we 
are unwittingly caught.”
110
 Relying too heavily on psychoanalytic lens “diverts attention 
from multi-media techniques that pull viewers into a story line they might otherwise resist. 
It is through attention to such techniques that we learn how micropolitics regularly 
proceeds.”
111
 In narrative-inflicted methods, we forget about how time operates as 
becoming and focus on the rational decisions of story lines – the logics, decisions, 
fantasies, paradoxes, and symbolisms of film. Time becomes linear because, as Connolly 
puts it, “The story is the thing.”
112
  
Connolly and Beauvoir: Between Ambiguity and Technique   
Connolly’s insights on becoming are valuable because they call attention to the 
consequences of our reluctance to think about time as incidental, interruptive, non-rational, 
and part of a non-linear experience.  But his analysis falls short of producing a complete 
portrayal of experiential time. He is right to identify the limits of rationalism for film 
analysis and the temptation of theorists to play the role of the Lacanian analyst, or, more 
generally, the “theorist as master.”
113
 The theory of becoming is a welcome attempt to 
categorize the techniques that illustrate time, many of which elude our analysis altogether 
and are fated to always be in some measure obscure. However, I worry that Connolly’s 
ontological resituating of time as becoming encourages us to depoliticize time: to render 
time practically immanent and thereby underplay its relationship to embodied human 
actions. Connolly’s reading of Bergson, Deleuze, and Lucretius accentuates the incidental 
techniques of time, but does not account for how these techniques are intimately related in 
spatial-temporal relation to the body. I am concerned that Connolly’s very well intentioned 
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and necessary aim to help individuals “come to terms with the force-fields of multiple 
types with different degrees of agency moving and different speeds,” and to 
“negotiate…relations between the human estate and the larger world,” may yet conceal 
particular themes of embodiment.
114
 Becoming may promise a modification to rational 
reading of time, but it is foremost an ethical claim.  
In Connolly’s theory of becoming, the critical relationship between body and time 
is vague. Connolly intentionally leaves open multiple possibilities to depict the various 
locations for bodies to be affected by time. Drawing from complexity theory in the 
physical sciences, Connolly asserts that by strictly adhering to rationalism, pockets of self-
conducting agency transpire with little propulsion from human agents:  
A world of becoming—consisting of multiple temporal layers, many of 
which interact, each with its own degree of agency—is a world in which 
changes in some systems periodically make a difference to the efficacy and 
direction of others. Moreover, since human beings themselves are 
composed of multiple micro-agents collaborating and conflicting with one 
another, it is wise to think of both individual and collective human agency 





On the one hand, this model encourages us to consider the immanent components of our 
bodies, the very flesh and blood that materialize us and compose our agency. On the other, 
it demands a sort of reliance on incidental components of agency, a world “replete with 
loose and partial connections” that may reduce the relationship the embodied individual 
has toward affecting time.
116
 Connolly theorizes that agents in a world of becoming must 
give in to the “surprising turns in time, uncanny experiences, and the possibility of human 
participation to some degree in larger processes of creativity that both include and surpass 
the human estate.”
117
 Micropolitical experience evaluated by the individual may seem 
embodied on some initial level, but time may be experienced as too wholly immanent, 
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complex, and beyond the perceptible actions Connolly himself argues are integral to the 
human world’s relationship to time as becoming.  
Here, I think Beauvoir may help. Considering the fissures of micropolitics through 
a completely technical lens may provoke inaction and an overreliance on becoming as an 
incidental and totally immanent process. How then are we to fully break with the 
rationalism in the analysis of film and/or micropolitics? I contend that turning to Beauvoir 
may help us formulate more accurate readings of bodies and time.  
There are several points of overlap between Connolly and Beauvoir that would 
allow us to consider Beauvoir’s analysis of time as technique. First, Beauvoir, like 
Connolly, uses time as a technique that is active in micropolitical situations. The Second 
Sex (2011) employs time as an affective hermeneutical technique to denote the lack for 
freedom afforded to women and patriarchy’s diverse systemic operations. Second, in 
keeping with Connolly, Beauvoir uses time as a technique that undermines the importance 
placed on rationalism, relocating political phenomenon on a micropolitical and experiential 
register. 
118
  For Beauvoir, freedom and politics are not established by any claims to a 
possessive sovereignty and are comparable to the macropolitical experiences of becoming 
that are explained by Connolly.
119
 Time is not purely idea and its operations are far from 
linear. On the contrary, for Beauvoir, time is a technique and a concept deeply embedded 






Situated Time in Beauvoir’s The Second Sex  
In Beauvoir’s situated time, a relationship between temporality, bodies, and 
phenomenon is expressed through an acknowledgement realities occur within time and 
space. In The Second Sex it becomes clear that experience is not grounded, but embedded 
in time. Consistent with her phenomenological methodology time is a fluid component of 
being-in-the-world-- universally contextualizing lived experience. Not only does her 
emphasis on lived experience prioritize embodied realities as the foundation for politics, 
but it also attends to time’s relationship to embodied experiences: situations for Beauvoir 
exist within a time and space. According to Beauvoir, experience is always embodied and 
mediated by both time and situation. Denying either’s influence distorts experience:  
Limited in time and space, possessing only one body and one finite life, man 
is but one individual in the middle of a foreign Nature and History. Limited 
like him, similarly by the spirit, woman belongs to Nature: she is traversed 
by the infinite current of Life, she thus appears as the mediator between the 




Beauvoir employs the language of time and space to establish that time neither exists as an 
a priori to an event or action, or serves as the backdrop for events to occur.  
As we have already noted, Beauvoir’s time is situated in and influenced by lived 
realities but also is depicted as partially immanent and un-mastered. Time is at once 
something individuals assert some ascendancy over (transcendent) and at the same time 
evades our rational analysis (immanence). Beauvoir’s phenomenological inclination 
stresses that our lived realities are contextualized by our experiences with time. 
Subsequently, through Beauvoir’s lens, consideration is given to the way actions can 
position others and ourselves in relation to time. When Beauvoir calls into question the 
ways in which individuals act in relation to time, she illustrates how we either affirm or 
violate time as a form of ambiguity.  By trying to place oneself beyond time or attempting 
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to undermine its immanent and embodied characteristics, we violate our own ambiguity 
and the ambiguity of others. Beauvoir warns of the temptation to establish oneself as 
beyond time’s intercession in our lives. Men in the Second Sex constantly violate this ethos 
by presenting themselves as pure transcendence; they fail to recognize the ways in which 
they are “limited in time and space” (Beauvoir, 2011, p.190).  
Although Beauvoir illustrates that time is controlled by our actions, she opposes a 
time that is defined by rationalism. Ascribing time to rationalism is one way in which 
time’s ambiguity is violated. She is quick to identify the limits of rationalism and its 
tendency to deny embodiment, time, immanence and other constitutive parts of our 
ontological foundations.
121
 In her discussion of myths, Beauvoir urges against establishing 
ourselves as pure idea as a means to transcend time’s influence. Men revolt against time by 
exhibiting themselves as pure idea:  
he would like himself to be as necessary as pure Idea, as One, All, absolute 
Spirit; and he finds himself enclosed in a limited body, in a place and time he 
did not choose, to which he was not called, useless, awkward, absurd 
(Beauvoir, 2011,  p.164). 
 
Beauvoir does not limit this analysis to men. Women, she contends, violate time’s 
immanence through false claims to freedom where they too apply rationalism to claim 
themselves beyond time. In her discussion of independent women who seek to surpass the 
immanent roles assigned to them, Beauvoir affirms that denying time is a form of bad faith 
where one posits oneself as sovereign. The mirror is one such object that falsely affirms 
rationalism and sovereignty to time and immanence. When women look in the mirror, “the 
whole future is concentrated in this rectangle of light…every woman drowned in her 
reflections reigns over space and time, alone, sovereign, she has total rights over men, 
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fortune, glory, sensual pleasure” (Beauvoir, 2011, p.669). Time is an explicitly political 
concept connected with womanly narcissism and false claims to sovereignty and freedom. 
Situated Time in Housework 
 Beauvoir’s theorization of housework attends to this reading of situated time by 
noting how situation delimits women’s opportunities to experience freedom. Housework is 
depicted as structural oppression intently adjoined to women through situation. Time is 
read as part of condition of being rendered immanent. One way women are oppressively 
situated by time is through turning to the home to gain a sense of false-freedom Beauvoir 
depicts housework as the ability to “realize herself as an activity” (SS 471). Acquainting 
the housework with the interminable experience of Sisyphus or as an “endlessly recurrent 
fatigue in battle that never leads to victory,” Beauvoir posits continual repetition as “the 
sad futility of an activity the stubbornly resists time” (SS 475). Time does not affect the 
woman in the same integrated somatic way, it determines situation. “Washing, ironing, 
sweeping, routing our tufts of dusting in the dark places behind the wardrobe…for in one 
moment time is created and destroyed: the housewife only grasps the negative aspects of 
it” (SS 476). 
 The experience of situated time in housework is imbricated with questions of 
repetition and structure. For some Beauvoir scholars, such a Penelope Deutscher, equate 
these structural experiences of oppression with the experience of a transcendent self being 
reduced to immanence. Deutscher writes,  
in identifying women, like all humans, with transcendence, the question 
arises of how that transcendence is to be located in forms of repetition as 
they are lived by women, as compared to its expression in the progressive 






Applying this question of repetitive housework Deutscher maintains that Beauvoir 
articulates multiple forms of repetitive structural oppression. In a Marxian analysis, 
“Women- particularly those who are not paid workers—seem to be considered by Beauvoir 
“out of time”: not part of a historical or dialectical process.”
123
 
 I will argue that in Beauvoir’s account of situated housework and the structural 
conditions of repetition, she does not posit the question of freedom and free time solely in 
terms of transcendent self. By contrast my reading of women’s lived situation is enhanced 
by an account of an affective and somatic time in Beauvoir. The question of which bodies 
are free and under what conditions is both a question of situation and material, of both 
position and affect. In doing so, the concept of freedom being accessible to the self only 
through transcending structural conditions is problematized by are reading of the 
micropolitical bodily affects that Beauvoir divulges in her recitation of housework.  
Affective Somatic Time in Beauvoir’s Second Sex 
Beauvoir also considers time’s active and affective role on bodies. Beyond 
denoting situation, time is presented as an active component of sensation and perception. 
Here we may think in terms of Connolly’s language, that time is not only part of narrative, 
but also a fluid, affective, and active technique in becoming or the micropolitical 
phenomenon which beckons answering questions more existentially. Although Beauvoir 
places her examination of housework within the Lived Experience Volume and more 
specifically in the category of “Situation,” caveats of a somatic and affective interaction 
with time are presented within Beauvoir’s description. Beauvoir creates a perceptive and 
sensory experience of time that is commensurate with Connolly’s conception of technique 
in filmic micropolitics. For example, in the immanent moments of time experienced as 
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interruption; Beauvoir clearly identifies affective anxiety, hope, despondence, rage, 
routinization, and objectification (SS 477). She is attune to how specific experiences of 
loss time, timeless, and the overwhelming affect of multiple temporalities operate 
anatomically as visceral and sensory as well as psychologically (read as operating on the 
brain) and pathologically. These moments are best understood as how time operates on the 
body. They are in keeping with the somatic, felt as action-oriented perception.  
Acknowledging the confinement of women to the home as affecting boredom in 
homemakers, Beauvoir acknowledges how and excess of time evolves into an investment 
in the home as time-consuming project and edifying meaning.
124
  The home Beauvoir 
writes, becomes “her earthly lot, the expression of social worth, and her intimate truth. 
Because she does nothing, she avidly seek herself in what she has” (SS 471). The 
investment of her time into specific home projects is imbued with sensory and affective 
dimensions. In attempts to compensate for other sorts of somatic pleasures, Beauvoir notes 
that housework produces sensorial pleasure in women. “In A la recherché de Marie 
(Marie), Madeleine Bourdouxhe describes her heroine’s pleasure in spreading cleaing 
paste on her stove. In her fingertips she feels the freedom and power that the brilliant 
image from scrubbed cast iron reflects back to her” (SS 472).  
Beauvoir’s most compelling citation of affective somatic time is manifest in her 
reading of sensations of uncleanliness. Having infixed pride and control into time spent on 
housework “every moment [that] threatens her with more thankless work” must be actively 
rejected. It form is manifest, not entirely form of an existential retraction from being. Its 
affects are felt on the body both corporeally and mentally. It changes perceptual 
orientations and associations, “a child’s somersault is a tear to sew up” (SS 476). 
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Anatomical transitions occur, “her eyes sharpen, her face looks preoccupied and serious, 
always on guard; she protects herself through prudence and avarice” (SS 476). Dust poses 
a material threat to her time and affects changes in action, “in the provinces, some 
bourgeois women have been known to but on white gloves to make sure no invisible dust 
remains on the furniture” (SS 477).  
Technique and Narrative: Blending Embodied Time and Somatic Time Towards 
Theory of Freedom 
 
Investigating both of the somatic and the situated body, Beauvoir’s theorization 
housework encapsulates both transcendent and immanent components of time—it is at 
once incidental technique and a construct made up of the actions of subjective individuals. 
By reading bodily time as an amalgamation of technique and narrative, she offers an 
alternative to rational disembodied theories of time without reducing our own subjective 
capacities to interact with time.
125
 Bringing together Beauvoir’s two reading of bodily time 
encourages a new reading of the synthesis of narrative and technique, one that does not 
admonish the role of narrative but examines its active role in formulating conceptions of 
time. Beauvoir’s situated time exculpates an account of time experienced narratively, while 
somatic time calls our attention to the affective, preconscious, and nonlinear interruptions 
that sensorially and viscerally orient us.   
Integrating the two readings of body, Beauvoir often intimates the complex 
entangling of structure, situation, and affect in concocting narrative’s of time. Beauvoir 
distances herself from Connolly in the sense that examining narrative does not amount to 
an attempt to violate an untouchable or sacrosanct in the immanent naturalism evoked in 
Connolly’s Bergson, Nietzsche, Lucretius, and Delueze.
126
  Beauvoir’s housework chapter 
attends to this fact by examining how affects of timelessness or anxiety are experienced in 
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relationship to the body and consequently produces new narrative accounts of situation. All 
the while, these experiences are structured around political questions of structure that do 
not admonish the interruptive, affective, sensory experiences of time but occur in 
contingent fluid relationship to them. Through her emphasis on situation, Beauvoir 
prompts us to think about time as a different sort of becoming: one that is centrally located 
within the confines of individuals and their lived realities. Beauvoir distances herself from 
Connolly in the sense that her time is not untouchable or sacrosanct in the immanent 
naturalism evoked in Connolly’s Bergson, Nietzsche, Lucretius, and Delueze.
127
   
Beauvoir’s analysis is particularly useful is establishing a relationship between time 
and freedom. By drawing attention to the central relationship between bodies and time, she 
is able to detail ways in which time can be used to reproduce oppression and deny 
freedom. Here, I think Beauvoir makes the most promising contribution to theorizing our 
micropolitical experiences in the ways that we affirm and violate freedom through our 
diverse and multifarious relations with time. At the heart of Connolly and Beauvoir’s 
arguments is skepticism about rationalism as a model to guide our interactions with time. 
Both reject that interacting with time through ascribing it rational import can result in 
freedom. Time operates in Beauvoir’s work as an ambiguous component of the world. We 
perceive and act in relation to time as both totality (narrative) and as a radical existential 
immanence (affective technique). While Connolly’s interpretation precipitates our thinking 
about the visceral techniques and shifted ontological situations of freedom as becoming, it 
may adversely encourage us to think about time as immanent, incidental, and beyond 
human ascription. In opposition to this, Beauvoir manages to present time as a partially 
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immanent affective technique while still clarifying the human relationship to time as 
impactful for how we may affirm and violate the freedom of others and ourselves.  
Ackerman’s Jeanne Dielman and Beauvoir’s Second Sex  
 Reading corporeal time in Beauvoir’s Second Sex provides us with an embodied 
time as a lens for analyzing filmic technique, in so far as it offers a venue to think about 
the synthesis of somatic and situational time. Most importantly for our thinking about the 
nexus between Beauvoir’s time and film is how we may think about time as a technique 
that informs micropolitical experience. Beauvoir’s time operates as a technique because it 
analyzes the impossibility of experiencing time and the very materialized and embodied 
realities of micropolitics. Throughout The Second Sex, Beauvoir reminds us the woman’s 
destiny is negotiated by time in ways that reduce her to pure immanence, or to an other. 
Part of her argument is that women are denied the moments of synthesis or ambiguity that 
are the ability to establish oneself as both immanence and transcendence. Beauvoir 
explains how domestic quotidian routines are designed to provide these compounded 
moments to men, but only by ascribing women to pure immanence: 
Woman is destined to maintain the species and care for the home, which is 
to say, to immanence. In truth, all human existence is transcendence and 
immanence at the same time; to go beyond itself, it must maintain itself; to 
thrust itself toward the future, it must integrate the past into self; and while 
relating to others, it must confirm itself. These two moments are implied in 
every living moment: for man, marriage provides the perfect synthesis of 
them: in his work and political life, he finds change and progress: he 
experiences his dispersion through time and the universe; and when he tires 
of this wandering, he establishes a home, he settles down, anchors himself 
in the world (SS 443)  
 
Here, Beauvoir posits that our experiences are limited by a time that is constructed, by a 
time women are unable to control. Beauvoir’s ontological considerations on time take on a 
decidedly political character because of their ability to identify oppression, in this case that 
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of women homemakers, as situational and embedded within a time and space and as 
affective, sensorial, and perceptory.  
 Chantal Ackerman’s Jeanne Dielman, 23 quai du commerce, 1080 Bruxelles 
profiles a single mother and homemaker, Jeanne Dielman, who must attend to the 
traditional functions demanded by motherhood. The film’s hyperrealist style conveys the 
extended and tedious nature of housework and childcare. The housework is conducted in 
excessive and overstated routine. For the most part, Dielman’s routine is familiar, if not 
innate, to the viewer; the unexpected component of Dielman’s routine comes in the form of 
her once a week occupation as a prostitute to male client. Ackerman’s film, much like 
Beauvoir’s Second Sex, was instantly valorized for it feminist ideals and statements. 
Congruous with the Second Sex, the film has received positively a variety of interpretations 
and canonization. Also analogous, to the Beauvoir’s magnum opus, it has been ascribed 
what seems like a hegemonically imposed meaning and a reputation that tends to eclipse 
other intentions animate in the work.
128
  
Reading film on the level of narrative, moral, and narrative representation, as is 
traditionally done in political theory’s use of film, Ackerman’s plot confirms Beauvoir’s 
theories of time as a denial of situated freedom. Arguments can easily be rendered that 
Ackerman’s character manifests many of the symptoms, pathologies, and neurosis of a 
mother and homemaker identified by Beauvoir. Her obsession with meticulous cleaning, 
her boredom, her alienation to and fetishization of particular household objects, her 
inability to recuperate from the loss of her husband, and her investment in her son as an 
affirmation of subject are all apparent in the film’s plot. Read on the level of plot, the film 
seems to epitomize Beauvoir’s ethical disposition. Emily Wang plainly notes, “The trouble 
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with writing about Jeanne Dielman, and why such a large body of critical work has 
accured around it, is that is so easy to impute a particular politics to it through a 
structuralist-feminist lens.”
129
 Ackerman rejects this reading of the film as reductionist.  In 
one interview she responded to the claim that her film makes a contained structural 
statement about women’s situation by saying,  “To name something is a way to possess 
it. I think it makes the film smaller. And O.K., maybe they are right, but they are never 
right enough.”130 
Beauvoir and Ackerman both reject a systematized interpretation of their project. 
Recognizing the congruency between Ackerman’s rejection of her film as solely evincing a 
structural claim about women’s situation and Beauvoir’s own interpretive structural 
limitations, I suggest that placing Beauvoir’s reading corporeal time is helpful towards 
understanding the synthesized role of narrative and technique in Ackerman’s Jean 
Dielman. Through Beauvoir’s reading of time as dually somatic and situational an 
affective and structural politics is discernable in Ackerman’s film. By first considering the 
somatic experience of time in Beauvoir’s work, I’ll argue that Ackerman by way of her 
structralist filmmaking and heightened attention to technique reads technical and narrative 
time in a synthesized manner consistent with Beauvoir. 
131
  
Like Beauvoir, Ackerman’s film is posited in tense relation to narrative or other 
systematizing modes of interpretation. Reflecting on her experiences viewing the avant-
garde film of structuralist filmmaker Michael Snow, Ackerman acknowledged that she felt 
as affected by the non-narrative sequences of Snow’s (1971) La Region Central as much as 
any of the plot driven auteur film of Godard. Locating this experience on an affective 
register Ackerman writes, “I didn’t need any story to feel…you didn’t need stories to feel 
suspense.”
132
 By the time Ackerman returns to Paris to write the script for Jeanne Dielman 
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she tentatively returns to the narrative style. 
133
 She writes in the spirit of the Nouveau 
roman, a genre apprehensive of the films conventional features like narrative, plot, and 
arc.
134
 Ackmerman’s choice to expose the affective and technical in concert with the 
narrative evinces a Beauvoirian claim about somatic and situated bodies.
135
  Film theorist 
Ivone Margulies contends that time operates as a “structural strategy” to expose gendered 
oppression through a “series of real-time, nondramatic shots.”
136
 
 Time in Jeanne Dielman operates as visual technique. The films highly visual and 
sensory exploration of time accomplishes precisely what Connolly details as technique—it 
operates on our senses to expose the monotony of domestic structural economies and 
gendered oppression. In fact, Dielman’s use of particular technical elements forces us 
toward readerly fatigue. The fixed camera, indicative of structuralist filmmaking focuses 
us Dielman’s mundane life. The shots of Dielman from behind are unexciting, when 
Dielman is facing the stove or skin she becomes a literal material and corporeal barrier to 
the action. The closet like assemblage hallways, small doors, passages, and cluttered 
furniture that compose the film’s mis-en-scene, obfuscate anything attention grabbing or 
entertaining in the background shots. Furthermore, we may be conditioned by the 
repetitive technique in Ackerman to preempt and anticipate the camera. “On the second 
day, as she stands in her kitchen wearing her apron and hears the doorbell” writes Marsha 
Kinder, “we recognize that this is an exact repition of the opening scene. She moves at the 
same pace; and predictably the camera is in the same position.”
137
  Margulies exposition of 
Ackmerman, perhaps aptly titled as Nothing Ever Happens, she writes, “The fixed focus 
and extended duration of Akerman’s shots create a relatively stable texture that allows one 
to perceive the disjunctions between body and character, speech an script. The 
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Much like Beauvoir, Ackerman’s structuralist film making blurs the rigorous line 
drawn by Connolly between affect and technique, explicating examples of affective 
boredom as advanced by the films pacing, plot, and acting simultaneously. Viewing the 
film produces a somatic experience of time for both the viewer and Dielman. Margulies 
notes that Ackerman’s drawn-out pacing induces a familiar fatigue on its viewers. 
Margulies notes,  
Akerman’s film simultaneously allows viewers to experience the materiality 
of cinema, its literal duration, and gives concrete meaning to a woman’s 
work. We watch, for three hours and twenty-one minutes, as Jeanne cooks, 
takes a bath, has dinner with her adolescent son, shops for groceries, and 
looks for a missing button. Each gesture and sound becomes imprinted in 
our mind, and as we are lulled by familiar rhythms and expected behavior, 







Jeanne Dielman (1975): Jeanne Dielman prepares potatoes for son’s meal (l) and Jeanne Dielman watches 
neighbor’s infant son (r) 
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Dielman experiences the immediate and somatic experience of boredom and fatigue as 
well. In some instances this affective boredom is brought on narratively by sequences not 
dominated by a chore. When not preoccupied knitting sweaters, making beds, combing her 
hair, or preparing food, Dielman frequently shown slumping down in her living room chair 
or looking impassively while eating lunch in the kitchen.   
 
Time is important to the narrative of the film. Much of the film is imbued with 
Dielman’s relationship to routine and time management. Tension builds throughout the 
film, as Dielman is unable to exercise complete sovereignty over her routine. As viewers 
we are invited to Dielman’s anxiety over disruptions in the rhythms and routines of 
housework: lost buttons, imperfect meals, and an inconsolable infant. Dielman’s psychosis 
peaks at the end of the film when she experiences orgasm for the first time and in 
immediate aftermath stabs her client with a pair of scissors. One way in which this scene 
may be read is that the stabbing is the culmination of anxiety experienced by Dielman as a 
result of managing her routine and rhythm. Beauvoir emphasizes that women often seek to 




. Beauvoir is also acutely attuned to the time sensitive nature of domestic 
labor:  
Done every day, this work becomes monotonous and mechanical; it is laden 
with waiting: waiting for the water to boil, for the roast to be cooked just 
right, for the laundry to dry; even if different tasks are well organized, there 
are long moments of passivity and emptiness; most of the time, they are 
accomplished in boredom; between present life and the life for tomorrow, 
they are but an inessential intermediary (Beauvoir 480)  
 
Dielman’s inability to control her routine and rhythm is associated with an attempt to posit 
herself beyond the immanence of time. Dielman acts in bad faith by trying to ascribe time 
a rational and purely constructed meaning; she does this by investing in the predictability 
of her routine.  
Conclusion  
 Beauvoir’s embodied and ambiguous time provides a useful synthesis of the 
narrative and technical components of time in cinema. By locating her analysis of time 
within the realm of situation and somatics, Beauvoir is able to expose the embodied 
components of time that give it the becoming aspects appraised by Connolly. As we have 
seen, Beauvoir’s use of time as a technical strategy in the Second Sex is useful for 
developing the relationship between experience and micropolitics. Beauvoir is a useful 
resource to film and political theory and in keeping with the tradition of thinkers who aim 
to expose the limits of rationalism for understanding opaque concepts such as time. 
However, Beauvoir offers a distinctive interpretation where the agent is not lost or eroded 
to the larger composition of incidences and interrupt, rather she embraces interruption as 
somatic and situated experience. Foremost, Beauvoir’s ambiguous time provides us with a 
lens to understand how we interact on a micropolitical level with time. By establishing 
time as an affective ambiguity, she is able to articulate the ways in which individuals 
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violate and affirm freedom through our dealings with time. In Ackerman’s Jeanne 
Dielman, time can best be understood through Beauvoir’s framework because it attends to 
the immutable immanent aspect of time while still presenting individuals as responsive and 

















5| Beauvoir Minds Neuropolitics 
“Rejecting any a priori doctrine, any implausible theory, we find ourselves before a fact 
that has neither ontological not empirical basis and whose impact cannot a priori be 
understood. By examining it in its concrete reality, we can hope to extract its significance: 
thus perhaps the content of the word “female” will come to light.”- Simone de Beauvoir, 
“Biological Data,” The Second Sex  
 
Are Beauvoir and Scientific Method Inimical?  
 
At first, Beauvoir may seem a logical collaborator with contemporary critics of the 
neurocognitive turn in political theory. When we think about the application and 
presentation of science in Beauvoir’s we are not initially flooded approbatory images. Take 
for example her indignation of the scientist as a denier of ambiguous freedom in her 
seminal Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir writes, “For a scientist who would aspire to know 
everything about a phenomenon would dissolve it within the totality.”
140
 In addition, 
scientists of all sorts including but not limited to physicians, psychoanalysts, chemists, 
biologists, and physiologists, receive caviling analysis in Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Often, 
they are portrayed as the unapologetic accomplices of universalism, systematization, and 
doctrines. With all this in mind, Beauvoir may be an unlikely choice to explain the political 
merit of cognitive and neurological in theorizing the body. 
 Furthermore, the propensity in Beauvoir’s work for her to challenge scientific 
research’s claim to objectivity implies that she may concur with critics of neurological 
influenced affect theory. Beauvoir exhibits skepticism throughout her work that scientific 
methods create the purely objective outcomes they have come to extol in their modern 
representations. Moreover she is sensitive to the ways in which this narrative of pure 
objectivity is manufactured through a problematic realist philosophical method. She is 
quick to suggest the inherent subjective biases and structural prejudices that doctor the 
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objectivity of fact and myth alike. To the claim that science’s objectivity provides a critical 
distance from worldly structure and prejudices, Beauvoir establishes the clearly political 
proportions of scientific discourse by disclosing their involvement in denying forms of 
freedom and agency. Nowhere is this account more prominent than in Beauvoir’s 
“Biological Data” chapter of the Second Sex. Located under the “Destiny” section, perhaps 
ironically, Beauvoir dismantles the coupling of patriarchal essentialist narrative from 
biological data in what can be at times a disoriented blend of philosophy of science, inter-
specieal analysis, ecological research, and rhetorical deconstruction of political thinkers, 
physiologists, and cognitive scientists alike. Her perfunctory political aim is to dispel the 
determinism that arises from scientific discourse on ‘women’s nature’—exposing how 
superficially objective science is inculcated in the reproduction of patriarchal narrative and 
the refutation of women’s ambiguity and freedom. The claims of realism animate in 
science are in reality attempts to “find a justification in biology” for a “disquieting hostility 
women triggers” in men (SS 21).  
At the same time, as this thesis suggests, Beauvoir herself is open to the tenants of 
an empirical methodology that stresses immediacy, desystematized experience, action-
oriented perception, sensorial politics, and somatically aligned bodies. A Bernardian and 
Bergsonian Beauvoir who recognized the ontological and political significance of an 
action-oriented methodological experimentation, which precedes a metaphysical 
description, is also recognizable, albeit less commented on, in “Biological Data”. While 
claiming to take no stance “proposing a philosophy of life or to take sides too hastily in the 
quarrel between finalism and mechanism, ” Beauvoir notes that contemporary science is 
not in and of itself deterministic, rather it is the coupling premade observation, idea, or 
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thought that leads to oppressive politics of pseudo-objective scientific method—“it is 
noteworthy that physiologists all use a more of less finalistic language merely because the 
ascribe meaning to vital phenomena” (SS 26).  
Although a reading where Beauvoir totally abates the claims of biological fact and 
method is possible, I will argue that more accurately, Beauvoir educes a critique of a 
philosophy of science that claims objectivity whilst imposing a priori idea/knowledge onto 
an experimentation. This claim echoes her Bergsonian evaluation of scientific 
experimentation as perceptory action and their mutual critique of the epistolary aims of 
perception as inimical to theorizing an active and somatic body. Beauvoir does not 
abandon the vocabulary but employs it through adapted methodological approach 
congruent with the experimental method in Bernard. Much like her positive evaluation of 
Bernard, Beauvoir is not hostile to science but contrarily sees creative possibility in 
experimentation when undertaken with sensitivity to the aforementioned somatic concepts. 
For that reason, Beauvoir does not discard science from her methodological register. By 
contrast, she extrapolates its creative and positive potential as an interpretive apparatus to 
dismantle totalizing values, ideas, and practices. Beauvoir explains her decision to “use 
their [scientists] vocabulary,” by celebrating the interpretive possibilities of science 
undertaken, “without coming to any conclusion about life and consciousness,”  whence 
undertaken as such, Beauvoir writes, “we can affirm that any living fact indicates 
transcendence, and that a project is in the making in every function” (SS 26). Consistent 
with her Bernardian experimental skepticism she follows this sentence by stating the 
empirical vitalism of these “descriptions do not suggest more than this” (SS 26).  
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Finally, scientists are not as clearly admonished in Beauvoir’s corpus as their 
reputation implies. While much work has been done establishing the philosophical and 
political implications of Beauvoir’s veneration of the artist’s aesthetic contributions, the 
role of the scientist as a creator and arbiter of a sensory and aesthetic politics is both 
seldom and incomplete. However, in much of Beauvoir’s work the scientist is represented 
with the same venerable potential for creative, affective, and somatic politics. The 
concluding portion of Beauvoir’s account of ambiguity, “The Positive Aspects of 
Ambiguity,” provides a positivist account of how art is enhance freedom through 
acknowledging its own limitations and intents.
141
 Much scholarship has been written to this 
end, which joins her writing on the ethical propensities of the artist with her own aesthetic 
criticism and literature. This is at the expense of the account vibrant philosophy of science 
its own creative potentia.  
While Beauvoir devotes more philosophical attention to the ethical capaciousness 
of the material artist (Cezanne, Ponge, Barres, and Giotto to name a few), her account is 
also furnished with a substantial account of the scientific method as imbued with the 
potential to recognize ambiguity and enhance freedom. Foremost, Beauvoir recognizes the 
shared action-oriented experiential aim in science and art that make them, when 
undertaken in the character of ambiguity, able to wage a critique of knowledge as an end 
and to operate under an experiential lens. Beauvoir writes,  
Science, technics, art, and philosophy are indefinite conquests of existence 
over being; it is by assuming themselves as such that they take on their 
genuine aspect; it is in the light of this assumption that the word progress 
finds its veridical meaning. It is not a matter of approaching a fixed limit: 
absolute Knowledge or the happiness of man or the perfection of beauty; all 
human effort would then be doomed to failure, for with each step forward 
the horizon recedes a step; for man it is a matter of pursuing the expansion 
of his existence and of retrieving this very effort as an absolute. 
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Important for Beauvoir’s ambiguous philosophical method, science does not portend to 
establish universals, but attends to the world’s concrete facticity and onto-political 
contingencies.
142
 Intrigued by the ability to draw a comparison between a work of art and a 
scientific theory, Beauvoir remarks on their mutual capacity to create through 
acknowledging the limits and contingencies of lived experience, Beauvoir argues …  
But likewise just as the physicist finds it profitable to reflect on the 
conditions of scientific invention and the artist on those of artistic creation 
without expecting any ready-made solutions to come from these reflections, 
it is useful for the man of action to find out under what conditions his 
undertakings are valid. We are going to see that on this basis new 
perspectives are disclosed (EA 74).  
 
Beauvoir scholars are right to acknowledge a certain antipathy towards science, however, I 
argue this critique is slightly dislocated. It is true that Beauvoir recognizes and critiques 
scientific method for systematizing, claiming false objectivity, and denying its situation in 
a subjective and contingent universe. However, aim to show that this is only in attempt to 
attempt to salvage its creative ambiguous capacity. Beauvoir establishes the premise of 
ethics as an ambiguous entity by pointing to science and art’s capacity to create without 
producing ‘recipes’ of ready-made values and ethics. “Ethics does not furnish recipes any 
more than do science and art. One can merely propose methods” (EA). In science, 
Beauvoir writes, “the fundamental problem is to make the idea adequate to its content and 
the law adequate to the facts; the logician finds that in the case where the pressure of the 
given fact bursts the concept which serves to comprehend it, one is obliged to invent 
another concept; but he can not define a priori the moment of invention, still less foresee 
it” (EA 75). Beauvoir is quick to point out that science fails to live up to its ambiguous 
potential when it defies ambiguity to establish objective truths.  
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Science condemns itself to failure when, yielding to the infatuation of the 
serious, it aspires to attain being, to contain it, and to possess it; but it finds 
its truth if it considers itself as a free engagement of thought in the given, 
aiming, at each discovery, not at fusion with the thing, but at the possibility 
of new discoveries; what the mind then projects is the concrete 
accomplishment of its freedom. The attempt is sometimes made to find an 
objective justification of science in technics (EA 74). 
 
Because both science and art are united by experience, observation, and the project of 
creation they fall under the same category of freedom enhancing enterprises.  
It is on this point of methodological sympathy between the aesthetic political 
potential of the scientific experimental method in Beauvoir that I undertake my exploration 
of the contemporary neurocognitive political turn. Beauvoir’s own inconstant relationship 
to scientific research as a source of theoretical fodder finds its compliment in the 
contemporary debates surrounding what Linda Zerilli calls “the turn toward the ontology 
of affect and neuroscience… in political theory.”
143
 With the notion in mind that science, 
when conducted with the intent to understand the transcendence of ontological things, 
discloses a creative and freedom enhancing politics, I turn to contemporary debates 
surrounding the benefits of scientism on devising theories of the body and body politics. At 
the lacuna between critics and supporters of this affective ontological political theory, I 
interject Beauvoir as a moderator whose own apprehensive but ultimately sympathetic 
view of scientism provides a somatic theory of bodies responsive to observations that this 
discourse is potentially deterministic and apolitical.  
Taking up this analysis, I pose a rejoinder to theorists who have suggested that 
Beauvoir is incompatible with the neurocognitive scientism of contemporary political 
theories, as well as those who suggest that Beauvoir would reject these methods for their 
determinism, systematization, and intellectual reductionism. Sonia Kruks argues that on 
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the question of judgment neuroscientific political theory and Beauvoir diverge, because the 
former reduces the experience of judgment to a deterministic set of non-conscious 
functions. Kruks writes,  
There is another strand of recent scholarship that also challenges 
rationalist accounts of judgment. Beauvoir’s insistent rejection of mind-
body dualism and her argument that subjectivity is always embodied 
might, at first sight, seem to anticipate recent studies that draw on 
neuroscience in order to account for judgment primarily in 
nonconscious terms. However, much of this literature tends toward a 




Kruks presents Beauvoir as more open to a theory of deliberative judgment, which 
eschews determinism by accounting for the radically singular agentic subject. By contrast, 
the neuroscientific notion of the ‘self’ “is conceived here as but a particular composite of 
neural pathways, wherein prior experiences have become encoded in “brain maps” that, in 
turn, structure our future preconscious responses.”
145
 Because Beauvoir is such a vehement 
critique of deterministic ontologies, Kruks reasons that Beauvoir would not endorse the 
this account of judgment. The self, for Beauvoir, is not “a collection of “brain maps” laid 
down in synaptic pathways, as Thiele and others suggest.”
146
 Kruks returns to a reading of 
the embodied subject to reject the anatomical and materially reductionist reading proffered 
by Theile,  
To return to Beauvoir’s example in The Mandarins, the disagreements 
between Dureuilh and Henri are in no way reducible to their differing 
“brain maps.” Rather, we have to say, with Beauvoir, that the entire 
existence of each—each an embodied subject, each ambiguously free and 




Kruks returns things to the level of embodiment to offer a retort to what she feels is affect 
theory’s over materialization of experience to the level of incidental. 
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Operating under the belief that the recent cognitive-neurological turn in political 
theory has benefited holistic thinking about the political body, this chapter considers what 
contributions, both positive and critical, Simone de Beauvoir holds for contemporary 
debates on the role of cogno-neuropolitical theories of the body. Evaluating both the merits 
and critiques of this discourse, I argue that Beauvoir’s somatic body offers something to 
both the contingents of patrons and critics. Addressing the claims made by critics of 
affective neurocognitive approaches that cognitive political theory is deterministic, 
apolitical, and methodologically lax, I explore how Beauvoir’s commitment to political 
freedom separates her from the battery of theorists who are subject to such a critique. 
Using her account of situated freedom, I demonstrate that Beauvoirian embodiment 
addresses many of the concerns raised by critics of the neurocognitive approach.  
To see where Beauvoir makes her most critical intervention in the neurocognitive 
theoretical study of bodies some familiarity with the already existing literature of its 
proponents and objectors. The first portion of this chapter explores the benefits of turning 
to neurological research for theorizing a somatic body. Engaging in some contemporary 
reception studies, the second portion of this paper examines the fallibility of presenting 
bodies as political in the neurocognitive approach. Drawing from responses Linda Zerilli, 
Ruth Leys, John Gunnell, and Sharon Krause to the neurocognitive valuation of the body 
as deterministic, apolitical, and methodologically lax, I use the chasm created by their 
criticism to explore in the third section how Beauvoir’s methodological assessment of 
scientism excavated in the second chapter allows for a somatic body advertent to political 
conditions such as freedom, contingency, and action. By mobilizing a somatic reading of 
bodies in Beauvoir’s “Biological Data” chapter of I show a somatic body is discernable 
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through scientific method that can still attend to first order political dilemmas of 
embodiment, freedom, and situation. 
Somatics and the Neurocognitive Approach to Political Theory  
 The movement to use neurocognitive research as a fabric for political theory 
responds to treatment of the body by other approaches that enforce mind-body dualism.
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Through examining scientific information about our body’s material, anatomical, and 
technical actions we come to understand a new and complex relationship between the two 
categories body and mind dualistically constructed.
149
 When this information confers the 
somatic skepticism that the mind is fully autonomous in its processes of judgment, reason, 
and action, the body and mind as distinct categories are recast in a complex relation that 
stresses immanence, desystematization, and de-hierarchical experience. As advocates of 
this methodology such as William Connolly suggest, analysis of neuroscience experiment 
confers the “radical immanence” of mind-body relations.
150
 Connolly explains,  
mind and body are intrinsically connected, through the experimental 
knowledge and experiential capacities of human beings are not fully 
commensurable. It is through this creative movement back and forth 
among experience, reflection upon it, experimental observation, 
reflexive awareness of such experiments, and the cautious application of 





This approach heightens our attention to the ways in which the mind is susceptible to 
the condition of material immanence. Denying this sort of corporeal facticity holds 
implications for conduct of politics. If we take seriously that lived experience is the 
grounds for politics than ignoring the “neuroscientist’s ability… to establish 
correlations between observed body/brain states and the quality of lived experience,” 
then we obstruct our own ability not only to observe phenomenon but to formulate an 
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understanding of the multiple ways our own experience is categorized and 
constructed.
152
  This is not a call for the embrace of determinism, but rather to acknowledge the bodies corporeal limitations posed by its functional capacities, mechanics, and anatomical facts.  
This is not a call for the embrace of determinism, but rather to acknowledge the 
body’s corporeal limitations posed by its functional capacities, mechanics, and 
anatomical facts. To think the bodies promises and limitations beyond position is to 
acknowledge as John Hibbing puts it that, “biology does not determine human behavior 
but it does touch and shape it. Changeable but inertial biologically-instantiated 
predispositions of defaults affect the probability than an individuals will behave in a 
certain fashion when faced with a certain situation…people’s choices are biologically 
encumbered and mainstream social science has failed to absorb this reality.”
153
 
Contrarily to what we think, an embrace of neuroscience in political theorizing does 
not determine our agentic capacity, but opens the dialogue of bodily movement, 
sensation, and function to think more animatedly and experientially. Suddenly the 
bodies “emergent qualities” are introduces as a grounds for political inquiry and an 
affective component on thinking through pre-existing political questions.
154
 
 Beyond demystifying the primacy of the mind in the history of political thinking as 
an autonomous subjective concept, neurocognitive theory portends to understand how 
these pseudo-immanent body functions affect politics. The indispensible activeness of 
bodies is reinforced by neuro-scientific research.
155
 This weighs most heavily discussions 
of perception as an influence on political actions such as judgment, reason, opinion 
formation, representation, and recognition. Neuroscientific research establishes that these 
perceptory functions, both pre-conscious and consciously undertaken, happen through a 
multitude of neural and corporeal systems.
156
 Broadly understood, this discourse aims at 
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introducing bodily affects into economies of politics. Our body’s anatomical processes are 
always part of our being the world. Even the most basic actions occur through the body’s 
operational movement, sensation, and perception.
157
  Eschewing that these anatomical 
practices are not enmeshed in the political functions of the world or ascribing them 
passivity because they are not undertaken with total subjectivity is neglectful to their 
legitimate influence on lived experience. Through such an understanding of the body as 
animate, the most basic and complex political procedures alike are shown to be inculcated 
and affected by the variety of neurocognitive influences and processes. The body’s most 
fundamental movements play an active role in conditioning and constructing politics even 
though this may occur in ways that fail to register with us on a day to day level. Connolly 
writes, theorist critical of neuropolitical theorizing, “lapse into a reductionism that ignores 




 The political potential of such a bodily orientation is best represented by 
Connolly’s seminal Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed, which is widely considered 
the first book in political theory to adapt and seriously engage with neuroscientific 
research. Connolly’s book posits that the complexities of brian/body relations evince his 
large project of engaging in and with a tradition of political pluralism.
159
 Where 
neuroscience brings to bear a new model of thinking politics is through the various 
components of neurological functioning that help to orient our bodies in the world and 
contribute to our understanding of and participating in politics. Up until this point, 
Connolly suggests, political theory had only paid attention to the highest functions of 
neural activity, giving “singular priority to the highest and conceptually most sophisticated 
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brain nodules in thinking and judgment may encourage those invested in these theories to 
underestimate the importance of body image, unconscious motor memory, and thought-
imbued affect.”
160
 Blending cultural analysis of film, contemporary legal theory, cultural 
theory, scientific research, and texts and essays from canonical and marginal political 
thinkers such as Stuart Hampshire, William James, Lucretius, and Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Connolly shows the neuroscientific research is sustains claims about the body made by 
prior political philosophers and that contemporary scientific experiment when analyzed in 
congress with cultural theory enriches our account of phenomenologically lived bodies.   
Anne Jaap Jacobson and Robyn Bluhm’s Neurofeminism: Issues at the Intersection 
of Feminist Theory and Cognitive Science illustrates that the brains cognitive functions 
play an critical role in animating a mobile and somatic body not just in its individuated 
experience, but also for structural and cultural questions, in this case those concerning 
feminist theorists. Influenced by an approach the weds neuroscienftic research with 
feminist questions about power, oppression, structure, and agency Jaap Jacobson and 
Bluhm portend to show that some of the sex/ gender distinctions that situate sex with the 
domain of biology and gender with culture may be inimical to advancing a feminist 
politics. By denying the intermixed nature of biological practice with cultural, social, and 
political condition, we situate biological fact in an objective role that disregards 
scientism’s embroilment in the world. Additionally, by relegating sex to a biological 
function we render the bodies anatomy to a pre-political state injurious to feminist politics 





Associating biology with sex differences is problematic. Biological 
characteristics are thought to be innate and unchangeable. If this is true, 
then biological differences between men and women must also be innate 
and immutable. So if behavioral differences can be associated with 




With this information in mind the relationship between cognitive functions and biological 
functions that define women’s embodied relationship to the world are complicated. The 
interplay between sex, gender, and biology is more ambiguous open to the politics of 
creative movement, social and cultural construction, and the immanences and 
contingencies of lived experience.
162
 
Determinism in Neurocognitive Political Theory  
 Critics of the neurocognitive turn in political theory point out than the exculpation 
of affect also instantiates an apolitical and deterministic model of bodies (and to larger 
extent knowledge). Suggesting that underwriting politics with a biological framework 
prioritizes the determined ontological conditions of experience and reduces lived 
subjective action to “nonsignifying, nonconscious “intensity” disconnected from the 
subjective, signifying, functional-meaning axis.”
163
 By asserting that a biological realism 
underlies all actions, neurocognitive theory fundamentally advocates a determined view of 
politics. Even what seems contingency, random, and discontinuous is predicated on a 
framework that reduces the political stakes of self, judgment, and freedom. Although 
critiques of affective and neuroscientific approaches to theorizing bodies vary on the 
specifics of argument they are united by a return to the theme of determinism. Claims 
regarding the objectivism, methodological remissness, unconsciousness, or apoliticality all 
to some measure suggest a concern about enabling determinism and thus reducing some 
sort of agentic capacity in the self.  
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Ruth Leys identifies this determinism as a belief in a politics of automation or the 
coupling of action with a theory of neurological determinism. Analyzing Brian Massumi 
and William Connolly’s respective turns to neuroscience to support a theory of affect, Leys 
argues that “affects are “inhuman,” “pre-subjective,” and “visceral" forces and intensities 
that influence our thinking and judgment but are separate from these” these “affects must 
be noncognitive, corporeal processes or states.”
164
 Leys equates this nonconscious turn in 
thinking about political affects with Connolly and Massumi’s choice of reliance on 
neuroscientific research.  For Leys neuroscientific research for the past twenty years has 
been dominated by a belief that “affective processes occur independently of intention or 
meaning.”
165
 Because affective draw from this fountainhead of research their work 
invariably suffers from the same conviction that “our basic emotions do not involve 
cognitions or beliefs about the objects in the world” and are wholly “rapid, 
phylogenetically old, automatic responses of the organism that have evolved for survival 
purposes and lack the cognitive characteristic of the higher-order mental processes.”
166
 
Leys suggest that even if these thinkers such as Connolly intend to articulate a more 
nuanced understanding that incorporates more visceral affects such as taste and ‘higher-
order mental processes’ such as reason under the horizontal roofing of somaticism, their 




 Linda Zerilli expresses a similar concern that transposing neuroscientific research 
onto political will cultivate an objective and determined understanding politics. Zerilli 
expresses concern that “although rightly critical of over rationalist and cognitive models, 
the neurobiological turn casts action and judgment as the mere effects of already primed 
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dispostitions, for which the giving of reasons is little more than window-dressing on what 
was going to happen in any case.”
168
 The work of neuroscientists and biologists such as 
Richard Lewontin, Evan Balaban, Anne Fausto-Sterling, and Evelyn Fox Keller all 
champion a deterministic vision of biological action, even if unintentionally. Zerilli takes 
to this expressly by showing how neurocognitive theorists’ aims to challenge rationalism 
and subsequently endorse a vision of politics premised on a humble acknowledgment of 
biological limitation re-ensconce theoretical method in “a familiar recrimination game of 
scienctism, where the inductive methods of the natural sciences are heralded as the only 
reliable source of factual knowledge and anyone who says otherwise doesn’t know what 
she is talking about (i.e. has no knowledge.”
169
 For Zerilli, the question of determinist 
method and claims of objective knowledge are intimately related to questions of 
determined bodies and conditions of freedom. To this end, Zerilli claims that if we want to 
“refigure the place of the body in political life” we must “contest the excessively 




 If Zerilli is concerned with method as telling for political questions, John Gunnell’s 
critique of cognitive political theory conversely compliments Zerilli’s wariness about 
determinism in scientism by attending to the problems of the method in and of itself. 
Gunnell maintains that the method by which political theorists apply neuroscience is 
determinist, not because the cognitive approach is inherently determinist but, because of 
the “highly selective and conceptual problematical” manner that political theorists apply 
the aforementioned research. 
171
 Gunnell remarks that social scientists that implement this 




 In short, our inadequate comprehension forecasts an insurmountable 
paradox between claiming scientific authority through objectivism and willful 
reductionism. Many of these neurocognitive approaches aim to dismantle mind/body 
dualism, but in confusing the vocabulary of brain and subjective self thinkers such as 
Connolly and Damasio have problematized precisely what they are rebelling against.
173
 
Foremost, if pressed further to adopt the mission and methodology of neuroscientists such 
as Damaasio and Churchland,  Gunnell claims most theorists who disagree with complete 
determinism of their notion of not just brain but self. These disciplinary projects are in 
actuality at fundamental odds—a social scientist that seeks to examine the contingencies of 
social experience “would probably not find the whole meal palatable once they were 
familiar with all the ingredients. Connectionism is a distinctly reductionist position which 




 Leys, Zerilli, and Gunnell mobilize convincing points about the apolitical debility 
of somatic bodies rendered through neuroscientific research.  If we understand agency and 
autonomy to be the central components of political action then a deterministic framework 
of the body’s movements, actions, reactions, and sensations facilities an apolitical notion 
of self. Critiques of affect theory note the limited opportunities for political engagement 
that does not seem automated. Therefore, the body offered up by neuroscience cannot be 
somatic. It entraps the body in the same essentialism that affect theorists chide in more 
ideological views of the body by supplants the limitations that are imposed by an idea of 
the body with the limitations imposed by the bodies materialism.  
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 What sorts of body politics can be rendered through such neuroscience, while still 
heeding attention to the body’s agentic capacity? Responding to the new materialism 
paradigm in political theory, which conceptualizes the agentic possibility of matter, 
including but not limited to anatomical matter, Sharon Krause’s “Bodies in Action: 
Corporeal Agency and Democratic Politics” offers insight into locations where democratic 
politics and material traditions of the body coalesce and enhance each other. Krause argues 
that to combat the ebbing of “personal responsibility that is so crucial to political 
obligation and democratic citizenship” that is possibly capacitated by material discourses 
(one being the neurocognitive turn), political theorists must centralize to role of 
“reflexivity,” both of our notion of self and our conditions in our material, ideological, and 
normative capacities.
175
 To rectify the disruptions of a notion of self, Krause argues we 
need to “recognize the ways that individual agency is corporeal and distributed by also 
make room for responsibility and normativity…we need to sustain the close connection 
between agency and sense of selfhood that is individuated, reflexive, and responsive to 
norms.”
176
 Krause suggests that we treat the neural and marterial processes as part of our 
sense of a non-sovereign, but subjective self. We ought to treat our corporeal “force of 
physical carriage” as evidence of our “creativity of human agency.”
177
 
Neuroscientific Ambiguity: Supporter or Skeptic  
 Where Beauvoir may differ with Krause is in her understanding of how scientific 
discourses operate. Beauvoir does not synthesize the contributions of science with 
procedural political vocabulary to authorize scientific research’s aptness to theorize 
political bodies. Where Krause seeks to understand the research coming from neuroscience 
as promising when understood through political terminology, framework, and practice of 
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subjective reflexivity and agency, Beauvoir stations political theories of the body within 
the research itself. Instead of transposing scientific research onto political theory, she 
offers us a new and unusual lens, which when employed, alters the ways by which we 
interpret scientific intent and research. By changing our exegetical relationship to the work 
itself, Beauvoir is able to account for the aporetical limitations and drawbacks of the 
neurocognitive body. As we had established in chapter two, Beauvoir’s theorization of 
scientific experimentation stresses experience, doubt, perception, and hesitancy towards 
knowledge as an end. Like Bernard and Bergson, she does not seek to place a metaphysical 
framework onto experimentation.   
Thus, it should be said that Beauvoir’s ‘lens’ by which to understand science is not 
as concrete and universal formula, thesis, or theory of science. Beauvoir’s understanding of 
scientism is best understood as a modification to the methods, strategies, approaches, and 
analytical skills in our toolbox. Replacing, revising, and disregarding particular tools instill 
scientific research with new aims and questions. Using the “Biological Data” chapter of 
The Second Sex, I aim to show that Beauvoir provides a framework to understand the role 
of political bodies that incorporates the criteria and tenets of neurocognitive bodies whilst 
remaining committed to first order political concerns of freedom.  
First, I will claim that Beauvoir’s proclivity to read scientific data as political 
theory aligns her with contemporary theorists and “the turn toward an ontology of affect 
and neuroscience.”
178
  Because Beauvoir theorizes science and politics in the junction 
between science and culture, nature and society, and idea her location is methodologically 
akin with the contemporary neurocognitive school. Next I will look at how Beauvoir’s 
approach of theorizing at the morass of biology, other societal forces, and ontological 
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realities addresses the problems introduced by critics of affect. Where Beauvoir diverges 
from contemporary theorist using scienctific text as foment for politics is through her 
explicit situation of the question of political freedom. While both Beauvoir and 
contemporary theorists of affect mobilize a creative vision scientific bodies, Beauvoir’s 
account offers a unique rejoinder by locating what seem like ontological concerns with 
questions of bodily political freedom. Lastly, I will inquire about how Beauvoir’s account 
of the body rendered through this method of reading biological data offers a hybrid of the 
animate, vital, and somatic claims rendered by theorists of affect and neuropolitics and 
questions of political structure, idea, and action alleged to be missing in their account by 
critics of affect.  
Foremost, it is important to establish Beauvoir’s opinion on the composition, 
authority, and character of biological data. Beauvoir rejects that scientism is rooted within 
the context of realism and objectivism. Beauvoir recalls the skepticism and “doubt” 
exhibited in her earlier claims about realism in the Bernardian scientific method in the 
“Biological Data” by systematically exposing the construction of scientific facts to fortify 
patriarchal oppression.  Within the first lines of the chapter she dispels that scientism, even 
if analyzing realistic and empirical phenomena manifests in objective data. Beauvoir 
writes,  
he wants to find a justification in biology for this feeling. The word 
“female evokes a saraband of images: an enormous round egg snatching 
and castricating the agile sperm; monstrous and stuffed, the queen termite 
reigning over the servile males; the praying mantis and the spider gorged 
on love, crushing their partners and gobbling them up…man projects all 




Here Beauvoir offers an additional critique of scientism, one wherein, she suggests that 
when science’s end is to establish knowledge it disregards the creative contingencies it 
portends to examine.  Harkening back to Bernard’s preference for experimental method, 
Beauvoir is more concerned with the experience of biology (experience) than the 
verification of hypothesis (knowledge). Elevating this claim to a political claim, Beauvoir 
suggests that knowledge based claims produce essentialist ideologies and narratives, 
which sustain a politics of patriarchy.  
On Beauvoir’s account biological data is never the objective, contained, empirical, 
and abstract universal facts that they are presented as because they are always tangled in 
human interpretation, culture, and the ontological facticities of situation. In her 
justification for utilizing biological data as a text, Beauvoir outright denies the authority of 
data to claim objectivity by debunking its sole ability to substantiate patriarchy.  These 
facts “do not suffice to constitute the basis for a sexual hierarch; they do not explain why 
woman is the Other; they do not condemn her forever to this subjugated role” (SS 44). At 
the same time, ignoring material facticities of experience that can be rendered through 
biological data is another way of denying the conditions of lived experience. By denying 
material and corporeal conditions we abstract and systematize experience at the opposite 
extreme and equally unattractive option to Beauvoir.  
The question for Beauvoir is thus, what can help to make sense of material data 
while eschewing objectivist readings of data? For Beauvoir what settles the question of 
objectivism and abstraction is the incorporation of data into other texts also produced in 
lived situation. To suss out biological data’s implications on lived experience, Beauvoir not 
only treats scientific research as non-objective, but employs a litany of subjective texts to 
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be read in conversation with data. By demanding that data be read as in conversation with 
and influenced by contingent and subjective texts such as philosophy, history of science, 
sociology, and cultural theory. Beauvoir’s view of lived data poses a rejoinder to Zerilli’s 
claim that when science is introduced to our phenomenological analysis, ‘we find our 
selves recriminated’ in a “game of scientism, where the inductive methods…are heralded as 
the only reliable source of factual knowledge.”
179
  
In seeking to bring scientific data into conversation with lived experience Beauvoir 
exhibits a posture similar to neurocognitive theorists. Both acknowledge the potential for 
political theory when scientific research is read with and against cultural theory. We are 
inclined to see Beauvoir’s attempts to deconstruct the patriarchal implications of 
physiological studies of Fouillee, Binet, Roger, and Vignes with cultural theory, scientific 
data, and reception studies as aligned with the work of contemporary cultural theorists who 
do not use scientific research to prove their argumentation, but employ it as another text in 
conversation with social and cultural theory.  
Beauvoir’s central claim in the chapter is that data does not translate to political 
subordination; in the impasse between data and women’s oppression cultural, systemic, and 
rhetorical application are at play. It is precisely in this impasse where disciplines, ideas, 
facts, and materials converge that both Beauvoir and contemporary affect theorists using 
neuroscience are conducting the bulk of their work. This is not an epistemological terrain 
but an ontological domain mobilized by questions of lived experience. “Thus we will 
clarify the biological data by examining them in the light of ontological, economic, and 
psychological contexts” (SS 48). This is further evidenced in her broader social framework. 
Beauvoir situates her analysis as diagnostic for politics or what she calls “second nature,” 
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and consequently rejects the seductiveness of abstraction and objectivism. “Society is not a 
species,” Beauvoir explains, “the species realizes itself as existence in a society; it 
transcends itself toward the world and the future; its customs cannot be deduced from 
biology; individuals are never left to their nature; they obey this second nature, that is, 
customs in which the desires and fears that express their ontological attitude are reflected” 
(SS 47). 
In one case study of early twentieth-century physiology, Beauvoir rejects that data 
presented as realistic empirical data is a knowledge claim, but is in fact an observation that 
whence admixed with cultural patriarchy is instantiated into a narrative of female 
inferiority. In the study Beauvoir analyzes male and female brains were weighed to get a 
sense of which brain was larger and to use this data to support an argument of superior 
male intellectual development (SS 45). To further her point about cultural reception, 
Beauvoir argues that this research is worth dissecting despite having been “philosophically 
and scientifically ruined,” because “it still haunts a large number of minds” (SS 45). 
To show this structural assembling of cultural and biology, Beauvoir must examine 
the data. “Materialist scholars have claimed” Beauvoir writes, “to posit the problem in a 
purely static way…they imagined that these measurements directly defined their functional 
ability” (SS 44). Beauvoir uses an amalgamation of methodological argument and cultural 
theory of the body to dissect and divest this merit biological data. To do so she solicits the 
bodily theory of Merleau-Ponty, who claims like Beauvoir, that empiricism is of little 
theoretical value without human interpretation always mired in contingency, randomness, 
and fallibility. Beauvoir writes, “only within a human perspective can the female and male 
be compared in the human species. But the definition of man is that he is a being who is not 
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given, who makes himself what he is. As Merleau-Ponty rightly said, man is not a natural 
species: he is a historical idea.  Woman is not a fixed reality bus a becoming” (SS 45). 
These two concepts undermine the data’s claim to objective authority.  
The pernicious reception scientific research as objective and the subsequent 
application of it to sustain patriarchal ideologies is not reason enough for Beauvoir to 
abandon biological discourse as grounds for political theory. Acknowledging that our 
bodies’ material existence is unavoidable and thus must be engaged with to produce a 
comprehensive account mirrors Connolly’s claim that political theorist must be attentive to 
both the high and low corporeal functions.
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 Beauvoir engages with science to understand 
its place is culturally and politically orienting us. Discussing her application of 
physiological research Beauvoir writes,  
These biological data are of extreme importance: they play an all 
important role and are an essential element of woman’s situation: we will 
be referring to them in all further accounts. Because the body is the 
instrument of our hold on the world, the world appears different to us 
depending on how it is grasped, which explains why we have studied 
these data so deeply; they are one of the keys that enable us to understand 
woman. (SS 44) 
 
Simply put, “physiology cannot ground values; rather, biological data take on those values 
the existent confers on them” (SS 47).  
Like neurocognitive affect theorists Beauvoir exhibits profound interest in the 
body’s functions beyond mental capacity. Her interest in the most basic anatomical and 
corporeal functions and procedures as expository for broader cultural theorization displays 
is analogous with the contemporary project of theorizing animate places in constant and 
contingent relationship to other social, economic, cultural, ontological, and political 
contexts. Beauvoir’s interest theorizing at the intersection creative biology and lived 
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experience, employing philosophy, sociological research, and scientific data, produces an 
animate body agnate to those produced by contemporary turns to neuroscientific research. 
By acknowledging that biological data is not sacrosanct objective knowledge, Beauvoir is 
able to analyze the political implications and politics implicit in data as text.   
As we know from chapter 2, Beauvoir’s Bergsonian strategy of reading science 
stresses perceptory action, and not the end of knowledge. In the biological data chapter, 
Beauvoir is invested in deflating science as an abstract knowledge claim. Beauvoir 
articulates bluntly by saying, “Many of these characteristics are due to woman’s 
subordination to the species” not because of an essential knowledge proven by biology (SS 
46). Beauvoir shows that defenses of biological essentialism cannot be understood as 
objectivist or “factual knowledge,” because they are in conversation or influenced by 
antecedent hypothesizes, desires, philosophies, methods of thought, and socio-cultural 
norms.  It is not the data itself that is deterministic, but the biological data admixed with 
other worldly forces. 
Beauvoir’s investment in using biology whilst resisting Zerilli’s “game of 
scientism” is manifest in her staging of conversation between philosophical argument and 
physiological data. Here methodological choice to place these two disciplines together 
implies the inherent subjectivism of research and a commitment to stressing the fallaility of 
both of these abstract forms of discourse on bringing to bear a model of lived experience. In 
one example where Beauvoir punctures a physiologist’s claim of objectivity she examines 
the scientific claim that heterogenetic gamates produce different sexes by deploying an 
unusual choice secondary literature-- canonical philosophers ranging from Plato, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. “Most philosophies have 
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taken sexual differentiation for granted without trying to explain it,” Beauvoir writes, 




By contrast with critiques of the alloying of biology and political science that claim 
biology is a deterministic discourse, Beauvoir utilizes her non-objectivistic account to 
mobilize an account of biology as fluid, creative, and characterized by contingent and 
random movements. Throughout the chapter Beauvoir employs a language of randomness 
and dystematization.  Her description of biological data is not static, contrarily she utilizes 
the language of violence, movement, and rupture to allay a description of biological 
processes as inert. While Beauvoir describes biological processes as both determined 
“maintenance” and incidental “creation,” both of features are sustained by contingency and 
are therefore never completely determined qua the descriptions afforded to them by critics 
of neurocognitive political theory (SS 38). Disclosing her affinity for the ontological 
approach of Bergson, Beauvoir describes biological process as a “becoming.” Beauvoir 
describes becoming as contestation between maintaining as a “means of denying the 
dispersion of instants, thereby affirming continuity in the course of their outpouring” and 
creating as an “exploding” of “irreducible and separate present within a temporal unit” (SS 
38).  All of these processes are also subject to extreme contingency, assessing the animal 
kingdom, Beauvoir writes that “in nature nothing is ever completely clear” the sex of 
animals is not always clear and physical characteristics such as color and coat are always 
“absolutely contingent” (SS 38) 
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Consistent with her larger political project, Beauvoir establishes a body politics out 
of biological data that centralizes the role of situated political freedom. Beauvoir’s concern 
with the body constructed, narrativized, and mystified by the intersection of biological data 
and cultural reception is related to her attempts to dismantle doctrines that constrain and 
deny women’s freedom. Beauvoir is able through sustained engagement with biological 
data to expose the disparity and complex negotiation between women’s corporeal and 
material limitations, being confined to an animate body, and the suppositions, postulations, 
and hypothesis of scientific data that affect women’s bodies and lived experiences by 
confining them to immanence. 
 Beauvoir notes that the reception of scientific data is acutely related to how 
women experience their own freedom in relation to their bodies. When discussing 
menstruation, a corporeal process, she denotes how the narrative surrounding menstruation 
alienates women from their bodies, not the determined biological process in and of itself. 
Women’s blood, although part of a specific anatomical practice becomes animated by 
social conception and thus, “every month a child is prepared to be born and is aborted in 
the flow of the crimson tide; woman is her body and man is his, but her body is something 
other than her” (SS 41). Beauvoir furthers this point to discuss the biological process as 
constraining to women’s experience not only in terms of practical agency, but also in terms 
of the freedom to exert autonomy over ones body. Female bodies, although biologically 
determined are denied freedom through the ability to alienate and isolate women’s freedom 
to define relationships to their corporeal and anatomical processes.  
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At the end of “Biological Data” Beauvoir attempts to oriented us toward what sort 
of body is rendered through this disquistion. As we have seen, throughout this chapter, the 
Beauvoirian body is multidimensional to say the least. Through the application of 
biological text, women’s bodies are presented somewhat objectively. The female body is 
presented as active and animate material. Beauvoir employs biological fact to also suggest 
that these animate corporeal practices are to some extent, although full of person-to-person 
variance, contrained by particular realisms—“the woman’s body is one of the essentail 
elements that define her” (SS 48). Materialistic corporeality in all of its processes are a 
consititutive ontological principle- on average women’s pelvises are wider (SS 43). Just 
because biological processes are automated does not imbue them with meaning—women 
during gestation will retain fat in the connective tissues in their breasts (SS 43). At the 
same time, we cannot occulde them from our account of what composes lived experience 
or render them as passive because they are automated. Nor can we treat this corporeal 
actions as dissociated from the other factors of lived experience. This would further surve 
to objectivify corporeal movement. 
At the same time, Beauvoir rejects a completely materialistic account of the body. 
“In the position I adopt…that the body is not a thing, it is a situation: it is our grasp on the 
world and the outline for our projects”  (SS 46). She experiences herself as subject despite 
the objective corporeality she is confined to. Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir 
cites a from Phenomenology of Perception, “I am thus my body, at least inasmuch as I 
have experience, and reciprocally, my body is like a natural subject, like a tentative draft of 
my total being.”
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 Woman is body, but is also a subject with a sense of situation acutely 
related to projects of political freedom. Her situation as a subject, not just as a material 
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body, situates her in relation to the world. The political contours of situation centralize 
freedom as a bodily enterprise that supersedes a material body. 
 Beauvoir often presents these two notions of body as not only in conflict with the 
world, but also in conflict with one another. Women’s bodies experience determined 
processes, but they are by no means confined to them. At the same time our sense of self, 
situation, and our “grasp on the world” are mitigated by a set of vital and dynamic 
processes that happen without every registering on the conscious level of self. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir note as the tentative draft of self. The tension between the 
animate processes of the body and its situation are a manifestation of ambiguous conflict 
occurring on the level of the body, subject, and conscious simultaneously. This tension, 
Beauvoir points out becomes inexorably more complicated and political, when we realize 
that these contestations are happening within and through a world of systems, immanences, 
ideas, contingencies, disruptions, and others constantly enduring the same contestation. 
Conclusion  
To see where Beauvoir enhances an account of political freedom and situation 
neurocognitive theories of bodies, I return to the debate between Connolly and Leys. Leys 
analyzes Connolly’s use of neurologist Itzhak Fried’s study of laughter to show that 
Connolly makes an apolitical argument about the state of affect.
183
 Fried’s study concerns 
a sixteen-year-old young woman with epilepsy. At the time, the young woman was 
undergoing an examination before surgery wherein intracranial electrodes were stimulated 
in various parts of her brain. The neurologists found that when a part of the left quadrant of 
the frontal lobe was stimulated the patient laughed, yet was unable to provide a reason for 
the stimulation.
184
 Connolly uses this study to sustain a model of “thought- imbued affects” 
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and other visceral affects that inform our political bodies. However, Leys writes that this 
reading of bodies incites an apolitical and abstracted view of bodily process,  
he is implicitly arguing,” Leys writes, “that far from being a complex, 
social-cognitive phenomenon, laughter as an expression of amusement can 
be conceptualized as an automatic response to stimuli without regard to the 
meaning those stimuli might have for us, since they are intrinsically capable 




Connolly responds to Leys, by acknowledging the interwinedness of emotion produced in 
complex social situation and the visceral affects that happen on a biological level.  
 
Emotion and affect are essentially interinvolved, and neither is entirely 
reducible to the other. (Few theorists in this field accept the straitjacket 
imposed by the analytic/synthetic dichotomy upon which early analytic 
philosophy was founded, and we appreciate how this shift weakens the 
ability to attribute “performative contradictions” to intellectual adversaries.) 
Each layer of the body/brain system enters into bumpy communications 




To Leys claim that acknowledging complexity is not inherently political, Connolly 
assumes a position consistent with that articulate by Beauvoir. Also referencing Merleau-
Ponty, Connolly writes that the political stakes of neuroscientific research such as that 




 Beauvoir helps us to connect Connolly’s claims about cultural implications of 
sensorial processes with Leys unease of abstraction from politics by establishing the 
political stakes of freedom within discourse about cultural and biology. By emphasizing 
that beyond and within discussions about corporeal and anatomical processes are larger 
structural but also ontological inquests about freedom, Beauvoir invests politics into 
biological science. Beauvoir makes explicit the question of situated political freedom in the 
questions raised by Connolly, Jaap Jacobson, and Massumi. In analyzing Fried’s research 
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Beauvoir may ask not only what the research tells about pre-epistolary experiences of 
laughter, but may also focus more explicitly on how this account of affective body 
movement and reaction enriches our cultural understanding of laughter. Perhaps Beauvoir 
would look at the research and ask how the production of such data diversifies our account 
of spontaneous action. Ever concerned with the political implications she may ask how 
experiences that precede rationalism complicate our experience of bodily freedom and the 















6| Afterward   
“Presence in the world vigorously implies the positioning of a body that is both a thing of 
the world and a point of view on this world: but this body need not possess this or that 
particular structure”-Simone de Beauvoir, Second Sex 
 
Having spent much of this thesis observing and considering Beauvoir’s various 
takes on method, either as literary form, affect, or experiment, I will conclude with 
analysis of where my method emanates from and collides with Beauvoir’s. What I have 
attempted to show is that corporeality has been read somewhat hegemonically in 
Beauvoir’s work in defiance of her commitment to a methodological multiplicity and a 
non-hierarchical, non-sovereign, desystemized outlook on experience. Viewing body 
politics in one way, as positionality and situation, as I have suggested, and subsequently 
extending and applying this view to her ouvere operates in defiance of Beauvoir’s 
methodological commitments and anti-universalism. Somaticism, as a theoretical paradigm 
of bodies, matches the contours of Beauvoir’s discursive and sometimes bewilderingly 
nebulous approach. It is precisely that reason that somaticism is best excavated through her 
aesthetic politics, which most prominently exhibit a commitment to desystematization. 
 It should be noted that the Beauvoir presented in this thesis, if presented to 
Beauvoir, might be unrecognizable and certainly susceptible to much of her own 
existential criticism. However it is precisely the mix of creativity and critique that 
approximates Beauvoir’s aesthetic politics. The point of form, method, and 
desystematization of bodies, which I have emphasized in this thesis, is very much indebted 
to Beauvoir’s work and her methodology. By pulling Beauvoir’s diverse texts that range 
from the canonical Second Sex to her less politically-read literary criticism, and even her 
orphic catalog of student essays, public lectures, and writings on the philosophy of science 
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and cognition, I hope to show that a dystematized assembling of fractals is consistent with 
if not Beauvoir’s normative reputation than certainly her political methodology.  
In an attempt to not reconcile but embrace the controversies and contradictions in 
Beauvoir’s bodily legacy, this thesis is an intervention into both history of political thought 
and contemporary political theory. With reverence to the ambiguity of trying to understand 
situation and contingency as simultaneous components of the body but also as a method, I 
have attempted to account for both a Beauvoir concerned with the conditions of situated 
political freedom and one observant of the various immanences and contingencies that 
interrupt a sense of situation. This scholarly approach of paradoxical embrace is a reminder 
of the importance to continue involving and accepting paradox, rupture, and discontinuity 
as vital political ingredients. Although Beauvoir was not invested in theorizing the 
dimensions of a democratic politics, Beauvoir’s embrace of contestable ideas, modes of 
being, and facities, is commensurable with Bonnie Honig’s theory of agonistic politics. 
Honig maintains that interruption, contestation, and conflict are integral components of 
democratic politics. Beauvoir’s embrace of inexorable bodily contestation, namely in the 
form of desystematized powers of the body continually interrupting one another, posits her 
work as a valuable and under-utilized resource to the those who wish understand the 
bodies as mired in agon.
188
  Foremost, Beauvoir’s work shows that corporeality is in 
immutable conflict. 
Finally, this research is motivated by Beauvoir’s insistence that ontology does not 
precede but is enmeshed in politics. To that extent, I believe Beauvoir aesthetic politics as 
a method for somatic inquiry helps us to challenge the relevance of the questions many 
political theorists dread being asked—“this seems more like an ethics than a politics” or “ 
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but what are the political implications of this work.” Beauvoir’s theorization of somatic 
bodies shows how the constant condition of ambiguity and the ambiguities of somaticism 
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